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Dedication 
 
To the people of Palestine and Israel, may they find peace.  
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1 Introduction and Framework Analysis 
 
 
'Those to whom evil is done/Do evil in return.' W.H.Auden 
 
 
Suicide terrorism - the readiness and willingness to die in the process of 
committing an act of terror - is a complex and multi-causal phenomenon, and any 
attempt to explain and understand the motivations and actions of suicide bombers 
and groups must take the different factors involved into account.  Several previous 
studies have been conducted on the topic, but have failed to take into account the 
multiplicity of factors involved. One approach to understanding suicide bombings 
and their motivations is to assume that they are solely the results of strategic choice 
– that is, logical reasoning aimed at achieving rational, strategic goals.   
Another approach is to assume that suicide bombings are not strategic or 
logical at all, but rather the results of individual, psychological factors. However, 
neither of these approaches alone offers an accurate explanation of all suicide 
bombing behaviors and motivations.  In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
particular, the motives for suicide bombings must be examined from an 
organizational perspective. The different Palestinian factions used the individual 
motivations and social support of suicide bombings to further their organizational 
objectives. The objectives ranged from revenge, retaliation, and provocation of 
government concessions and included tactical goals with the intention of disrupting 
peace processes or acquiring political recognition and status. Further organizational 
motivations in the Palestinian case also included inter-factional rivalry for power. 
This research study examines the ways in which the Palestinian suicide 
attacks that were carried out from 1993 to 2008 in the struggle against Israel can be 
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understood as an expression of political strategy, and attempts to show that the use 
of suicide bombings followed logical processes that can be explained at the 
organizational level (which includes the individual and social/cultural levels).   
The study examines why Palestinian groups heavily relied (but not 
exclusively) on ‘suicide bombing’ operations against Israeli targets during the course 
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It then explains why and how this form of resistance was 
adopted by secular resistance groups, such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of 
Fatah, after it had previously been the monopoly of Islamic religious resistance 
groups, namely Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The study then proceeds 
to discuss how the organizations used the individual factors that led Palestinians to 
volunteer for and conduct suicide missions to their advantage. The discussion also 
focuses on why there was strong Palestinian public support for suicide bombing 
operations, and why and how this changed depending on the given political 
situation. The concluding analysis is dedicated to a discussion of how effective these 
suicide attacks were in achieving the political and strategic aims stated by the 
various organizations, and what was ultimately the greatest factor that prevented 
suicide attacks from achieving these aims – was it the Israeli counter-measures or 
Palestinian inter-organizational rivalry? 
Among the many authors of research studies on the phenomenon, Ami 
Pedahzur, deputy chair of the National Security Studies Center at Haifa University, is 
considered an internationally renowned expert on suicide terrorism. I share his belief 
that suicide bombings are a social political phenomenon. Pedahzur emphasizes the 
instrumental nature of suicide terrorism and states that organizations employ this 
tactic when their leaders believe it is an effective instrument in furthering their 
political objectives. Suicide terrorism is not only used to destroy a specific target, but 
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has a broader intention of creating an atmosphere of fear and terror. According to 
Pedahzur, the organizations employing suicide missions are motivated by the belief 
that the collective public anxiety generated by suicide bombings will translate into 
political gains for their organizations.   
Suicide terrorism is not solely an Islamic phenomenon, as was previously 
believed, but has also been employed by secular groups, such as the Palestinian 
Fatah, a nationalist organization. Therefore, religion cannot be treated as an 
independent factor when analyzing the phenomenon of suicide bombings. Pedahzur 
also cautions that “Islam is not the factor that explains suicide terrorism and treating 
it as so is misleading.”1 
Based on the comparative case studies conducted by Pedahzur2, 95 percent 
of suicide attacks worldwide were initiated by organizations (not by individuals). In 
order for a suicide campaign to be successful, it not only requires individuals who 
are willing to perpetrate the attacks, but also a community that supports them. 
Hence, according to Pedahzur, the organizations employing suicide bombing tactics 
have glorified suicide missions, seeking to create “a culture of death” within the 
community. To do so they capitalize on the community’s belief that it is the target of 
discrimination and violence, and the resulting sense of hopelessness and 
powerlessness. The organizations promote suicide bombings as a way the 
community can empower itself. Referring to the false connection between Islam and 
suicide terrorism, Pedahzur explains that “Islam has no culture of death embedded 
                                                 
1 Interview with Ami Pedahzur, February 28, 2005: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1416&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=108487 
2 Pedahzur, Ami; 'Suicide Terrorism' (Polity Press, 2005) 
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in it. Organizations market this culture of death by using religious symbols because it 
helps them achieve their goals.” 3  
In addition to the importance of the organization and the community that 
supports it, the individual level must also be considered within this context. What 
makes the suicide bombers volunteer? Early studies on suicide bombings attempted 
to profile the suicide bomber, yet most studies concluded that suicide bombers 
exhibited no distinct features. Pedahzur suggests that suicide terrorism is a social 
political phenomenon and has very little to do with personal characteristics. He 
argues that there are two main types of individual motivations---crisis and 
commitment, whereby the crisis can be communal or personal. “We see that the 
best predictor is taking revenge. When you see a loved one getting killed, it is a very 
strong predictor…we see this everywhere.”4 A further variable is the social network. 
A number of case studies have shown that close family ties or friendship bonds are 
common among suicide bombers.  
Suicide terrorism has been used effectively in the past. For example, it led to 
the withdrawal of the United States and France from Lebanon in the mid-1980s. 
Suicide bombings will continue to be used by groups when they believe it is an 
effective means to an end. Conversely, suicide bombings will decline in incidence 
when the organizations conclude that it is not effective as an instrument or if its use 
undercuts their political agenda.  
                                                 
3 Interview with Ami Pedahzur, February 28, 2005: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1416&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=108487 
4 Interview with Ami Pedahzur, February 28, 2005: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1416&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=108487 
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1.1 Structure 
 
 
The paper is structured as follows: To gain a better understanding of the 
terminology, the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘suicide terrorism’ are both defined and 
explained in this first chapter.  Chapter 2 outlines and analyses the roots of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, without which an understanding of the development of the 
use of suicide bombings would not be definitive. This chapter also focuses on the 
Palestinian organizations that emerged especially under the banner of Islam 
(Hamas, Islamic Jihad) and includes the political profiles of the key Palestinian 
groups, the reasons why the organizations decided on suicide bombings, and how 
martyrdom was legitimized by politicizing Islam – a tactic used by Hamas. Chapter 3 
examines the organizational motives of using suicide terrorism – that is, why 
organizations use suicide terrorism, the strategic logic of insurgent groups, and the 
interactions between the different dimensions (i.e. how the organizations seek 
societal support by creating a culture of martyrdom).  The central problem is to 
determine when an organization finds suicide attacks useful. This chapter also 
discusses the individual motivations and explores the societal motives in supporting 
suicide bombing attacks.  The latter psychology is important to grasp because the 
logic of communities in conflict is key to understanding the phenomenon of suicide 
bombings in the Palestinian case study. Chapter 4 turns to a discussion of the 
effectiveness of suicide bombings as an organizational strategy according to the 
objectives of the different Palestinian organizations – whether to gain political 
concessions from Israel, elicit Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories or to 
gain public support and internal political power.  Chapter 5 discusses the impact of 
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Israel’s counterterrorism measures on the organizations’ use of suicide bombings as 
a tactic.  The final chapter turns to the present status quo. 
 
1.2 Historical Research Methodology 
 
I have chosen historical analysis as a research method since important insights can 
be gained from past events which can help us understand, interpret and perhaps 
even predict and control current and future events.  I share historian Ilan Pappe’s 
belief that the present events are heavily shaped and influenced by events and 
perceptions developed in the past, and that the main value of research of this type 
can be categorized as follows: 
a) It throws light on present and future trends.  
b) It enables the understanding of and solutions to contemporary problems to 
be sought in the past. 
c) It can explain the effects of key interactions within a culture or sub-culture. 
d) It enables the revaluation of data on selected hypotheses, theories and 
generalizations that are presently held about the past and the present. 
 
1.3 Data Sources 
 
 
I collected data on Palestinian suicide bombings within the Israeli-Palestinian 
1967 border (the green line), Israeli arrests of suspects planning suicide-bombing 
operations, Israeli targeted killings of suspects, and Israeli interceptions of suicide 
bombers already en route (Mintz et al. 2004). I obtained data describing suicide 
bombings in Israel from Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since
13 
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+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm) and from the 
International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism’s terror-attack database 
(http://www.ict.org.il/arab_isr/mideast_attacksearch_frame.htm). I obtained data on 
targeted hits from B’tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories (http://www.btselem.org/index.asp). I also obtained published 
data on interceptions from the archives of the newspaper Ha’aretz 
(http://www.haaretz.co.il) and cross-validated them with data from Palestinian 
sources (for example, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, 
http://www.phrmg.org, and the Palestinian Information Center, http://palestine-
info.info/index.html). I took data on Israeli preventive arrests from the IDF Website: 
(http://www1.idf.il/dover/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=22&docid=37572.EN). The 
data was processed by collecting, classifying, ordering, synthesizing, evaluating and 
interpreting the material available.  
 
1.4 Framework Analysis 
 
Recent literature on the root causes of suicide terrorism yields several 
hypotheses, most notably Robert Pape’s theory that suicide attacks are a strategic 
response by insurgent groups confronting foreign occupation5. I demonstrate in this 
research study, however, that the Palestinian suicide bombings in particular are a 
product of political and organizational features of the various groups themselves. 
More specifically, why did the organizations adopt suicide missions as a tactic in 
their struggle against the Israeli occupation forces? What role did the Palestinian 
society play in its condoning of the “martyrdom operations” and acceptance of the 
                                                 
5 Pape, Robert A. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97:343-362 
August 2003. 
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suicide bombers as heroes? My analysis focuses on whether the suicide attacks 
used in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from 1993 to 2008 were effective (whereby 
effective will be defined as the extent to which the purpose of the attack as indicated 
in the statement claiming ownership of the attack was fulfilled, i.e. revenge for Israeli 
targeted killings, mass reprisals, political concessions, etc) or just gave rise to 
reprisals.   
As discussed above, previous and recent research studies on Palestinian 
suicide bombings show that the phenomenon cannot be explained by a single 
overarching motivation. To understand this form of political violence, we must 
approach the analysis at four different levels: the political and strategic motivations, 
the individual motivations, the organizational objectives, and the societal motives. At 
each level of analysis there are different factors at play that explain why the 
Palestinian individuals, organizations, and society embraced suicide bombings as a 
strategy of resistance (during the Al-Aqsa Intifada). 
At the individual level, the Palestinian case study shows how motives rooted in 
nationalistic aspirations, religious redemption, and social ties created psychological 
and social incentives to seek a “heroic” end. Organizations may be able to 
manipulate and indoctrinate some individuals to carry out the suicide attacks, but 
when these attacks reach such high levels as in the Palestinian Intifada of 2000, the 
phenomenon cannot simply be explained away with notions of “brainwashing” or 
religious indoctrination. One must explore how the various Palestinian organizations 
were able to persuasively frame suicide bombings as rational, legitimate, and 
necessary means to achieve liberation from occupation which spoke to the desires 
of the individuals. The Palestinian suicide bombers are not very different from other 
rebels or soldiers in history around the world who were willing to conduct risky 
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operations out of a sense of duty and obligation to their fellow comrades, families, 
communities, or God. What motivates individuals to make such sacrifices in both 
cases is their great sense of personal identity with the cause combined with feelings 
of obligation towards their friends, team members, family, community, or faith. The 
Palestinian organizations framed suicide attacks as acts of heroism, as religious 
imperative, and as opportunities for salvation. In doing so, they fostered a culture of 
martyrdom that inspired future volunteers to conduct suicide attacks. The socio-
cultural context in which this takes place is of equal importance for this to be 
possible (more on this later).  
At the organizational level, the Palestinian case suggests that strategic 
calculation with regard to balancing asymmetric warfare was the main motivation 
behind deploying suicide attacks. While many individual bombers may be motivated 
to carry out a suicide attack for religious or nationalistic motives, or for their 
community, organizational leaders are first and foremost motivated by the tactical 
advantages of suicide bombings. Asymmetry in power forces the weaker party to 
seek other methods in order to surprise and counter their opponents’ stronger 
capabilities. ‘Human’ bombs are a more effective ‘weapon’ because they are flexible, 
accurate, extremely lethal, and can change target destinations if the need arises. 
They are also relatively cheap to produce and their psychological impact on the 
enemy is quite significant.  
In some instances, the use of suicide bombings was intended to gain 
organizational support in the face of rivalry among the different groups. In such 
cases, the intended effect of suicide bombings is not liberation from occupation per 
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se, but organizational maintenance or survival.6  Religious and nationalist interests 
are merely instruments that further organizational needs. The culture of martyrdom 
is thus created for the purpose of generating volunteers to execute organizational 
strategies.7 
At the societal level, the Palestinian case study shows that a deep sense of 
victimization reinforced societal support for suicide bombings. In the first two months 
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, before the use of suicide attacks by the different Palestinian 
factions began, the military tactics used by the Israeli occupying authorities to 
suppress Palestinian rioting caused the conflict to escalate rather than contain the 
violence. Confronted with such excessive use of force (see Table 1 below), 
Palestinians began calling for retribution against Israelis in return8. When Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad began sending out suicide bombers, the Palestinian communities 
in the Occupied Territories felt empowered in the face of Israel’s superior military 
capabilities. However, the suicide bombings drove Israel to employ even harsher 
measures, resulting in a security dilemma on both sides, where actions by one party 
to “safeguard its security” created increasing insecurity on the other side. The 
violence, however, was not solely motivated by the sense of security issue. 
Authorities on both sides promoted or acquiesced to this type of violence in pursuing 
their own agendas. For example, religious authorities inside Palestine and in the 
Muslim world conferred the status of “martyrs” on Palestinian human bombs, thus 
giving legitimacy to the culture of martyrdom and to recruiters of suicide bombers.   
 
 
                                                 
6 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
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Table 19 
 
Injured Palestinian in Al-Aqsa Intifada, by Year and Tool of Injury 29 September 
2000-31 March 2008 
 
 
These findings show that the study of suicide bombers cannot be reduced to 
individual motivations or societal contexts. The case of the Palestinian suicide 
bombers demonstrates that perhaps one cannot develop a comprehensive 
explanation of suicide terrorism without examining the strategic and political tools 
and objectives underlying the use of such a method by the Palestinian organizations.  
 
1.5 Definition of Terms 
 
 
1.5.1 Problems of Definition 
 
Many authors have noted the immense difficulties in defining terrorism and 
                                                 
9 Source: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/Intifada/98dd344c-21be-4672-a252-c6890e201d58.htm 
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suicide terrorism. Literature provides hundreds of definitions for terrorism. Some 
definitions focus on the perpetrator, others on the purpose, and others on the 
technique. There are two characteristics of terrorism that distinguish it from other 
forms of violence. The first is that terrorism is aimed at non-combatants. This 
characteristic sets terrorism apart from war-fighting, in which non-combatants may 
be killed or injured in the process, but are not explicitly targeted. Second, terrorists 
use violence to instill dread and fear in the target audience – this dramatic 
psychological effect is often more important than the physical result.10 
Before examining the specific case of the Palestinian suicide bombers in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is important to begin by defining terrorism and suicide 
terrorism. The most problematic question in this regard is defining which actions can 
be designated as acts of terrorism. Since the word "terrorism" is both politically as 
well as emotionally charged11, providing a precise all-encompassing definition is 
difficult. Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur has counted over 100 definitions and 
concludes that the 'only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that 
terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence.’12  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the United Nations’ attempts to define the term 
terrorism failed mainly due to the differences of opinion among various member 
states about the use of violence in conflicts over national liberation and self-
determination. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 recognized in Article 1. Paragraph 4 "... in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes..." 
contains many ambiguities over who is or is not a legitimate combatant. Hence, 
                                                 
10 Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins. 
11 Hoffman, Bruce "Inside Terrorism" Columbia University Press 1998. Page 32 
12 Jeffrey Record. Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, 1 December 2003ISBN 1-58487-146-6. p. 6 (page 12 
of the PDF document) citing in footnote 11: Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of 
Mass Destruction, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 6. 
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depending on the perspective, a resistance movement may or may not be labeled a 
terrorist group based on whether the members of the resistance movement are 
considered lawful or unlawful combatants and their right to resist occupation is 
recognized. Ultimately, the distinction is a relative political judgment.13 
The modern definition of terrorism is inherently controversial. Both state and 
non-state actors use violence to achieve political ends. The difficulty is in agreeing 
on when the use of violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is 
legitimate. The majority of definitions in use have been written by agencies directly 
associated with a government, and are thus biased to exclude governments from the 
definition of terrorism.  
 
1.5.2 Defining Terrorism 
 
 
Although it is generally recognized that there is no official definition of 
terrorism, there are many functional descriptions. For instance, Wilkinson (2001: 
206) describes it as a special form of political violence with five characteristics: 
1. It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or 
terror. 
2. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate 
victims of the violence. 
3. It inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, 
including civilians. 
4. The acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which 
they occur as extranormal, in the literal sense that they breach 
social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage; and 
5. Terrorism is generally used to try to influence political behavior in 
some way: for example, to force opponents into conceding some 
or all of the perpetrators demands, to provoke an over-reaction, 
to serve as a catalyst for more general conflict or to publicize a 
political or religious cause, to inspire followers to emulate violent 
attacks, to give vent to deep hatred and the thirst for revenge, 
and to help undermine governments and institutions designate 
as enemies by the terrorists. 
 
                                                 
13 Khan, Ali Ali, "A Theory of International Terrorism". Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 945, 1987 
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Boaz Ganor, Director of The International Institute for Counter Terrorism 
based in Herzliya, Israel, proposed the following definition of terrorism in his article 
“Defining Terrorism - Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”: 
“The definition proposed here states that terrorism is the intentional 
use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian 
targets, in order to attain political aims. This definition is based on 
three important elements:  
1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, 
violence. According to this definition, an activity that does not 
involve violence or a threat of violence will not be defined as 
terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful 
demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).  
2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal 
is to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing 
the people in power, changing social or economic policies, etc. 
In the absence of a political aim, the activity in quest will not be 
defined as terrorism. A violent activity against civilians that has 
no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a 
felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to terrorism. Some 
scholars tend to add ideological or religious aims to the list of 
political aims. The advantage of this definition, however, is that 
it is as short and exhaustive as possible. The concept of 
“political aim” is sufficiently broad to include these goals as well. 
The motivation—whether ideological, religious, or something 
else—behind the political objective is irrelevant for the purpose 
of defining terrorism.  
3. The targets of terrorism are civilians. Terrorism is thus 
distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla 
warfare, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative 
vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous 
anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks 
against civilian targets. The proposed definition emphasizes that 
terrorism is not the result of an accidental injury inflicted on a 
civilian or a group of civilians who stumbled into an area of 
violent political activity, but stresses that this is an act purposely 
directed against civilians. Hence, the term “terrorism” should not 
be ascribed to collateral damage to civilians used as human 
shields or to cover military activity or installations, if such 
damage is incurred in an attack originally aimed against a 
military target. In this case, the responsibility for civilian 
casualties is incumbent upon whoever used them as shields.”14 
 
                                                 
14 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism - Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter? Retrieved 
from http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articlsid/432/currentpage/1/Default.aspx on 2008-
07-17 
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For the purposes of this research paper, terrorism will be defined in 
accordance with Jessica Stern’s definition as “an act or threat of violence against 
non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise 
influencing an audience”15. This definition of terrorism does not limit perpetrator or 
purpose and allows for a range of possible actors (states, international groups, or 
individuals) and all alleged goals (political, religious, economic).  
The characteristics of terrorism as defined above in turn raise additional 
questions. How do we define non-combatants? A soldier on a battlefield is 
unquestionably a combatant, but what if he is riding a bus also carrying civilians, as 
happens regularly in Israel, when a suicide bomber attacks? Under these 
circumstances many would claim that the soldier is not a combatant in this instance, 
as he is off-duty.  On the other hand, some Palestinian groups claim that every 
Israeli citizen is a soldier – even children (who will later grow up to join the Israeli 
army).16   
 
1.5.2.1 State Terror 
 
A second controversial issue is the perpetrator of the violent act. Can a state 
commit acts whose purpose is to intimidate non-combatants, and might be labeled 
terrorism? States can and do unleash terrorist violence against their own civilians 
and as an instrument of war by deliberately attacking civilians in the hope of 
crushing morale. Israel frequently engages in ‘collective punishment’ in the Occupied 
Territories. According to Jeff Halper, the Coordinator of the Israeli Committee 
Against House Demolitions, Israel’s attacks upon an innocent civilian population are 
                                                 
15 Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins. 
16 Ibid, p.40 
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so indiscriminate and disproportionate that they can only be described as state 
terrorism.17 Attacks on non-combatant populations, collective punishment and the 
demolition of homes are all illegal under international law and constitute war crimes, 
as even Yossi Sarid, former Knesset minister, declared in an article in the Israeli 
newspaper Haaretz.18 The use of Israeli fighter jets, missiles, tanks, bulldozers and 
ground troops on densely populated civilian areas, the destruction of entire 
neighborhoods, can only be called state terrorism. To add to the tragedy, the camps 
and neighborhoods under attack are home to Palestinians made refugees by Israel 
in 1948. 
In fact, since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, 
repeated Israeli bombardments and assassinations against Palestinians have 
contributed to aggravating the violence. Many major Palestinian suicide attacks 
since 2001 have come in retaliation for Israeli “targeted assassinations”, many of 
which occurred when the Palestinians were abiding by self-imposed restraint. To 
give just two of numerous similar instances: On July 22, 2002, an Israeli air attack on 
a crowded apartment block in Gaza City killed a senior Hamas leader, Salah 
Shehada, and fourteen civilians, nine of them children, hours before a widely 
reported unilateral cease-fire declaration. A suicide bombing followed on August 4. 
On June 10, 2003, Israel's attempted assassination of the senior Hamas political 
leader in Gaza, Abdel-Aziz al-Rantisi, which wounded him and killed four Palestinian 
civilians, led to a bus bombing in Jerusalem on June 11 that killed sixteen Israelis. 
Although Israeli provocations don't justify suicide bombings, they demonstrate 
how Israel’s means of deterrence can also be defined as terrorism, and why the 
                                                 
17 Article retrieved from  http://electronicIntifada.net/v2/article2676.shtml: Halper, Jeff, “Israel's "state terrorism 
in Gaza”, The Electronic Intifada, 14 May 2004 
18 Haaretz, 14 May 2004 
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source of terrorism lies first and foremost in its aggression and occupation.19 In this 
context, Palestinian civilians are also victims of state terrorism, just as Palestinian 
suicide attacks can be coined acts of terrorism. The purpose is the same: to 
intimidate the wider public and provoke a state of terror in order to compel the 
government or organizations to abstain from their actions or concede to 
concessions. Only the means are different. This is one of the reasons why suicide 
attacks began to be employed by the Palestinian militant groups in the first place. To 
balance the ‘terror’. 
 
1.5.3 Defining Suicide Terrorism 
 
Perhaps the most frequently cited definition of suicide terrorism, or a 
martyrdom operation, comes from the Israeli terrorism expert, Yoram Schweitzer 
(2002:78), which says a suicide attack (attack being the word preferred by those 
who believe terrorism is too charged a word) is "a politically motivated violent attack 
perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely 
causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The 
perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission."  The 
latter part of this definition--the notion that success means death of the perpetrator--
is a defining feature according to Crenshaw (2002) and Ganor (2002).  
Scott Atran defines suicide terrorism as “the targeted use of self-destructing 
humans against noncombatant—typically civilian—populations to effect political 
change”.20 He claims that the principal use of suicide terrorism is “as a weapon of 
psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public audience.”  Ariel Merari 
                                                 
19 Bishara, Marwan, “Israel on the Offensive”, July 12, 2006, retrieved from 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/bishara 
20 Atran, S. 2003. Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science 299(5612) 1534–1539. 
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(1990) and Ami Pedahzur (2003) examined the characteristics of suicide bombers 
and their motivations. In an article in the American Political Science Review, Robert 
Pape argued that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, “one specifically 
designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial 
concessions.” Pape also wrote that, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism 
has been on the rise “largely because terrorists have learned that it pays”.21  
Definitions are controversial for theoretical reasons.  What is considered an act 
of suicide by some is viewed as a form of self-sacrifice for a noble, greater cause, 
that is martyrdom, by others. Some authors have suggested that suicide terrorism 
can be traced back to the eleventh to thirteenth centuries AD to ancient groups such 
as the Jewish Sicarii (first century AD) and the Assassins (Hashishiyun). However, 
bearing in mind the definitions of suicide attacks stated above, this claim is false due 
to the absence of the element of self-immolation. Both the Sicarii and the Assassins 
killed their opponents by dagger. Although they took a very high risk of being caught 
and executed in the process, they never purposefully killed themselves.  
For the purposes of this essay, suicide attacks are defined as attacks or 
attempted attacks during which the perpetrator reaches his or her target or its vicinity 
carrying or wearing an explosive device which s/he intends to detonate (i.e., the 
suicide bomber is aware that s/he has no chance of remaining alive, assuming the 
explosive device detonates as planned).22 In the Palestinian case study, from the 
point of view of those who support such attacks, the act is not considered suicide as 
the term is generally accepted, i.e., an act of desperation carried out for personal 
reasons (Arabic: intihar), which is forbidden by Islam. On the contrary, it is an act of 
                                                 
21 Pape, Robert A. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97:343-362 
August 2003. 
22 Similar definition issued by Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), retrieved from http://www.mefacts.com/cached.asp?x_id=11731 
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martyrdom carried out by a Muslim (male or female) for the sake of Allah (istishhad). 
Thus a suicide bomber is referred to as istishhadi, that is, one who has knowingly 
sacrificed himself or herself for the sake of Allah. According to the modern Islamist 
interpretation, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, a shaheed is 
anyone who dies during the confrontation. That includes anyone who is killed in a 
planned attack against Israel or was killed by Israel (i.e., in a targeted assassination 
or by sniper fire or in an exchange of fire, etc.). The term istishhadi is used by the 
Palestinian organizations to give a special merit to suicide bombers who have of 
their own free will chosen to become shaheeds and knowingly gone out on a mission 
from which they know they have no chance of returning alive. The suicide bombing 
act is called ‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah (an act of self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah). 
The targets are populated areas inside Israel: crowded streets, shopping malls, 
buses, restaurants, etc. It is a modern term which is not found in classic or medieval 
Islamic literature, but which has become common today in Palestinian society and 
the Arab world. 
Suicide attacks demonstrate the perpetrators’ determination and devotion, to 
the extent of killing themselves for their cause. The vigor of this resolve instills the 
impression that people who are willing to sacrifice themselves cannot be stopped, 
which has an added psychological effect on the wider population. Due to the nature 
of suicide attacks (see description above), they can also be more lethal than other 
forms of violence, and this lethality may also explain the increasing attractiveness of 
this method for the groups. Robert Pape (2003), for example, has attributed the 
increase in number of suicide attacks to their apparent effectiveness in terms of 
number of fatalities. He argues that suicide operations have often succeeded in 
gaining at least partial concessions from the targeted governments. 
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Another definition proposed by Scott Atran23 focuses on the goals of suicide 
terrorism and states that the suicide attacker’s intention is to cause harm to as many 
people as possible, with the ultimate purpose of effecting some type of political 
change. According to this definition, the perpetrator’s action is in fact aimed at the 
destruction of a chosen target. However, the means for bringing about political 
change lie in the psychological effects the attacks have on the greater populace.24 
 So the conclusions that can be drawn from the above definitions are that 
although suicide terrorism also aims at destroying or damaging a specific target, its 
real intention is to create an atmosphere of terror amidst a population not 
necessarily exposed to the incident directly, but rather those who are informed about 
it from a secondary source (i.e. the media). As the organizations using this form of 
attack perceive it, public pressure resulting from this collective anxiety may translate 
into political gains.  
 
1.6 Explaining Suicide Terrorism 
 
In the late 19th century, Emile Durkheim published a first in-depth study on 
suicide. In his typology of suicide types, Durkheim discusses egoistic, altruistic and 
fatalistic suicide types. According to Durkheim, and contrary to egoistic suicide 
whose motives are individual, altruistic suicide intends to serve the will of the 
collective. This kind of suicide is the result of a situation in which a person is 
integrated into a social group which advocates the act of suicide. As a result, the 
interests and desires of the individual become secondary to the group and s/he will 
                                                 
23 Atran, S. 2003. Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science 299(5612) 1534–1539. 
24Ibid. 
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take any measures necessary to help advance its goals.25 
 Fatalistic suicide is associated with an environment in which the individual or 
social context to which s/he belongs has been subject to persistent oppression, 
leading to feelings of despair and a belief that the future does not promise any 
improvement in these conditions. This type of despair may arise from hopelessness 
stemming from economic conditions as well as under the circumstances of the 
restriction of political and civil liberties.26 According to Pedahzur (2005), in contrast 
to the individualistic types of suicide (which occur mostly in post-industrial societies), 
the altruistic and fatalistic suicide types are more common in traditional societies that 
have undergone political, social and economic transformation.27 When a person with 
a profound sense of calling takes his/her own life as part of a social role required of 
him or her, the action is considered to be altruistic suicide, whereas if s/he performs 
this act from within a sense of deep despair, in most cases, this will be referred to as 
fatalistic suicide.28 It appears that in the case of the Palestinian struggle against 
Israeli occupation, suicide became a means by which to fulfill a broader purpose, 
namely, the intentional and more extensive harm to other people in the fulfillment of 
a common political goal.  
On the other hand, the suitability of Durkheim’s concept of altruistic suicide to 
the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in the Palestinian case is questionable on 
                                                 
25 Durkheim distinguishes three sub-categories of altruistic suicide: obligatory, optional and acute altruistic 
suicide. While Ariel Merari maintains that optional altruistic suicide is most applicable to suicide terrorism 
phenomenon, Ami Pedhazur’s view is that acute altruistic suicide is the most relevant to this phenomenon. For a 
discussion of this matter, see Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide 
Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root 
Causes of Terrorism ( 9-11 June 2003), Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003; also, 
Emile Durkheim Suicide, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 217-40; and Ami Pedhazur Suicide 
Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp.6-10 
26 Steven Stack ‘Durkheim’s Theory of Fatalistic Suicide: A Cross-National Approach’, The Journal of Social 
Psychology (1979), 107: 161-8 
27 Hussein Sirriyeh ‘Democratization and the Palestinian National Authority: From State in the Making to 
Statehood’, Israel Affairs (2000), 7(1): 49-62. 
28 Young Lung-Chang ‘Altruistic Suicide: A Subjective Approach’, Sociological Bulletin (1972), 21(2): 103-21 
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several grounds. Among others, Durkheim used the concept of altruistic suicide to 
characterize societies, not individuals (for a more in-depth discussion of the 
suitability of Durkheim’s concept to the phenomenon of suicide terrorism see 
Merari)29.  It can be argued that the important factor is the micro-society of a terrorist 
group itself that provides the social environment open to generating self-sacrificial 
suicide, in accordance with Durkheim’s altruistic type. According to Merari, there are 
highly cohesive and rigorous rules of conduct and behavioral ethics that members 
are expected to abide and live by.  
Psychological theories of suicide have also attempted to explain the 
phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Schneidman, for example, emphasizes the 
element of despair.30 In his view, the wish to commit suicide is almost always caused 
by intense psychological pain, which is triggered by frustrated psychological needs. 
The prevailing emotion of suicides is the feeling of hopelessness-helplessness 
(Schneidman 1985, 1999). Farber (1968)31 also underscored the role of 
hopelessness in creating the wish to commit suicide: the greater the feeling of hope, 
the less the likelihood of suicide. Hope is the perceived ability to influence the world, 
and to be satisfied by the world. However, Farber’s concept of hope relates more to 
the individual’s ability to function in his own social surroundings, rather than to a 
broader communal situation, such as being under occupation. With regard to 
Palestinian suicide terrorism, whereas it can be argued that the suicide attacks were 
motivated by despair associated with frustrated national needs at the national or 
community level, there is no evidence that the persons who carried out the suicide 
                                                 
29 Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) 
The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism ( 9-11 June 
2003), Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003 
30 Schneidman, Edwin S. “The Suicidal Mind”, Oxford University Press, 1996 
31 Quoted in ‘Suicide Over the Life Cycle: Risk Factors, Assessment, and Treatment of Suicidal Patients’; Susan 
J. Blumenthal, David J. Kupfer, American Psychiatric Pub, 1990 
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attacks suffered from despair at the individual level.  In none of the cases studied did 
the profiles of the suicide bombers resemble a typical suicide candidate, as 
described in the literature. The individuals who committed the suicide attacks had 
not made earlier attempts at self-immolation, were not in conflict with their family and 
friends, and many had not expressed being fed up with life.32 In the suicide bombers’ 
notes and last messages, the act of self-destruction was presented as a form of 
struggle, an act of projecting power rather than as an escape. Therefore, it seems 
that most suicide attacks in the Palestinian case study were not ‘suicidal’ in the usual 
psychological sense. The key to understanding the Palestinian suicide bombings, 
then, should be sought in an area other than personality disorders and suicidality. 
And as claimed earlier in this paper, it is best to examine the phenomenon from a 
political, organizational and social perspective.  
 
1.6.1 The Making of Suicide Bombers  
 
In an interview with Jessica Stern in the course of her research on suicide 
bombers, Brigadier General Nizar Ammar of the Palestinian General Security 
Organization recounted the profile of the typical Palestinian suicide bomber prior to 
the second Intifada as follows: 
Young, often a teenager. 
He is mentally immature.  
There is a pressure on him to work. 
He can’t find a job. 
He has no options, and there is no social safety net to help him. 
He would try to work for the PA but he doesn’t get a job because he has no connections. 
He tries to get into Arafat’s army, but again, he doesn’t have the right connections. He 
doesn’t have vitamin “W” (“W” is an expression of wasta in Arabic which refers to political, 
social and personal connections). 
He has no girlfriend or fiancé. 
                                                 
32 Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) 
The Root Causes of Terrorism, p.78 
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On the days he is off, he has no money to go to the disco and pick up girls (even if it were 
acceptable). 
No means for him to enjoy life in any way. 
Life has no meaning but pain. 
Marriage is not an option – it’s expensive and he can’t even take care of his own family. 
He feels he has lost everything.  
The only way out is to find refuge in God.  
He goes to the local mosque. 
It’s not like in the United States where they just go to church on Sundays. 
He begins going to the mosque five times a day – even for the 4 a.m. prayers (an average 
devoted Muslim will not attend the early morning prayers). 
Hamas members are there and notice him looking anxious, worried, and depressed and that 
he is coming every day. 
It’s a small society here, people tend to know each other. They will ask about him, discover 
his situation.  
Gradually, they will begin to recruit him.  
They talk to him about the afterlife and tell him that paradise awaits him if he dies in the 
jihad. They explain to him that if he volunteers for a suicide bombing, his family name will be 
held in the highest respect. He will be remembered as a shaheed (martyr, a hero). He will 
become a martyr and Hamas will give his family about 5,000 USD, wheat flour, sugar, other 
staples, and clothing. The most important things is that his family’s status will be raised 
significantly, they too will be treated as heroes. The condition for all this: he is not allowed to 
tell anyone. They will take him away from home 48 hours before the operation so there is no 
chance for him to reconsider. During this period he will write his last letters and sign his 
will, making it difficult to turn back.33  
 
 Ariel Merari gained a comprehensive picture of the process of making suicide 
bombers with the data he collected on Palestinian suicide bombers, including 
interviews with trainers for such missions and intercepted suicide bombers. The data 
he collected suggested that there are three main elements in the preparation of a 
suicide bomber by an organization: indoctrination, group commitment and a personal 
pledge. These elements are described below.34 
• Indoctrination: Throughout the preparation for a suicide mission, the 
candidate is subjected to indoctrination by authoritative persons in the group. 
Although the candidate is, presumably, convinced from the start in the justification of 
                                                 
33 Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins, p. 
51 
34 Taken from Ariel Merari’s findings quoted in ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide 
Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005, p.78 
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the cause for which s/he is willing to die, the indoctrination is intended to further 
strengthen the motivation and to keep it from dwindling. Indoctrination in the 
religious Palestinian groups (Hamas and PIJ) included nationalist themes 
(Palestinian humiliation by Israel, examples of acts of heroism during the Islamic 
wars), and religious themes (the act of self-sacrifice is Allah’s will, and description of 
the rewards guaranteed for shaheeds (martyrs) in paradise). 
• Group commitment: The mutual commitment of candidates of suicide 
operations to carry out the self-sacrificial attacks is a very powerful motivation to 
stick to the mission despite hesitations and second thoughts. In Hamas and the PIJ, 
the preparation for suicide attacks is often done in cells, consisting of three to five 
volunteers. These cells are characterized in the organization as ‘martyrdom cells’ 
(khaliya istishhadiya), to differentiate them from ordinary ‘military cells’ (khaliya 
askariya). Members of these cells are mutually committed to each other in this kind 
of an unbreakable social contract. In fact, the power of a group commitment and 
inability to break it was also the basis of the willingness of Japanese pilots in the 
Second World War to fly kamikaze missions. Last letters of kamikazes to their 
families indicated that while some of them went on their suicidal attack 
enthusiastically, others regarded it as a duty that they could not evade.  
• Personal pledge: Many Palestinian groups adopted a routine of releasing to 
the media a videotape shortly after a suicide attack. These tapes are also presented 
by the organization to the suicide’s family, after the operation, as a farewell 
message. Typically, in this tape the suicide is seen holding a rifle (and in Islamic 
groups a Qur’an in the other hand), declaring his intention to go on the suicide 
mission. This act is not only meant for propaganda. It is primarily a ceremony 
intended to establish an irrevocable personal commitment of the candidate to carry 
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out the suicide attack. This ritual constitutes a point of no return. Having committed 
himself in front of a television camera (the candidate is also asked at that time to 
write farewell letters to his family and friends, which are kept by the group alongside 
with the video tape for release after the completion of the suicide mission), the 
candidate cannot possibly turn back on his promise. In fact, in both Hamas and the 
PIJ, from that point on the candidate is formally referred to as ‘the living martyr’ (al-
shaheed al-hai). This title is often used by the candidates themselves in the opening 
sentence of the video statement, which routinely starts with ‘I am [the candidate’s 
name], the living martyr…’ At this stage, the candidate is presumably in a mental 
state of a living dead, and has already resigned from life.  
 
1.6.1.1 The Organizational Procedure  
 
 
The organizational procedure of organizing the suicide operation and training the 
potential bomber has several parallel steps. The operation itself is planned by the 
higher echelons of the organization, who design the strategic guidelines and raise 
economic, organizational and tactical resources. In addition, there are trainers and 
handlers responsible for recruiting the potential suicide bombers, training them and 
then dispatching them to their final operation.  
The first step in the process is the recruitment of the potential suicide bomber. 
Sometimes the recruits approach the organization of their own accord. Generally, the 
organizations prefer to recruit young individuals who are not attached to family or 
have other commitments.35 Great importance is placed on training the individual; the 
reason for this is the need to bring a human being to conduct a mission within a short 
                                                 
35 Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins. 
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period of time whose psychological complexity is far greater than its tactical 
challenges. The suicide bombers are not older members of the organization itself. 
Their decision to undertake the suicide operation did not crystallize over a long 
period of time so that over the years they were gradually able to assume the mental 
determination necessary to conduct the operation. Many suicide bombers are 
recruited by the various organizations or are approached for only one purpose, the 
suicide attack. And this requires prompt and efficient indoctrination and training.  
The most important phase of the training process is the indoctrination. This 
alludes to the process of bringing about change in a whole set of attitudes, opinions 
and beliefs of a person by means of mental persuasion. In most cases, the process 
is somewhat different because operatives are ‘preaching to the converted’. The 
recruits are already well aware of the purpose for which they enlisted in the first 
place. The indoctrination is therefore not to change their behavior but to reinforce an 
existing inclination within a short period of time (to minimize the risk that they will 
change their minds). The indoctrination process serves to instill the feeling of a 
calling and decrease the fear of death. In the last phase of the training, when the 
suicide bombers are asked to write a farewell letter and leave behind a videotape to 
loved ones, they are already in a mental state where all their hopes are pinned on 
the suicide action. From this point on the chances that the suicide bombers will go 
back on their word or decision are relatively small, because such a step would be 
condemned by friends in the organization and sometimes even part of the 
community. It would also harm their self-esteem. 
In the next chapter I will examine the roots of the conflict that gave rise to the 
use of suicide attacks as well as the different Palestinian groups that have played a 
major role in the struggle against Israel and in the Palestinian political arena. 
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2 Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
 
 
The Palestinian suicide bombings should not be viewed as spontaneous and 
unprompted acts of terror, unrelated to surrounding events – past and present. In 
order to gain a better understanding of the motives behind the suicide bombings, it is 
necessary to examine the context in which they occurred and explore their possible 
causes.   
 
2.1 The Context: The Roots of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
 
2.1.1 The establishment of the ‘Jewish State’ 
However desirable it was for the Jewish people, the ‘Jewish State’ was a 
catastrophe for the Palestinians. And indeed al-Nakba, the Catastrophe, is how they 
referred to it from then on.  In its origins and subsequent expansion, the state of 
Israel was and remains in essence a colonial enterprise. It may have been different 
from the nineteenth century European colonization, but it was no less unjust or harsh 
in its method and impact on the inhabitants of the land it colonized.36 David Hirst, 
longtime Middle East correspondent for the British newspaper Guardian, explains 
the myth surrounding the conflict in the Middle East succinctly as follows:  
The greatest act of violence in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle 
– Israel’s ‘War of Independence’ – was in reality a massive act of 
ethnic cleansing on which the Zionists had been resolved, and 
girding for, ever since they set foot in Palestine, that the official 
Zionist narrative surrounding this event is a myth of gigantic 
proportions: the myth, that is to say, which broadly speaking 
contends that – as a celebrated maxim had it – Palestine was ‘a land 
without a people, waiting for a people without a land’; that, in the war 
which broke out in 1948 the Palestinians fled the country on the 
orders of their leaders; that the Jewish soldiers, faithful to their ‘purity 
of arms’, perpetrated no wilful atrocities against them, vanquishing a 
                                                 
36 David Hirst The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East, Thunder’s Mouth 
Press/Nation Books, New York, 2003, pp.6-10 
35 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
hugely superior coalition of Arab armies bent on Israel’s destruction_; 
and that, after its establishment, the newborn state earnestly sought 
peace with its neighbours, only resorting to military force in self-
defence against on-going, unprovoked Palestinian terror and Arab 
aggression.”37  
 
The response to this historical falsification came from Israel itself. When Israeli 
archives were opened in 1978, this presented new opportunities for research into the 
establishment of the Jewish state. Works like Benni Morris’ “Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem, 1947-194938” and Ilan Pappe’s “The Making of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1947-195139” challenged these ‘sacred truths’ of Zionism that arose from 
the ‘certainty’ that Israel’s cause was and always had been just and its behavior 
above reproach.40 The archives made it clear that the Jewish community had never 
been in danger of annihilation on the eve of the 1948 war. The Arab armies, inferior 
in numbers, poorly trained and equipped, and operationally incompetent, stood 
practically no chance of defeating the newly established state. 
The Palestinians did not flee because they were following orders from their 
leaders. They fled because of the deliberate atrocities, terror and violence 
perpetrated against them by Jewish militias. Furthermore, in the early years of the 
Israeli state, Israel was not interested in making peace with its neighbors. Its so-
called ‘retaliatory’ policies were in reality brutal and aggressive forms of 
expansionism that led, again deliberately, to another war. The so-called ‘new 
historians’ came to accept that, in fact, the Palestinian version of events – that of 
deliberate, long-planned ethnic cleansing-- had been the correct one all along.41  
                                                 
37 Ibid, p. 6-7 
38 Morris, Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and 
New York, 1988. 
39 Pappe, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951, I.B. Taurus, London and New York, 1992. 
40 Pappe, Ilan, ‘Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Issue 102, 
Winter 1997 
41 Pappe,“The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine”, Oneworld Publications, 2006 
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But this reassessment of the origins of the conflict led to no significant 
consequences. It led to no change in Israel’s policies, or less support from the 
United States. In principle, at least, better understanding of the conflict could have 
worked in favor of the Palestinians. For until then, in the eyes of the vast majority of 
the American public, the Palestinians simply never had a history. Their 
dispossession and dispersal in 1948 had become “an unrecognizable episode”, as 
David Hirst put it, “not only in the sense that it had been forgotten, but that it had 
been erased from any moral accountancy of the conflict.”42 The view was that 
Palestinian ‘resistance’ was borne out of hatred and the Arab refusal to accept 
Israel’s existence.43 Policy-makers practically ignored the Palestinian dimension of 
the conflict; all they saw was an Arab-Israeli, inter-state conflict in which the 
Palestinian refugees were simply a nuisance or the pawns of larger players. A better 
understanding of the conflict could thus only entail sympathy for the Palestinians as 
victims with a genuine grievance, as a people with a national cause and a right to 
‘self-determination’ which, in the end, might even take the form of independent 
statehood.  
In light of the ‘better understanding’ of the real roots of the conflict, there was 
an ever-growing discrepancy between what the policy-makers should have done and 
what they actually did do. Israel itself was steadily growing more extreme. In the first 
thirty years of Israel’s existence, the Labor party, which was the (relatively) moderate 
wing of the Zionist movement, had dominated public life. It had been responsible for 
the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, and all the abuses that came with it. But 
officially, it promoted Western ideals of democracy, social justice, equality and 
human and civil rights, and wanted to present a civilized image to the world. But 
                                                 
42 Hirst, p. 14 
43 Kerr, Malcolm, America’s Middle East Policy: Kissinger, Carter and the Future, IPS Papers 14 (E), Institute 
for Palestine Studies. 1980, pp8-9. 
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after the victory of Menachim Begin in the 1977 elections, the Israeli government 
alternated between Labor and Likud (or coalitions of the two). The Likud party 
embodied Zionism in its extreme, ultra-nationalist form and did not pay in the least 
attention to ethical appearances or international opinion. This secular right was 
reinforced by the religious right, the Israeli/Jewish fundamentalists, who became a 
powerful new actor in the Israeli political arena.44 
The United States did not react to the growing militancy and excesses of its 
protégé with any reproach. And it did not do so because of a parallel process that 
was happening in Washington at the same time: in both executive and legislature, 
the metropolitan sponsor was itself being ‘Zionized’ to an ever-greater degree.45 On 
the other hand, the Palestinians were becoming more and more moderate and 
accommodating, and did something that was quite exceptional in the history of 
indigenous peoples’ responses to colonialism. They recognized the colonial 
enterprise –Israel, the Jewish nation state – and its right to exist. They formally 
surrendered what they were entitled to claim as their right, both from the point of 
view of international law and established anti-colonial norms: the recovery of their 
appropriated homeland, the return of the refugees and the dismantling of the entire 
Zionist-colonial apparatus of immigration, settlement and political control. The 
victims were not just the Palestinians who had been expelled from their homeland, 
but the larger Arab community as well, namely the neighboring countries who took 
them in.  
Years later, the heart of peace-seeking Arab consensus was the notion of a 
Palestinian state to be established in the West Bank and Gaza, the territories Israel 
had conquered in the 1967 War and occupied ever since. Arab East Jerusalem 
                                                 
44 Hirst, p. 14 
45 Hirst, pp. 15-16 
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would be the Palestinian state’s capital. This was enshrined in the Oslo agreements 
of 1993. Oslo did not spell it out, but for Palestinians and Arabs, that was its ultimate 
meaning. The agreement was the climax of Yasser Arafat’s moderate stance. In the 
early sixties, when Arafat first emerged as the leader of the guerrilla organization 
Fatah, his goal was absolute and uncompromising: the liberation of the whole land of 
Palestine through ‘armed struggle’. Israel would cease to exist and the only Jews 
who would be permitted to remain would be those who had settled on the land 
before the Zionist ‘invasion’. But ever since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the peace 
process that then began in earnest, he had been taking on ever more moderate 
positions, implying that Israel was there to stay. He began resorting to diplomacy as 
well as violence to achieve his aims. Indeed, Arafat had very little ability to pursue an 
armed struggle of any kind from his exile. But in 1987, after years of becoming more 
and more irrelevant in his Tunisian exile, his own people came to the rescue in the 
form of the first Intifada. 
They were the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, those who were still 
living in their own homes as well as the refugees from 1948, who were living in 
camps outside the borders of ‘Israel proper’, as the original state of 1948 came to be 
called. Previously, in the earlier years of Palestinian resistance, it had been mainly 
the ‘outsiders’ who bore the main burden of the struggle.46 The ‘insiders’ had 
remained largely quiet, waiting for deliverance by their brothers-in-arms. But with 
Arafat’s setbacks, deliverance never came and did not look like it was ever going to 
come.  
Finally, frustrated and tired of twenty years of occupation, they took matters 
into their own hands and erupted in what became known as the Intifada.  This first 
                                                 
46 Arafat’s guerrillas came mainly from the refugee camps that were located outside Greater-Israel of 1967. 
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Intifada-- unlike the second that broke out in 2000 – was in essence non-violent, or 
at least unarmed. It became known as the ‘uprising of stones’ and proved to be more 
effective, in terms of its political impact on Israeli society and the Palestinian 
community, than the ‘outsiders’ had ever been. It could not be portrayed as 
‘terrorism’, which delegitimized any cause, even when just. Furthermore, Israel’s 
brutal response seriously damaged its international image and reputation. Quite 
early on during the Intifada, the defense minister of the time, Yitzhak Rabin, had 
decreed a policy of ‘force, might, beatings’, which was intended to lead to the 
deliberate and systematic breaking of the bones of bound and shackled men.47 The 
commander of the elite Givati Brigade had ordered his soldiers to ‘break their (the 
rioters’) legs so they won’t be able to walk and break their hands so they won’t throw 
stones’.48 The practice became so institutionalized in another regiment, the Golani, 
that medical orderlies were instructed to be present at bone-breakings, considered 
to be ‘educational’ in purpose, so as to ensure that no ‘irreversible medical damage 
was caused’.49  
 
2.1.2 The Oslo Agreement 
 
On September 13, 1993, Arafat was applauded as world statesman and 
peace-maker when he shook the hands of Yitzhak Rabin in a ceremony on the 
White House lawn. It seemed to be an historic reconciliation between two peoples 
whose attitude towards the other ever since Zionist settlement began had been of 
complete reciprocal denial. For the first time they recognized the other’s existence, 
                                                 
47 Sarid, Yossi, ‘The Night of the Broken Clubs’, Haaretz, 4 May 1989, Translations from the Hebrew Press (a 
monthly collection prepared for many years by the late Israel Shahak). 
48 Jerusalem Post, 3 February 1989, cited in Joost Hiltermann, ‘Human Rights and the Mass Movement: The 
First Year of the Intifada’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Issue 71, Spring 1999. 
49 Haaretz, 1 October 1990, Shahak, Translations 
40 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
and their right to self-determination, as peoples on the land of Palestine.50 It was the 
first step in the process of de-colonization to which all European colonial enterprises 
had submitted. But it was also the last step. It was of course the Palestinians who 
had made the real concession. For them, historically, it was pure loss against pure 
Israeli gain. Arafat had formally given up claim to 78 per cent of historic Palestine 
and had also given up the idea of the ‘Right of Return’ for almost half the Palestinian 
people, who had been driven out in 1948 and 1967 and ever since had regarded it 
as the ultimate goal of the struggle. Arafat himself was to return, along with the high 
officials of the PLO, to head the ‘interim government’, or the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), that was to be established in the territories. But for the Palestinian Diaspora, 
Arafat’s return and that of his cronies meant the final abandonment of theirs. 
Furthermore, he had given up two of the most powerful weapons in his hands. On 
the one hand, he renounced violence of all kinds. Indeed, he turned himself into 
collaborator as much as liberator. For the Israelis, it was their security –not the 
Palestinians’ – that was the be-all-and-end-all of Oslo. And Arafat’s job was to 
supply it on their behalf. Israel’s ‘right to exist in peace and security’ took 
precedence over the Palestinians’ right to continue their struggle for any rights Israel 
continued to deny them. The whole purpose for the ‘strong police force’ Arafat was 
allowed to set up was to ‘discipline violators’ who might disturb Israeli ‘security’. On 
the other hand, Arafat also abandoned all of the United Nations resolutions which 
had constituted, at least on paper, the irrefutable, internationally recognized 
evidence to the justice of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, Arafat’s agreement 
with Israel was in itself incomplete. He had made these retreats for nothing in return 
– at least nothing guaranteed.  
                                                 
50 It was not entirely reciprocal, however. While the PLO recognized Israel and its right to exist, Israel only 
recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, not the Palestinians’ right to self-
determination. 
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Arafat, of course, claimed otherwise. He assured his people that Oslo’s five-
year ‘transitional period’ would lead to the end of the whole conflict through a series 
of negotiations on successive ‘interim arrangements’ and then so-called ‘permanent 
status’ issues such as the refugees’ right of return. As the negotiations proceeded 
and the Israelis withdrew, the Palestine Authority, starting off in part of Gaza and the 
small West Bank town of Jericho, would expand little by little to incorporate all of the 
territories. He had supposedly set an unstoppable momentum into motion. Nothing 
could now hinder the inevitable march towards statehood. 
But it was not to be. Given all that Arafat had renounced, the balance of 
power was now weighted even more in Israel’s favor. As Hirst explains, “It became 
more and more obvious that even the modest goal which he had set for himself, 
statehood in a very small portion of original Palestine, was unattainable, and that 
Israel, far from genuinely accepting the historic compromise, was merely exploiting 
the interminable and acrimonious negotiation to consolidate its hold on its Greater, 
post 1967 self.”51   
With almost complete impunity, Israel persisted in its colonialist expansionist 
policies, creating yet more Zionist ‘facts on the ground’ that made an ever greater 
mockery of the Palestinian state. The establishment of settlements had always been 
at the heart of these policies. The inevitable consequence: Palestinian 
dispossession and dispersal. The settlements which had already been established in 
the occupied territories were illegal under international law and repeatedly 
condemned as such by the United Nations. For the Palestinians, this meant that, 
under the Oslo agreement, these settlements were either to be dismantled or fall 
under eventual Palestinian sovereignty. Thus, upon the signing of Oslo, an end to all 
                                                 
51 Hirst, p. 23 
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new settlement activity would have been a reassuring signal that Israel was 
preparing for a partition, leaving to the Palestinians that part of their homeland to 
which they had agreed to confine themselves. However, the continuation of the 
building of settlements was the infuriating indication of the contrary. 
Settlement activity continued with a vengeance. Between 1993 and the 
present day, Labor governments which officially supported Oslo pursued the 
establishment of ‘facts on the ground’ with an even greater vigor than Likud 
governments which, though formally committed to it, were against the Oslo 
agreement. Between 1967 and 1982, 21,000 settlers had moved into the West Bank 
and Gaza. In 1990, the figure rose to 76,000. By 2000, the number stood at 213,000, 
and that did not include the 170,000 who had settled in Arab East Jerusalem, which 
had long since been annexed to Israel proper.52 For the approximately two million 
Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, the areas denied to them by the 
establishment of the settlements, settler roads, by confiscation or military use now 
amounted to 59 per cent of the whole. Seven thousand settlers controlled 20 per 
cent of Gaza. Gaza, with 1.1 million Palestinians packed into 140 square kilometers, 
ranks as the most densely populated territory in the world.53 General Ariel Sharon 
summed matters up with characteristic bluntness: ‘Everybody has to move, run and 
grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we 
take now will stay ours...’54  The Palestinians saw the last remnants of their 
homeland being confiscated and continued to endure all the humiliations of the 
occupation. The despair to which this led made an explosion all but inevitable.  
                                                 
52 Hirst, p. 24 
53 Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide, The Foundation for Middle East Peace, March 2002. 
54 Quoted in Agence France Presse, 15 November 1998 
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2.2 The Political Profiles of the Key Palestinian Groups 
 
This paper is specifically focused on Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian (PFLP) and Fatah as case 
studies for the suicide bombings that were conducted during the period under 
examination, 1993 to 2008. Therefore, before proceeding further on in the analysis, I 
would like to present a thumbnail sketch of the various Palestinian groups and their 
interrelationships, operating within Israel and the Palestinian territories.  
 
2.2.1 The PLO 
 
The history of Palestinian nationalism began with the rise of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the mid 1960s as a distinctive nationalistic 
movement55. In the beginning, the Palestinian struggle was a part of the broader 
Arab identity promoted by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Syrian Baath Party. 
However, the war of 1967 and the success of a small group of fighters in inflicting 
heavy damage to a column of Israeli armed forces created a great sense of pride 
among Palestinians. 
As a result of the subsequent political dynamics, a number of groups including 
the Fatah, the Syrian sponsored Saiqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoot, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PDLFP)56, merged under the umbrella of the PLO.57 
 
                                                 
55 Al-Shuaibi, 1980; Arafat, 1982; Nassar, 1991; Nofal, et al. 1998; Sela and Ma’oz, 1997 
56 All with diverse ideological orientations. 
57 Please note that I am using the term PLO here, although after 1994 it became the Palestinian Authority (PA). 
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2.2.2 Fatah 
 
Among the various groups under the PLO, the Fatah is the largest. Although 
the PLO is largely secular, the Fatah is distinctly Sunni Islamic. Fatah also carries 
the largest number of cadres and resources and, during the period under study, was 
dominated by Yasser Arafat and his group of Palestinians who lived in exile before 
1994 and then relocated to the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Fatah’s ideology is 
highly nationalistic, and it quickly followed a course that was different from the 
interests of other Arab nations. Thus, Fatah considers itself as the most mainstream 
Palestinian organization and as such, believes it is entitled to “speak for the 
Palestinian question”58. 
2.2.3 PFLP 
 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist 
group, was founded in 1967 by George Habash. The PFLP considers itself the 
representative of the working class Palestinians and seeks to liberate all of Palestine 
and establish a democratic socialist state.59 Although the PFLP was one of the 
original members of the PLO, it withdrew from the umbrella organization in 1993 in 
protest of Yasser Arafat’s peace accord with Israel and joined the Alliance of 
Palestinian Force to oppose the Oslo Agreement. However, this alliance proved to 
be short lived. In 1996 the PFLP split from the Alliance and its ideological brethren, 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).60 After the breakdown of 
the Oslo peace process and after Arafat took a more radical approach toward Israel, 
there was a closer cooperation between the PFLP and the PLO. 
                                                 
58 Said, 1979: 160. 
59 Hudson, 1972. 
60 Although the DFLP, like the PFLP, was a pro-Soviet socialist group, it broke with the latter over 
its agenda of creating a class struggle among the poor and working class Palestinians. 
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2.2.4 Hamas and the PIJ 
 
The Palestinian national identity both clashes and yet coexists with its other, 
Islamic identity. While the PLO was following a mostly secular course and enjoying 
increasing popularity, the prospect of a peaceful settlement with the Jewish state 
brought about disagreements within the Palestinian community. It set the mainly 
secular and increasingly accommodating PLO against those with a strong Islamic 
identity who did not believe in acceding even an inch of Palestinian land to Israel. 
Thus, challenges to the PLO and Arafat came primarily from two groups, Hamas and 
the Islamic Jihad. In January 1988 the PLO and the leadership of the Intifada 
movement issued a fourteen-point declaration calling for a Palestinian state to 
coexist with Israel. A month later Hamas was officially founded.61 
 
2.2.4.1 The PIJ 
 
Although both Hamas and the PIJ trace their origins back to the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement of Egypt, there is a clear distinction between the two groups’ 
priorities, particularly regarding the question of Jihad. The Muslim Brotherhood, like 
many other fundamentalist Islamic movements, saw Jihad as a general duty of all 
Muslims. It proposed that first “proper Islam” should be established throughout the 
Muslim world. Only after this primary goal is achieved, should violent Jihad be 
directed against Israel. In contrast, the irredentist Hamas movement switched the 
two priorities.62 Hamas maintained that Jihad should first be directed at liberating all 
of Palestine. Then the Muslims could direct their attention to the goal of restoring the 
“true faith” to the rest of the Islamic world. However, both groups absolutely rejected 
                                                 
61 Before this date, Hamas was more of a charitable organization, serving the poor Palestinians primarily  
in the Gaza Strip. 
62 Mundra, 2003 
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any political arrangement that would result in the relinquishment of any part of 
Palestine. 
A number of small Islamic Palestinian groups have been active under the 
general title of the PIJ (Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini); among them the Fathi 
Shqaqi faction is the most prominent. These groups are inspired more by the Pan-
Islamic ideology of restoring Islam to its old glory than by the nationalistic fervor of 
creating a Palestinian state in Israel. Nevertheless, they view Israel as the “Zionist 
Jewish” state and as the first target of their collective wrath. Dismayed by the lack of 
radicalism of the Islamic Brotherhood, specifically toward Israel, Fathi Abd al-Aziz 
Shqaqi, a Palestinian born in the Gaza Strip, established a separate Jihadi umbrella 
organization around 1979 along with Abd al-Aziz Odah and Bashir Musa. The group 
was particularly inspired by the revolutionary success of Aytollah Khomeini in Iran. 
Because of the PIJ’s emphasis on Pan-Islamic ideology, the group maintained close 
contact with other radical groups in the Palestinian occupied territories as well in 
Syria, Lebanon and Iran. Over the years, the PIJ developed its follower base among 
intellectuals and students, primarily in the Gaza Strip. The assassination of Shqaqi in 
October 1995 in Malta63 stripped the PIJ of its charismatic leader and, after Hamas 
switched tactics to employing suicide attacks, the two groups began cooperating 
closely with each other.64 
 
2.2.4.2 Hamas 
 
This section is dedicated to a more extensive analysis of Hamas, as a key 
player in the conflict and in Palestinian internal affairs. I will illustrate how Hamas’ 
                                                 
63 Although the murder of Mr. Shqaqi  remains unsolved, there is a strong suspicion that it was the work of the Israeli 
Intelligence agency, Mossad. 
64 See, http://www.ict.org.il/. 
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ideology not only linked its political objectives with religious rhetoric but also how the 
latter was shaped both by pan-Islamic concerns as well as specific Palestinian 
circumstances. This section also examines how Hamas utilized political Islam to 
construct a unique identity for itself, which in turn allowed it to adopt the strategy of 
jihad and martyrdom. 
The term Hamas is an abbreviation of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya 
(Islamic resistance movement). It emerged as an Islamic alternative to the PLO 
during the first Intifada uprising in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hamas’ 
ideology is contrary to the secular character of the PLO65 and is opposed to its 
intention of creating a separate Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank.66 By putting the issue into a religious Islamic context, Hamas was able to 
successfully create a political movement that directly challenged the power and 
authority of the PLO and Arafat. A further reason for the rise of Hamas is the 
frustration felt by the Palestinian populace regarding the inability of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) to deliver a transparent, democratic, and efficient administration. 
Furthermore, since the peace process began in 1993, the PA was viewed by the 
international community as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. As the 
successive Israeli governments negotiated with the PA, Hamas saw itself being 
increasingly marginalized.67 Therefore, Hamas maintained a delicate balance 
between its proclaimed political radicalism, its numerous social welfare programs, 
and its opposition to the PA through the use of controlled violence. By doing so, it 
                                                 
65Article 1 of its Charter states, “The basis of the Islamic Resistance Movement is Islam. From Islam it derives 
 its ideas and its fundamental precepts and views of life, the universe, and humanity; and it judges all its actions  
according to Islam and is inspired by Islam to correct its errors.” (Mishal and Sela, 2000, 177).  
66 Article 11 states: “the Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic  
Waqf [endowed] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection. It is not right to give it up or any part of it. 
 Neither a single Arab state nor all Arab states, neither a king nor a president, not all the kings and presidents,  
nor any organization or all of them – be they Palestinian or Arab – have such authority, because the land of Palestine 
 is an Islamic Waqf [endowed] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection.” (ibid: 181). 
67 Kusum Mundra, "Suicide Bombing As a Strategic Instrument of Protest: An Empirical Investigation", unpublished 
seminar paper submitted at University of California, 2003 
48 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
not only confronted the Israeli government but also challenged the PA’s dominance 
among the Palestinians. In this context and process, and most likely also inspired by 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the tactic of using suicide bombings emerged as a strategic 
weapon for the group. Hamas learned to use them to further its own political 
agendas. In Mishal and Sela’s (2000: 3) comprehensive study of Hamas and its 
ideology, the authors point out that: “…Hamas’ decision-making processes have 
been markedly balanced, combining realistic considerations with traditional beliefs 
and arguments, emphasizing visionary goals but also immediate needs.” The Hamas 
leadership orchestrated the sacrifices of their young followers by preaching in the 
mosques and publishing leaflets and directives. The social influence, which affects 
nearly every aspect of life in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, also played an 
important role. However, the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is not a political 
ideology particular only of Hamas. In fact, its professed nationalism is in direct 
conflict with the pan-Islamic transnational identity professed in the Qur’an,68 where 
all other identities are rejected in favor of an all-encompassing ummah (the Islamic 
community). Hence, Hamas’ mixture of the two identities (Palestinian and Islamic) 
came in conflict with a stricter interpretation of Islam. This came from the group, the 
PIJ. 
A survey of Hamas’ Covenant (mithaq), leaflets, wall graffiti as well as official 
statements demonstrates its set of concerns. These include: (i) the challenge of 
Zionism and the Jewish-Israeli state; (ii) the crisis within both the Palestinian and 
wider Muslim community and concurrently the challenge posed by the secular 
nationalist opposition; (iii) the sanctity of Palestinian land and the foreign occupation 
in Jerusalem; (iv) the defense of Palestinian national aspirations as a legitimate 
                                                 
68 Huband, 1998 
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Islamic goal and the establishment of a Palestinian Islamic state; (v) the declaration 
and justification of jihad as a legitimate strategy to accomplish specifically nationalist 
goals; and (vi) the defense of martyrdom as a legitimate Islamic tool of struggle 
within this jihad against oppression and occupation. These six themes are crucial 
components in Hamas’ construction of the rhetoric of jihad and martyrdom within the 
occupied territories. 
Hamas’ rhetoric does not make a distinction between Judaism, Zionism and 
Israel and tends to use the terms ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’ synonymously and 
interchangeably. The state of Israel is therefore regarded as the product of Judaism. 
Consequently, Hamas believes the only way to combat it is by establishing an 
Islamic state, as that alone possesses the strength to confront and counter all other 
faiths and ideologies69. At its very core Hamas’ ideology emphasizes the ‘Islamic 
essence’ of the Palestinian cause (Islamiyat al-qadiyya al-Filastiniyya) and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict70. For Hamas the conflict is not only a confrontation 
between nationalisms but also between faiths and as such represents an 
unbridgeable dichotomy. One leaflet addressed to Israel states: “Get your hands off 
our people, our cities, our camps and our villages. Our struggle with you is a contest 
of faith, existence and life”71.  
Secondly, Hamas is also concerned with the oppressive occupation faced by 
the Palestinian community. Hamas, very much like the Muslim Brotherhood, believes 
that the Islamisation of the Palestinian community is crucial to Palestinian liberation. 
However, for Hamas, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, liberation is attainable only 
                                                 
69 See for example: Meir Litvak, ‘Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: The Case of Hamas’ in Matthew Hughes and Gaynor 
Johnson (eds.), Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age (London: Frank Cass, 2005); Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and 
Violence in the Modern Ear (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
70 Meir Litvak, ‘Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: The Case of Hamas’ in Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (eds.), 
Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 
71 Undated Hamas leaflet from the first Intifada in Shaul Mishal, ‘Paper War – Words Behind Stones: The Intifada Leaflets’ 
in The Jerusalem Quarterly 51 (Summer 1989) 
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through a combination of tabligh wa da’wa (Islamic propagation) and jihad. 
Furthermore, Hamas believes that because Palestine is central to Islam it can only 
be recovered as an Islamic state by true Muslims. As such the secular national 
movement is lost and doomed to fail in its intended goal. Hence: “…despite our 
respect for the Palestinian Liberation Organization … we cannot exchange the 
Islamic nature of Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature 
of Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our religion, and whoever neglects part of 
his religion is surely lost”72. By using the language of political Islam in this manner, 
Hamas is not only demarcating its own political space but also trying to gain an 
upper hand by identifying the secular opposition as misguided and an obstacle to 
Palestinian liberation. 
Third, Hamas stresses that the land of Palestine is sacred for all Muslims for 
a number of reasons. Most importantly, God chose the Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as the site of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to heaven 
(al-Isra’ wal-Miraj) and also as the first qibla (direction to face during prayer). Hence, 
Hamas repeatedly refers to the sanctity of the mosque and Jerusalem and stresses 
that the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem is an affront not only for the Palestinians but 
also for the wider Arab and Islamic world.73 Hamas uses this to identify the 
Palestinian cause with broader Islamic concerns and rally support from the Arab 
world: “…The problem of the liberation of Palestine relates to three spheres: the 
Palestinian circle; the Arab circle; and the Islamic circle”74. At the same time, 
however, Hamas is also aware of its isolation and the lack of support from the 
Muslim world. It thus also rebukes the Arab and Muslim masses for abandoning the 
                                                 
72 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 27, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, opt. cit. 
73 Hamas Communiqué No. 4, dated 1 October 2000 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism:Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002) 
 
74 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 14, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, opt. cit. 
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Palestinian cause: “It is a shame on Arabs and Muslims to stand idle by vis-à-vis the 
daily and continuous extermination of an Arab, Islamic people on the land of al-Isra’ 
wal-Miraj (the ascension of the Prophet Muhammed)! There is no excuse for the 
Nation for not shouldering its duty towards Palestine and its people”75. 
Hamas’ adoption of a nationalist stance can be seen as being rooted in the 
competition with the secular national movement, whose rhetoric was based on 
popular notions of self-determination, independence and democracy. Yet 
nationalism is at odds with the traditional Islamic concept of dar al-Islam.76 So 
Hamas had to first create a narrative with which it could justify Palestinian Islamic 
nationalism as a legitimate Islamic goal. It did so by creating links between the 
Islamic sanctity of Palestinian land and Palestinian nationalism. In creating this 
narrative Hamas successfully retained its essence as an Islamic organization while 
at the same time merging its Islamic identity with a nationalist stance. This allowed it 
to compete with the PLO and the PA. In positioning itself as a political group whose 
nationalism encompassed the “materialistic, humanistic and geographical ties” of 
other nationalisms as well as “divine reasons”77, Hamas developed a unique identity 
in the Palestinian political arena over the past twenty years.  
 
2.2.4.2.1 Jihad and Istishhad 
 
This Islamisation of Palestinian nationalism by Hamas sheds light on how it 
constructed the call to jihad and martyrdom as a legitimate course of action in the 
struggle against Israel. Hamas’ stress upon the strategy of jihad can be traced 
                                                 
75 Hamas Communiqué dated 1 August 2001 in Yonah Alexander, opt. cit. 
76 An islamic term used by Muslim scholars to refer to those countries where Muslims can practice their religion 
freely. 
77 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 12, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, opt. cit. 
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throughout its literature. Hamas also illustrates its acceptance of the Islamic principle 
that jihad may be waged by multiple means – both military and non-military.78 
Hamas places martyrdom and sacrifice at the very centre of its strategy of 
military jihad and portrays suicide attacks, or ‘martyrdom operations’ as they are 
called, as the epitome of martyrdom. However, because suicide (intihar) is forbidden 
in Islamic theology, Hamas avoids this pitfall by coining its suicide attacks 
‘martyrdom operations’ (amaliyat istishhadiyya). This is because the notion of self-
sacrifice (ishtishad) has been lauded in Qur’anic teachings as not only permitted but 
also desirable. The shahid, unlike the suicide, is honored and guaranteed a place in 
paradise for all eternity79. Hamas emphatically stresses this difference between 
intihar and ishtishad. Suicide is shameful, committed by the weak, despairing and 
depressed. But martyrdom is the beginning of hope and deliverance and is a path 
chosen by the strong-willed and noble, who are therefore worth emulating. For 
example, according to the former second-in-command of Hamas’ political wing 
Rantisi, if a Muslim wants to “kill himself because he’s sick of being alive, that’s 
suicide. But if he wants to sacrifice his soul in order to defeat the enemy and for 
God’s sake – well, then he’s a martyr”80.  
The narrative of martyrdom constructed by Hamas was a crucial component 
of its military strategy. Hamas substantiated its claim for the necessity of sacrifice in 
Palestine by referring to the many Qur’anic verses and traditions that mention jihad 
and martyrdom. It thus urged the Palestinians to fight persecution and injustice on 
                                                 
78 See The Hamas Charter, Articles 15 and 30, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, opt. cit. 
79 See for example: Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); Prof. Abdul Hadi Palazzi ‘Orthodox Islamic Perceptions of Jihad and Martyrdom’ and 
Reuven Paz ‘The Islamic Legitimacy of Suicide Terrorism’ both in Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International 
Conference (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya, 
Feb. 20-23, 2000) 
80 Al-Hayat interview with Rantisi conducted on 25 April 2001 as cited in Christopher Reuter, opt. cit., p.123 
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the path of God and to never fear death, as those killed in battle are rewarded by 
God. Some verses mentioned in Hamas’ leaflets include: 
Surah 2:154 - “Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, 
finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord” 
Surah 3:139 – “Fight them! Allah will chastise them at your hands, and He will lay them low 
and give you victory over them, and He will heal the breast of folk who are believers” 
Surah 8:60 – “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies” 
Surah 14:52 – “And what though ye be slain in Allah’s way or die therein? Surely pardon 
from Allah and mercy are better than all that they amass. What though ye be slain or die, 
when unto Allah ye are gathered?”81 
 
Hamas elevated the position of the martyrs in Palestinian society by honoring 
them and their families after their deaths. By reinforcing that the strength of the 
Palestinians lies in their willingness and readiness to sacrifice themselves in a holy 
struggle, Hamas positioned the courageous and heroic Palestinian martyr who 
embraces death with a smile against the frightened Israeli who is instead scared of 
dying. Hamas’ first communiqué thus asserts:  
“..during one week, hundreds of wounded and tens of martyrs 
offered their lives in the path of God to uphold their nation’s glory 
and honour, to restore our rights in our homeland, and to elevate 
God’s banner in the land. This is a true expression of the spirit of 
sacrifice and redemption that characterises our people. This spirit 
has robbed the Zionists of their sleep and rocked their foundations, 
even as it proved to the whole world that a people that welcomes 
death shall never die. Let the Jews understand that … our people’s 
perseverance and steadfastness shall overcome their oppression 
and arrogance. Let them know that their policy of violence shall 
beget naught but a more powerful counter policy by our sons and 
youths who love the eternal life in heaven more than our enemies 
love life… The Intifada is here to convince them that Islam is the 
solution and the alternative. Let the reckless settlers beware: Our 
people know the way of sacrifice and martyrdom and are generous 
in this regard…Let them understand that violence breeds nothing 
but violence and that death bestows but death”82. 
 
                                                 
81 All verses are quoted in Yonah Alexander, opt cit. and Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt. cit. 
82 First Hamas Communiqué dated 14 December 1987 in Khaled Hroub, opt. cit. 
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Many Hamas leaflets from the late 1990s end with the slogans: “And it is 
Jihad until victory or martyrdom”, “Glory and immortality for our martyrs” or “Victory 
for our Mujahid people” – reflecting both the growing militarization and religiosity of 
society as well as the increasing centrality of martyrdom in the landscape of conflict. 
Indeed this growing importance of the martyrdom rhetoric is most evident when 
compared with the fact that Hamas leaflets from the first Intifada tend to end with the 
slogans “Allah is great, praise to God”, “Let the uprising continue until victory” or at 
the most “And it is Jihad until victory”. Thus even a cursory analysis of Hamas’ 
martyrdom rhetoric shows a significant shift with literature from the first Intifada 
containing only generic references to martyrdom and martyrs. However, by the mid-
1990s this rhetoric is developed into a sophisticated narrative which not only extends 
legitimacy to suicide operations as a means of resisting occupation but also provides 
forceful propaganda for the organization’s military activities by listing the names of 
martyrs as well as detailed accounts of Israeli attacks and the organization’s vows of 
revenge. The leaflets and wall graffiti ululate the deeds of martyrs through elaborate 
eulogies and describe in detail the costs and casualties that were inflicted upon the 
enemy in the name of God. Of course, there is a constant reaffirmation of the 
martyr’s attainment of eternal life and his/her place in paradise as one of God’s 
favorites.  
“Our heroic Palestinian people: a star has fallen from the skies of 
Palestine but its splinters would burn the heart of Zionists…Who 
will deter the angered (avenging) heroes? Who will date halt the 
blood-painted revenge? …The martyr commander was the knight 
that annoyed occupation; its soldiers and settlers in all areas of 
Palestine and his students have learnt from him the arts of combat 
and graduated from his school with distinction. They realise that the 
time has come now to play their role and teach the Zionists 
unforgettable lessons so that they [the Israelis] would know that if a 
knight had fallen a group of cavaliers would show up after him…the 
heinous crime perpetrated by the Zionist terrorist leaders in 
assassinating commander of the Qassam Brigades the martyr 
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Mujahid hero Mahmoud Abu Hannoud and his brothers Ayman and 
Ma’moon Hashayka will not pass unpunished…we in the 
IRM…bear with pride and glory the glad tidings of the martyrdom of 
commander Mahmoud Abu Hannoud and his brothers, a thing that 
they have always yearned for after he and his brothers managed to 
survive the enemy’s various assassination and arrest attempts for 
years. We vow before Allah to remain faithful to blood of the martyr 
and all martyrs of our people and we will remain insisting on 
resistance until end and ejection of occupation from our lands 
sacrificing our souls and blood as cheap price along that road. And 
it is a Jihad until either victory or martyrdom”83. 
 
Hamas’ spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin voiced this purposeful legitimization of 
martyrdom operations in 2002 when he said: “Our only initiative against the enemy is 
resistance, until we liberate our homeland…The Palestinians have the right to use all 
their weapons against this enemy, including the martyr death attacks. If we are 
asked to stop these operations, Israel must be forced to first stop its occupation of 
Palestinian lands. If the Israeli enemy wants to decide for me how to handle 
opposition against him that would no longer qualify as opposition.”84  
Some of Hamas’ leaflets and directives also carried details of geographical 
areas of operation, for example in a December 2001 leaflet Hamas declared a 
hudna (unilateral ceasefire) on martyrdom operations within Israeli territories: “We 
declare a suspension of martyrdom operations in the 1948 occupied territories and a 
stoppage of mortar fire until further notice. We affirm that all Hamas cadres 
especially the Qassam Brigades should abide by this matter until Allah ordains 
whatever He wills.”85 
Apart from the organizational rhetoric of Hamas, individual beliefs and 
sentiments in the letters and wills written by the ‘living martyrs’ were widely 
publicized by Hamas. Individual wills and last testimonies were either in the form of a 
                                                 
83 Hamas Communiqué dated 24 November 2001 in Yonah Alexander, opt. cit. 
84 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and Violence in the Modern Ear (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 146 
85 Hamas Communiqué dated 21 December 2001 in Yonah Alexander, opt. cit. 
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document or in the form of a ‘living will’, i.e. a videotape. A significant number of 
these wills reflect amongst other emotions a deep profession of faith. In a typical 
letter the martyr urges his/her family and community not to mourn their passing but 
to rejoice and celebrate their martyrdom as if it were their wedding day. They stress 
that through this act of martyrdom they have attained eternal life and the ability to 
intercede with Allah on their family’s behalf. The martyrs also ask their families to 
pray and fast regularly and be good Muslims. The last will and testament of the 
suicide bomber Hamed Abu Hejleh illustrates some of these elements:  
“Rejoice, for I have fulfilled my wish and achieved martyrdom in the 
path of God with the help of the determined holy fighters…know 
that the Prophet Muhammed, peace be upon him, has said that the 
martyr intercedes with God on behalf of seventy of his family 
members…My last wish to you my family is that none of you should 
weep in my procession to heaven. Indeed, distribute dates and 
ululate in the wedding of martyrdom. I conclude by saying we shall 
meet soon, God willing, in a paradise prepared for those who fear 
the Lord, the size of which spans heaven and earth.”86 
 
Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul who executed the 18 June 2006 bus bombing at 
the Patt junction in Jerusalem killing twenty people and injuring fifty-two wrote similar 
words in his last will and testament: 
“The triumphant outcome will be to those who fear the Lord, but this 
will not happen until we champion God and His religion…The 
martyr intercedes on behalf of seventy of his family members, so I 
request of Him that you be from among them. I ask you, for God’s 
sake, not to cry for my absence, for we will meet shortly in 
Paradise, God willing.”87 
 
Mohammed Hafez in his 2003 study of Palestinian suicide bombers locates a 
certain quality of personal and societal redemption in such statements. He points out 
how the act of martyrdom provides individual redemption because it is a privilege 
                                                 
86 For the full text of the will see Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), pp. 91-92 
87 Ibid. pp. 90-91 
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accorded only to committed believers. Simultaneously he stresses that the act also 
attempts to redeem the society’s failure to act righteously.  
Other than faith and religious responsibility a number of other themes can be 
located in last testimonials and ‘living wills’. In many cases the bomber calls upon 
the both the Palestinian masses and the wider Muslim community to follow the 
example of jihad set by themselves. The last will of Ismail Masawabi from Khan 
Yunis, who blew himself up at the edge of a nearby Israeli settlement killing two 
Israeli soldiers, states: “…In Paradise I shall be immortal, so you should be glad that 
I am there. To all those who have loved me, I say: don’t weep, for your tears won’t 
give me peace. This is the way I have chosen. So, if you have really loved me, carry 
on and carry my weapon …”88 
One videotape of a Hamas operative’s last will shows him holding hands with 
his mother, who says: “I am not losing you because you are going to paradise…Our 
message to the Israeli occupiers and killers is that this is our land. And our sons that 
we love are no more dear to us than our land. Their blood will redeem it.”89 
Martyrdom operations thus seem to be regarded, even at the individual level, as 
religious tools that can be implemented to achieve explicitly political ends. In this 
way the single act of martyrdom becomes a mechanism to end injustice and 
simultaneously seek liberation and religious redemption. 
What becomes clear is that the individual wills reflect the political and 
religious rhetoric constructed by Hamas in its organizational literature.  The end 
result was the successful construction of the belief that martyrdom operations serve 
                                                 
88 Christopher Reuter, opt. cit, p. 91 
89 Ira Sharkansky, Coping With Terror: An Israeli Perspective (Maryland and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), 
p. 58 
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the cause of God and the nation.90 Hamas was then able to channel this 
manufactured belief into conducting its suicide bombing campaigns. 
 
2.2.5 The Groups’ Use of Suicide Bombings Prior to the Al-Aqsa Intifada 
 
 
The Oslo Peace Accords helped strengthen the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people, and this greatly threatened its ideological 
rivals. In response, both Hamas and the PIJ increased their attacks against Israel, 
including suicide attacks. Suicide attacks succeeded in inflicting great damage not 
only on Israeli politics but also, for the first time, on Israeli citizens - the number of 
lives lost suddenly turning against the Israelis.91 Facing this unprecedented level of 
violence, Israel reacted brutally by imposing new punitive measures based on 
collective punishment. Israel’s disproportionate use of force and policy of collective 
punishment in turn further enraged and radicalized a large segment of the 
Palestinian population, who lost any hope of a peaceful coexistence with the Jewish 
state. 
This process of disenchantment was also intensified by the corruption and 
incompetence of the PA to set up an efficient government. Finally, its inability to 
secure an independent Palestinian state from the increasingly inflexible Labor Party 
government of Ehud Barak showed how futile the cooperative strategy of the PA and 
how fundamentally weak the Oslo peace process really were.92 The heightened 
                                                 
90 Singh, Rashmi. "Political Islam and Suicide Operations in the Israeli-Palestinian Context: The Case of 
Hamas" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual 
Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 . 2008-10-09 
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180049_index.html> 
91 Radlauer, 2002. 
92 Although the PLO had officially eschewed violence against Israel, the entire time period saw continued armed  
attacks by the PLO affiliated groups, although they did not stage any suicide attack before the peace process came  
to an end. 
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tension created by Ariel Sharon’s provocative walk-about of the Al Aqsa Mosque and 
the subsequent demonstrations and brutal suppression by Israeli forces that resulted 
in dozens of Palestinian deaths dealt the final death knell to the peace process. 
Ehud Barak’s defeat and the election of Ariel Sharon was the formal end of the 
process of a negotiated peace. Recognizing that they might be losing the global 
recognition of being the sole representative of the Palestinian people as well as 
losing political clout among its constituents, a number of factions within the PLO 
began to follow the path Hamas and the PIJ had already drawn and decided to also 
carry out the most successful of the violent strategies, suicide bombings.93 
By the time it became obvious that the Oslo peace process had failed, the 
armed wing of Fatah, the Tanzim, began its campaign of suicide bombings. This 
paramilitary wing of Fatah played a major role in October 2000 when it was 
becoming apparent that peace talks were at a dead end, and Sharon decided to 
make a symbolic visit to the Haram-al-Sharif. The breakdown of the Camp David 
meeting, coupled with Sharon’s provocative affront to the Islamic as well as 
Palestinian identity, saw the formation of yet another PLO affiliated radical group, the 
Martyrs of Al Aqsa (or the Al-Aqsa Brigades). Many of the leaders of this group were 
the former youths of the first Intifada of 1987. Along with the Tanzim and the Al-Aqsa 
Brigades, the PFLP redoubled its efforts to achieve the dual goals of retaliating the 
actions by the Israeli government as well as attempting to undermine the growing 
influence of Hamas and the PIJ, especially among the disaffected youth. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
93 By this time, an overwhelming portion of the Palestinians was supportive of the suicide attacks against the 
Jewish state (see Luft, 2002). 
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Figure 194 
The Changing Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
 
 
This brief sketch of the Palestinian groups must also include a mention of the 
Syrian and Iranian backed Shiite group, Hezbollah (the Party of God). Established 
during the Lebanese political chaos of 1982 with the ideological guidance of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Hezbollah quickly asserted its status through a series of 
spectacular suicide attacks. As early as the mid-1980s, Fathi al-Shiqaqi, the 
assassinated leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, advocated the use of 
“martyrdom operations” to counterbalance Israel’s superior military capabilities. The 
suicide attacks in Lebanon conducted by Hezbollah and other nationalist factions 
against Israel and western multinational forces during the 1980s had demonstrated 
the effectiveness of this tactic. Yet cooperation between Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
on the one hand, and Hezbollah in Lebanon on the other, didn’t take place until 
1992-1993. On December 17, 1992, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had 415 ‘Islamic 
                                                 
94 http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/final_05/pedahzur_ppt.pdf 
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activists’ deported from the West Bank and Gaza into southern Lebanon after five 
Israeli servicemen were killed. For much of 1993, they were forced to live in 
makeshift camps in the hillsides of southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government 
refused to take them in and Israel refused to allow them to return. This opened the 
way for Hezbollah, who provided them with material and support, and in the process, 
many of these activists and leaders held discussions with Hezbollah regarding 
strategies and tactics for resistance.95 
After the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 between 
the PLO and Israel, most of those expelled returned to the territories. However, 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they felt threatened by 
the Oslo accords as this might marginalize them politically after they had achieved 
national prominence during the first Intifada from 1987-1993. They did not want to 
join the PA because such a move would mean they would have to recognize Israel 
and accept a two-state solution, which was contradictory to their Islamist outlook. On 
the other hand, Hamas and Islamic Jihad could not simply conduct suicide bombings 
against Israel without unleashing repression from the PA. Under the Oslo accords, 
the latter was obliged to fight anti-Israeli terrorism stemming from areas under 
Palestinian control. In fact, the PA did exercise its repressive powers against militant 
groups in 1994, 1995 and 1996 after suicide attacks threatened to derail the peace 
process.96  
 
 
                                                 
95 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
96 Manufacturing Human Bombs March 2005, v. 2, p. 9 
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2.2.6 The First Suicide Attacks 
 
Strategically, Hamas and Islamic Jihad began to link their suicide attacks 
against Israelis to specific actions taken by Israel. The first such action came in 
February 1994, when Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler from New York, massacred 
29 Muslim worshipers while they were kneeling in prayer at the Ibrahimi Mosque in 
Hebron. Hamas avenged the killings by dispatching two suicide bombers in April of 
that same year, killing approximately 13 and injuring over 70 people.97 A similar 
action occurred in January 1996, when Israeli intelligence assassinated Yahya 
Ayyash, famously known as “the engineer.” Ayyash was the chief bomb maker for 
Hamas responsible for a number of suicide bombings. His assassination98 was a 
shock to Hamas, which then unleashed four suicide attacks, resulting in the deaths 
of approximately 57 and injury of over 130 Israelis. The PA found it difficult to take 
repressive measures against Hamas when the group appeared to be defending the 
Palestinian people. Had it done so, the PA would have risked a civil war. 
Suicide attacks carried out by Hamas and the PIJ after the Oslo agreement of 
1993 did have a significant impact on the peace process. Large segments in the 
Israeli public interpreted the suicide bombings as an indication that the Palestinian 
Authority under Yasser Arafat’s leadership was doing nothing to stop the attacks 
against Israel and that the Palestinians did not genuinely want peace. This 
perception among the Israeli public led to a policy change in government. In the 
electoral campaign of early 1996, Labor Party Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, was at 
first leading by about 20 percentage points. But after a series of suicide attacks in 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, right-wing candidate Benjamin Netanyahu defeated Peres 
                                                 
97 Ibid.  
98 with a hidden bomb in a mobile phone, which indicated a betrayal by close aides 
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by a small margin. The resulting policy change froze the peace process for a long 
time. Thus one could say that the suicide attacks contributed to bringing the peace 
process to a halt.  
 
 
Figure 299 
 
Number of Palestinian Suicide Attacks by Year, 1993-2006 
 
 
 
During the Oslo peace process years – 1993 to 2000 -- most Palestinians 
rejected the suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. This changed during the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada, when the overwhelming majority supported such attacks. For instance, in a 
March 1996 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research, only 21.1 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza expressed 
support for suicide bombings. The highest support for suicide bombings during the 
peace process years never exceeded 35.5 percent, which was in September 1997, 
when Benjamin Netanyahu, the hawkish Likud leader, was in office. In contrast, an 
October 2003 poll by the same research centre found that 74.5 percent of 
Palestinians support suicide bombings100. Only in March 2005, after a mutual 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
100 Manufacturing Human Bombs March 2005, v. 2, p. 10 
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ceasefire was agreed upon by the Palestinians and Israelis, did support for suicide 
bombings decline substantially: 29.1 percent continued to support them while 67.1 
percent opposed them.101 This was in direct relation to the political events occurring 
at that particular time the polls were taken, which will be discussed in more detail in 
the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2.7   The Second Intifada 
 
 
Even before the second Intifada, other Islamic Palestinian resistance groups 
began to engage in suicide bombing attacks, albeit on a limited and infrequent basis. 
Not until the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 2000 did suicide bombing 
attacks become more frequent and consistent. Then, suicide attacks were no longer 
confined to Islamic religious groups. Secularist groups also adopted this tactic in 
their resistance activities against an increasingly firmly established Israeli 
occupation. In other words, this tactic acquired more prevalence and popularity in 
Palestinian resistance, to the extent that it greatly characterized Palestinian-Israeli 
relations in the following years. 
The second Intifada came right after the Camp David summit conference of 
July 2000. The interim phases of the Oslo agreement had come to a standstill, and, 
with President Clinton’s blessing, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak laid before 
Arafat and his negotiating team a take-it-or-leave-it compromise.  In return for ‘the 
most generous offer’ Israel had ever made, the Palestinians had to give up all further 
claims.102 It may have been Israel’s ‘most generous offer’, but considering what 
Israel had ‘offered’ before, it could in no way be compared, historically, to what the 
                                                 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hirst, p.25 
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Palestinians had renounced at Oslo. Ehud Barak actually not only demanded much 
more than the 78 per cent of original Palestine which Arafat had offered him, he also 
sought a number of other ideological or ‘security-related’ gains, which would 
essentially reduce the Palestinian state to a dismal, powerless parody of itself.  What 
Barak was prepared to ‘give’ to the Palestinians was in reality far less than Israel 
claimed they were (90-95%), because it always left out certain areas, such as the 
municipality of East Jerusalem, which amounted to 5.4 per cent of the whole.103  In 
order to keep most of the illegal settlements under its sovereignty, Israel would have 
to annex strategically important territories which would cut deep into the Palestinian 
state, dividing it into three disconnected segments. So every time Palestinians 
wanted to cross or transport goods from one segment to the other, they would have 
to pass through Israeli roads, which Israel could close at will. This and other 
extortions and humiliations would have made many of the worst aspects of the 
Israeli occupation permanent. Camp David collapsed without any agreement at all.  
Within two months, the second Intifada broke out. It was triggered by Ariel 
Sharon’s provocative visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which was meant to embarrass 
his political rival at the time, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and was an attempt to win 
over the Israeli public by highlighting his courage and bravery.104 The second 
Intifada was in coming anyway and, in essence, it was a spontaneous, popular revolt 
directed against Israel’s continued occupation, and at the realization that Oslo could 
never end it. It was also implicitly directed against Arafat and his Palestinian 
Authority, which had so adamantly collaborated in upholding that fiction.  It was also 
in response to Israel’s measures of widespread killings, mass arrests, confiscation of 
lands and increased house demolitions. And it was in response to the crippling of 
                                                 
103 Walid Khalidi, The Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, speech delivered in London, 8 October 2002. 
104 Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) 
The Root Causes of Terrorism. 
66 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
Palestinian economy and chokehold on people’s everyday lives at the numerous 
Israeli checkpoints during the arduous seven-year political process of Oslo. All that 
was needed to stir the already tense environment was just a trigger. The Oslo 
Accords as well as further Palestinian-Israeli agreements were put on hold or 
scrapped altogether. The Palestinian voices who strived for conciliation were 
silenced by the daily confrontation with oppressive Israeli occupation forces and 
policies. The idea of negotiations within Palestinian society was overshadowed by 
the determination to end the occupation, by a variety of different resistance 
operations. It is also possible that the Islamic groups, most notably Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad, manipulated the failure of the Oslo Peace process to advance their 
internal political agenda to discredit the Palestinian Authority. Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad were still in principle pursuing the concept of ‘complete liberation’. But the 
mainstream ‘young guard’ leaders – notably the subsequently imprisoned Marwan 
Barghouti – and the organizations they headed – Fatah’s Tanzim or the al-Aqsa 
Brigades – repeatedly proclaimed no ambition beyond the 22 per cent Israel had 
offered. They wanted their independent state to co-exist with Israel, not to destroy 
it.105 
 
2.2.7.1 The use of suicide attacks during the second Intifada 
 
 
The conflict reached new heights with the introduction of the ‘martyrdom 
operations’. Palestinians were no longer content with symbolic expressions of 
protest through stone throwing as was the case during the 1987 Intifada, and more 
importantly, as was the case during the first few weeks of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. As 
discussed above, there had been suicide attacks before, but only with the second 
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Intifada did they become the principal, systematic and strategic weapon in the 
Palestinian resistance, both by the Islamic as well as secular resistance groups.  
The readiness of the many young men and women to sacrifice their lives in 
this manner was a reflection not merely of their own, individual despair, but of that of 
the whole society. With intensified Israeli policies of targeted assassinations, brutal 
reoccupation, mass incarceration and starvation, it was also perceived as the only 
way in which the Palestinians, so inferior, technically, organizationally and 
diplomatically, could even out the strategic and military balance at least some way in 
their favor.106  In the first month alone, the ratio of fatalities was twenty Palestinians 
to one Israeli, a disproportionate number which was only reduced to ten to one by 
the end of the third month.  Organizations such as Amnesty International, America’s 
Human Rights Watch or Physicians for Human Right amply documented the extra-
judicial ‘executions’ that had so quickly got under way, the brutality, the reckless and 
unnecessary shootings to kill or injure, the blatant disregard for standard methods of 
riot control.107 
There was undoubtedly strategic logic behind the use of suicide bombings, 
both in the years leading up to the second Intifada, and especially during the latter. 
The increased rate of suicide bombings shook Israel to its foundations. The 
immense damage they inflicted was also mainly psychological. But, in the end, they 
did not work. They were not only morally questionable, but also operationally 
counter-productive. Some Palestinians believed the targets should have been strictly 
confined to the soldiers and settlers who were both the symbols and the instruments 
of the occupation. The more disgust it generated in Israel and the rest of the world, 
the easier it became for Israel to make full and unconstrained use of its superior, 
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American-supplied arsenal of violence which it used to suppress the rebellion.108 
(See Figure 3 below). 
 
FIGURE 3109 
RATIO OF PALESTINIANS KILLED TO ISRAELIS KILLED, 2000-2006 
 
It had actually been the Israelis themselves who first resorted to violence, and 
massively disproportionate violence at that, at the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Immediately after Sharon’s visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the army opened fire on 
crowds of non-violent demonstrators. Palestinian civilians, many of them children, 
died in far higher numbers than Israelis did. This was deliberate. When the Intifada 
erupted, Maariv commentator Ben Kaspit writes:  
‘...it was finally clear to all: Israel is not a state with an army, but an army 
with a state...For many years the Israeli Defence Forces had been waiting 
for this Intifada, and when it erupted, it unleashed all its frustrations on the 
Palestinians, who did not know what had hit them...”Tell me”, General 
Amos Malka (head of Military Intelligence) said to Yosi Kopperwasser (a 
District Intelligence Officer), “how many bullets has the IDF fired since the 
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beginning of the Intifada?” Kopperwasser did not have a clue. Malka 
asked him to find out. When the answer arrived by noon, most of the 
officers who were present...turned white. In the first few days the IDF had 
fired about 700,000 bullets and other projectiles in the West Bank and 
about 300,000 in Gaza. Someone in the Central Command later quipped 
that the operation should be named “a bullet for every child”.’110 
 
High Palestinian officials protested to their Israeli counterparts that they were 
breaking all the rules of the game. But the army continued shooting, relying mainly 
on snipers.111  It led to more effective and lethal forms of Palestinian violence which 
eventually came to their climax in the suicide bombers. This led to the Israeli public 
to close ranks amid a growing clamor for punishment and revenge. The pervasive 
attitude of the Israeli public was that of disdain towards a subject people typical of 
colonial societies, and was quite receptive to the colonial slogan: ‘the only language 
they understand is force’112. For those on the left, who considered that they had 
done so much to promote the peace process, the Intifada was considered a kind of 
betrayal, even without the suicide bombers. The Arafat in whom they had placed 
their trust had grievously disappointed them. They believed Barak’s claim that, when 
Arafat rejected his most ‘generous offer’, he had ‘exposed Arafat’s true face’. The 
‘peace camp’ dwindled into almost non-existence. For the right, it was the fulfillment 
of all their prophecies: the Palestinians never wanted peace anyway, and Arafat 
remained the ‘killer and murderer’ bent on Israel’s destruction they always said he 
was. Hirst explains, ‘Before long both left and right were ready for the ‘savior’ who 
promised them a simple military solution. In the general elections of February 2001, 
and by an overwhelming margin, they chose Sharon to replace Barak at the head of 
the most extreme, bellicose government in Israel’s history.’113 Sharon’s mere 
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appointment was a sign of more atrocious deeds to come. And in fact, it was only 
after he took office that Hamas turned to what one Israeli military analyst called ‘the 
Palestinian H-bomb: exploding human beings’.114  
For Sharon, the Intifada and the violence that came with it was the 
opportunity he had been waiting for. He had always been opposed to the peace 
process because he knew that the compromises would mean the ‘re-division’ of 
‘Eretz Israel’ – an area considered by the mainstream Israeli right to be equivalent to 
historic Palestine, which had become one since 1967. The ground had already been 
prepared as early as 1996, when the Israeli military drew up the contingency plan 
‘Field of Thorns’, whose implementation would in effect bring about the destruction 
of Oslo and everything it stood for: the very notion of Palestinian self-determination, 
leading to eventual statehood, on any part of historic Palestine, and “any legitimate, 
representative, internationally recognized institution – such as Arafat and his 
Palestinian Authority –empowered to bring it about”.115 All that was needed was the 
pretext, and the Intifada provided it. The proponents of this plan were so eager to 
take advantage of this pretext that they went into action even before Hamas or 
Islamic Jihad had executed their first serious act of terror.116 By the time this took 
place, the Palestinian casualty toll had reached 145 dead compared to 14 Israelis.117 
Of course, when the suicide bombings came, they were horrible. However, 
according to Hirst, ‘Palestinian atrocities came, after all, in the service of what the 
world regards as a legitimate purpose, the ending of occupation; Israeli ones in the 
service of an illegitimate one, its perpetuation.’118 
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On 15 October 2000, at the request of Prime Minister Barak, the security 
services had already published a report which stated that ‘Arafat is a severe threat to 
the security of the state and the damage which will result from his disappearance is 
less than the damage caused by his existence’.119  This was followed by a 60-page 
‘White Book’ entitled PA Non-Compliance: A Record of Bad Faith and Misconduct, in 
which Arafat was accused of orchestrating the Intifada and giving the ‘green light’ to 
‘Islamist terror’. However, this claim completely contradicted what the Israeli security 
services had themselves long been saying about Arafat and his efforts to control 
Palestinian violence in the years before the Intifada, which was abundantly cited in 
the Israeli media. He ‘is doing his job – he is fighting terror – and puts all his weight 
against Hamas,’ Ami Ayalon, head of the Shabak secret service, told the 
government in 1998.120 He was even ordering the assassinations of Hamas terrorists 
which were disguised as ‘accidents’. Arafat was doing a better ‘job’ than the Israelis 
ever did themselves.121  
In Evil Unleashed, one of Israel’s forthright commentators, Tanya Reinhart, 
investigated the hidden origins, motives and methodology of the brutal Israeli 
response to the Al-Aqsa uprising.122 Reinhart writes: 
In mainstream political discourse, Israel's recent atrocities are 
described as 'retaliatory acts' - answering the last wave of terror 
attacks on Israeli civilians. But in fact, this 'retaliation' had been 
carefully prepared long before. Already in October 2000, at the 
outset of the Palestinian uprising, military circles were ready with 
detailed operative plans to topple Arafat and the Palestinian 
Authority. This was before the Palestinian terror attacks 
started…The operative plan, known as 'Fields of Thorns' had been 
prepared back in 1996, and was then updated during the Intifada. 
(Amir Oren, Ha'aretz, Nov. 23, 2001). The plan includes everything 
that Israel has been executing lately, and more…But what is the 
rationale behind Israel's systematic drive to eliminate the 
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Palestinian Authority and undo the Oslo arrangements? It certainly 
cannot be based on 'disappointment' with Arafat's performance, as 
is commonly claimed. The fact of the matter is that from the 
perspective of Israel's interests in maintaining the occupation, 
Arafat did fulfill Israel's expectations all these last years... Arafat did 
manage, through harsh means of oppression, to contain the 
frustration of his people, and guarantee the safety of the settlers, as 
Israel continued undisturbed to build new settlements and 
appropriate more Palestinian land. The oppressive machinery, - the 
various security forces of Arafat, were formed and trained in 
collaboration with Israel. Much energy and resources were put into 
building this complex Oslo apparatus. Why, then, was the military 
and political echelon so determined to destroy all this already in 
October 2000, even before the terror waves started?...The 
Palestinian society resorted once more to their marvelous strategy 
of 'zumud' - sticking to the land and sustaining the pressure. Right 
from the start, the Hamas political leadership, and others, were 
warning that Israel is trying to push the Palestinians into a civil war, 
in which the nation slaughters itself. All fragments of the society 
cooperated to prevent this danger, and calm conflicts as soon as 
they were deteriorating to arms. They also managed, despite the 
tyranny of Arafat's rule, to build an impressive amount of institutions 
and infrastructure… In 1999, the army got back to power, through 
the 'political generals' - first Barak, and then Sharon. (They 
collaborated in the last elections to guarantee that no other, civil, 
candidate will be allowed to run.) The road opened to correct what 
they view as the grave mistake of Oslo. In order to get there, it was 
first necessary to convince the spoiled Israeli society that the 
Palestinians are not willing to live in peace and are threatening our 
mere existence. Sharon alone could not have possibly achieved 
that, but Barak did succeed, with his 'generous offer' fraud. After a 
year of horrible terror attacks, combined with massive propaganda 
and lies, Sharon and the army feel that nothing can stop them from 
turning to full execution. Why is it so urgent for them to topple 
Arafat? Shabtai Shavit, former head of the Security Service 
('Mossad'), explains this openly: "…There is nobody in the 
Palestinian gallery that can enter his shoes in this context of 
international status. If they [the Palestinians] will lose this gain…the 
Palestinian issue will get off the international agenda." (interview in 
Yediot, December 7, 2001). Their immediate goal is to get the 
Palestinians off the international agenda, so slaughter, starvation, 
forced evacuation and 'migration' can continue undisturbed, 
leading, possibly, to the final realization of Sharon's long standing 
vision, embodied in the military plans.123  
 
Sharon went about his plan with a merciless brutality. He had not earned the 
nickname ‘the bulldozer’ for nothing.  It was all done in the name of ‘self-defense’ 
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and ‘retaliation’ against the terror which the Palestinians had allegedly initiated. In 
reality, however, it became clear that, once he had gotten the war he wanted, 
Sharon himself was doing all he could to perpetuate it. Although Sharon did publicly 
say that he wanted a ceasefire and the resumption of the peace process, his actions 
belied his words. Every time there was a period of calm, every time the Palestinians 
observed the latest ceasefire, every time Arafat did get Hamas to stop its suicide 
bombings, Sharon violated the ceasefire himself, most typically with the so-called 
‘targeted killings’ of Palestinian activists, which he knew would provoke the kind of 
Palestinian retaliation he wanted. He did this repeatedly. It became so obvious a 
pattern that the image he and his government sought to give to their public and the 
watching world was no longer as victim but the reverse: Israel became the 
aggressor, the Palestinians were the ones ‘retaliating’ in ‘self-defense’.  Hirst writes 
that  
Sharon did not want the ceasefire because he did not want the 
peace process, because the ‘peace plan’ he had in mind would 
then be exposed as the total antithesis of both ‘peace’ and 
‘process’ that it really was. Insofar as he ever spelt it out at all, it 
would have repudiated all the progress made, via the 1991 Madrid 
conference, Oslo, and subsequent accords and negotiations, since 
the peace-making began. It would have consecrated all existing 
Zionist ‘facts on the ground’ under yet another ‘interim’ agreement 
of indefinite duration during which Israel would be free to create 
ever more new ones. He hardly even bothered to pretend that he 
believed in it himself. The ‘idea of making peace with the 
Palestinians is absurd,’ he had said at the outset of the Intifada.124   
 
The only thing Sharon wanted was to complete the real agenda which lay 
behind his military campaign – the destruction of Oslo. In the pretext of his war 
against a poorly supplied Palestinian resistance, he unleashed high-tech, state terror 
of his own. It was the Palestinians’ guerrilla attacks on soldiers and settlers, or 
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civilians inside Israel proper, drive-by shootings, road-side bombs and home-made 
mortar volleys against Israel’s vast military might, its collective punishments, house 
demolitions, curfews, house-to-house searches, mass arrests, public stripping of 
civilians to their underwear or marking their arms with a number, re-occupation of 
major towns, brutal pacifications of refugee camps, razing of olive groves. It was 
suicide bombers versus tanks, helicopter gunships and F-16 fighter planes used on 
densely populated areas.  
Sharon held Arafat and the Palestinian Authority directly responsible for every 
single attack, and constantly demanded that they end them. They were not 
responsible, of course, and Sharon’s own actions ensured that they were not, and 
could not be. He subjected Arafat to long sieges in his headquarters in Ramallah. In 
the last of them the Israeli army dynamited and bulldozed the entire compound 
except for Arafat’s office. He destroyed the security services and the police, without 
which Arafat was powerless to enforce his will. The terror went on, as Sharon knew 
it would, because it simply wasn’t under Arafat’s control. In fact, in the eyes of the 
Palestinians, Arafat was a hero one day as he withstood Sharon’s sieges, and a 
traitor the next, as he enforced his collaborationist role (in vain). Yet even as he 
declared Arafat as ‘irrelevant’, Sharon still cast him as the mastermind behind the 
terror. It was logically ludicrous. Sharon’s actions and the actions the Israeli soldiers 
performed betrayed the real purpose. They rampaged through the Palestinian 
ministries of health, education, and agriculture, destroying computers, files, official 
records, smashing furniture, ransacking businesses and banks, looting public 
buildings and private residences. And just as they had done on an even greater 
scale during Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon twenty years before, they systematically 
defecated and urinated in any place but the lavatories, on floors, carpets or 
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children’s paintings, in bottles, drawers or flowerpots, and even in an office 
photocopier.125  The West Bank was carved up into countless disconnected 
enclaves, making all traffic and communication between them impracticable, 
dangerous or extremely difficult. Routine journeys to work or home, which might 
have taken just five minutes, now took five hours. They brought devastation to the 
Palestinian economy; unemployment rose to 60 per cent; 70 per cent of the 
population fell below the poverty line; nearly one third of Palestinian children 
suffered from malnutrition.126 Education, for the most educated community in the 
Middle East, was severely disrupted. In short, Israel made life so generally 
impossible for the Palestinians that, unless they had a very good reason to stay or 
nowhere else to go, any normal person would have left.127 
Over the course of the years, many Israeli politicians, from Moshe Dayan128 to 
Sharon, had confided that ‘making life impossible’ – by ‘bureaucratic, economic and 
social harassment of one kind or another’ became a secret practice by which they 
wanted to achieve it.129  It had not worked. Their ‘demographic problem’ is what the 
Israelis euphemistically call it. What should be done about the non-Jews in their 
midst? The ‘problem’ had been there since the Zionist enterprise began; it only 
found a temporary ‘solution’ in the expulsions of 1948. And ever since 1967, and the 
capture of the remaining 22 per cent of historic Palestine, Israel had steadily 
reasserted itself. From the left to right of the political spectrum, Israelis agreed that, if 
the Palestinians of the occupied territories were to be added to Israel’s own 
Palestinian citizens, it would be a demographic ‘time-bomb’ that ultimately would 
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threaten very identity of the Jewish state. If Israel wanted to safeguard its essential 
nature, its raison d’être, it would have to become an overtly discriminatory, in fact 
racist state, putting its Jewish character above its ‘democratic’ one.130  
For the Israeli left, the solution lay in the ‘separation’ of the two peoples. 
Ideally, this would be accomplished through a final settlement under which Israel 
would withdraw from most or all of the territories. But for the majority of the right, 
whose whole Greater-Israel ideology rejected withdrawal and the dismantling of 
settlements, the only feasible solution lay in ‘transfer’. This was just another 
euphemism which really meant expulsion and ethnic cleansing. Far right parties 
such as Moledet, with several seats in the Knesset, had openly inscribed it on their 
official programs.131  The Likud had not gone that far, but its public discourse was full 
of it. As many as a third of Labor supporters were said to approve it. In 2002, a poll 
showed that 46 per cent of the population would like to see the ‘transfer’ of the 
Palestinians living in the occupied territories, and 31 per cent (or even 60 per cent 
when the question was posed in a different way) supported the transfer of the 
Palestinians from Israel proper.132   
The disturbing thing was that, since the Intifada, not only had the popularity of 
‘transfer’ grown among its traditional advocates, it had increasingly entered into 
mainstream political discourse. But the mainstream did not consider Israel’s 
responsibility for the Nakba to be a matter of regret, a wrong to be righted. On the 
contrary, Ilan Pappe, one of the ‘new historians’, claims that “although a very 
considerable number of Israeli politicians, journalists and academics have ceased to 
deny what happened in 1948, they have nonetheless also been willing to justify it 
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publicly, not only in retrospect, but as a prescription for the future.”133 To many 
located at the centre of the political spectrum, the Nakba now seemed to be an 
inevitable and justifiable consequence of the Zionist project in historical Palestine. If 
there was any grievance it was that the expulsion was not complete. Transfer 
became the official option, even recommended by one of Israel’s most prestigious 
academic centers, the Center for Inter-Disciplinary Studies in Herzliya.134  
 Two years into the second Intifada, Sharon felt able to pronounce Oslo dead. 
But he had still not achieved the complete subjugation of the Palestinians. He also 
had not established that puppet leadership he wanted, which would pacify and police 
the territories on Israel’s behalf.   
 Having provided an analysis of the context in which the suicide bombings 
took place, in Chapter 3 I will examine the Palestinian suicide bombings from an 
organizational perspective, including a more in-depth analysis of the organizational 
motivations briefly touched upon in the first two chapters, the group process, the 
individual motivations used to the advantage of the organizations, and public 
support.  
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3 Suicide Bombings as Strategic Organizational Tool 
 
 
Some scholars studying suicide terrorism claim that suicide terrorism would 
not exist if it weren’t for the organizations that chose to employ this particular 
tactic135. They argue that it is the organization, not the individual, that is the 
important piece to study in order to understand why this method is employed and 
how to combat it. According to Joseph Lelyveld, executive editor of the New York 
Times, “it’s an organizational phenomenon. What we needed to understand was not 
why bombers did it but how they were recruited and trained. The bombers 
themselves were weapons. In times of turmoil, they were available to skilful and 
compelling recruiters who...knew how to weave interpretations of history, religion 
and present injustice, personal or national, into a tactical imperative.”136 
Although individual and environmental factors do play a role in the decision to 
conduct a suicide operation, it is the organizational level that is key to understanding 
the phenomenon, particularly in the Palestinian case study. This analysis therefore 
focuses on explaining the Palestinian suicide bombings from an organizational and 
strategic point of view. As several other authors have noted, suicide bombings are 
an extremely cost effective tactic in asymmetric warfare from an organizational 
standpoint137. It is relatively cheap; there is no need for complex and risky escape 
routes or safe houses. And if the suicide bombers carry out the attack successfully, 
they cannot disclose information. As Bruce Hoffmann explains, “Suicide bombings 
are inexpensive and effective. They are less complicated and compromising than 
other kinds of terrorist operations. The suicide terrorist is the ultimate smart bomb. 
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Perhaps most important, coldly efficient bombings tear at the fabric of trust that 
holds societies together.”138  
The importance of the organization to the use of suicide terrorism should not 
be underestimated. Without the organization, suicide terrorism would be far less 
prevalent, as suicide bombings hardly ever take place on an individual basis without 
the backing and support of an organization. Organizations are the important link 
between societal conflicts and individual suicide bombers. Without organizations, the 
aggrieved individuals cannot act out their violence in a sustained manner.139 Suicide 
operations require organizational tasks that include acquiring intelligence on the 
potential targets, recruiting and preparing the potential suicide bombers, engineering 
explosives for the suicide attacks, and issuing propaganda to promote the 
organization’s ideology, gain public support, and set the stage for future recruitment 
of followers.140 Organizations that adopt suicide bombings as their tactic of 
resistance require a sophisticated infrastructure, financial and material resources, 
and commitment at various levels of the organization’s membership and leadership. 
Without this organizational infrastructure and commitment, suicide attacks would be 
limited in scope and magnitude.  
However, the organizational aspect of suicide bombings is at the same time a 
major point of vulnerability for the organizations, since it opens up the possibility of 
launching effective counter-terrorism efforts.141 On the other hand, the fact that 
suicide bombings are an organizational tool also means that the suicide bombing 
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attacks can be stopped – at least at the organizational level. Thus, the organizational 
aspect of suicide terrorism offers some hope that this phenomenon is, after all, open 
to rational solutions – such as negotiations.142   
 
3.1 Why organizations use suicide terrorism 
 
 
At this point it is important to explore why an organization would choose to 
employ suicide terrorism as a tactic. The reasons for most organizations, especially 
those involved in an asymmetric power struggle, are strategic in nature. The 
advantages of the use of this tactic include: 
(1) it results in many casualties and causes extensive damage,  
(2) it attracts wide media coverage and displays great determination and an 
inclination of self-sacrifice, 
(3) it guarantees that the attack is carried out at the most appropriate time and 
place with regard to circumstances at the target location,  
(4) as soon as the suicide terrorist has left for the mission, success is virtually 
guaranteed,  
(5) planning and executing the escape route is one of the most complicated 
and problematic issues, suicide terrorists don’t need one, since the attacker is 
killed during the action, and  
(6) there is no fear of capture and interrogation of the terrorist.143 
 
Suicide bombings bring a wide range of advantages for the organization 
employing them. First of all, the organization predetermines the target but the suicide 
bomber himself decides on the precise location and timing of execution. By leaving 
room for flexibility, the mission has a greater chance of success. Second, the unique 
features of suicide bombings promote the likelihood of causing greater harm in 
comparison to other types of terrorism. Third, by upgrading their violence through the 
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use of suicide bombings, the organizations are suggesting that there are practically 
no means of deterring them with traditional methods.144 One of the main aims in 
using this tactic is to spread fear among the population, prompting the public to 
appeal to their governments to solve the problem by at the very least negotiating the 
demands. Mia Bloom writes: “Although a suicide attack aims to physically destroy an 
initial target, its primary use is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare 
intended to affect a larger public audience. The primary target is not those actually 
killed or injured in the attack, but those made to witness it.”145 And according to 
Robert Pape, at its core, “suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to 
compel a target government to change policy. The central logic of this strategy is 
simple: Suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to 
overwhelm their interest in resisting the terrorists’ demands and, so, to cause either 
the government to concede or the population to revolt against the government.”146 
External pressure on governments may also be beneficial to an organization’s 
cause. The fact that such tactics attract wide media coverage and highlight the 
group’s cause is a major benefit. Considering the advantages listed above, it 
becomes evident why organizations with limited resources or those who are fighting 
against a more powerful enemy would find this cost-efficient tactic highly attractive. 
In this sense, the use of suicide bombings as a strategy can be compared to the 
strategic use of force by nation states when in dispute with other states. According to 
Pape, “the heart of the strategy of suicide terrorism is the same as the coercive logic 
used by states when they employ air power or economic sanctions to punish an 
adversary: to cause mounting civilian costs to overwhelm the target state’s interest in 
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the issue in dispute and so to cause it to concede to the terrorists’ political 
demands.”147 
In many cases, and in particular in the Palestinian case study, “martyrdom 
operations” are also considered to be the only answer to opposing an enemy with 
vastly superior military capabilities.148 Groups opposing larger states with more 
military might are inclined to use a tactic that, although not as technologically 
advanced, has similar power capabilities. Mia Bloom explains that “most suicide 
terrorism…is perpetrated by insurgent opposition groups struggling against an 
established and much more powerful state. It is used after strategies have been tried 
and found wanting but is rarely the last ditch attempt in the face of certain defeat.”149 
Organizational theorists state four main motivations for organizations to 
employ suicide terrorism as one of their tactics: a) retaliatory actions against its 
adversaries; b) ideological aims of destroying the middle ground of compromise; c) 
competition for support within its prospective support groups; and d) organizational 
capabilities of the groups to continue with the bombing campaign.”150 
Retaliatory actions against the enemy through the use of suicide terrorism are 
seen as effective in that they are considered to inflict the pain and death that the 
group itself or the community it represents has experienced. Concerning the second 
motivation, if the group has a radical ideology with regard to the conflict and its 
resolution, the use of suicide terrorism will most likely ensure that the enemy will 
either categorically reject the aims of the group or concede to the aims of the group 
in order to stop the bombings. It is unlikely that a state will take the middle ground in 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 3. 
149 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 89. 
150 Mundra, Kusum and Gupta, Dipak K. Suicide Bombing As A Strategic Instrument of Protest:  
An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, at 14. (accessed on November 10, 2005). 
 Available from www.economics.ucr.edu/seminars/fall03/10-01-03%20Kusum%20Mundra%20Intro.pdf. 
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the conflict when faced with suicide terrorism.151 This type of tactic has a polarizing 
effect. Thirdly, organizations will use suicide terrorism to raise their group’s status in 
relation to other groups. This was particularly evident in the Palestinian case. The 
use of suicide terrorism places these organizations at the top, often enabling them to 
draw supporters from other groups to their cause as this tactic is considered to be 
among the most extreme and is a sign of absolute commitment to the cause. Lastly, 
the use of suicide terrorism shows that the group has the organizational structure 
and capabilities to employ this tactic and will continue to do so. 
Suicide terrorism does not depend on the number of ‘troops’ available, but on 
the ability to recruit individual bombers willing to sacrifice their lives for the 
organization’s cause.  The costs of sending suicide bombers are minimal, compared 
to the costs of conventional weapons and the complex logistics involved in acquiring 
them. Based on their understanding of various psychological principles, some 
militant organizations have been able to create a large pool of suicide bombers.152 
The organizations also decide when and where to deploy the suicide bombers in 
order to best achieve the organizations’ political objectives. For instance, Hamas 
refrained from carrying out suicide attacks early on in the Oslo peace process for the 
express reason that they felt that the Palestinian public would not support it153. In 
other words, the Palestinian organizations could turn suicide bombings on and off 
depending on their assessment of the political, social and economic context154. 
 
                                                 
151 Manekas, Jillian, “The Invisible Enemy: Suicide Terrorism in Chechnya and Sri Lanka.” MA Thesis 
submitted to Tufts University, 2005 
152 Kruglanski, Arie and Golec, Agnieszka, “Individual Motivations, The Group Process and Organizational 
Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” in E.M. Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for 
Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press  
153 Merari, July 13, 2000. 
154 See Berman & Laitin; Krueger & Laitin. 
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3.2 The Organizational Motivations of the Palestinian Groups 
 
 
Under what circumstances did the Palestinian groups decide to resort to suicide 
attacks? Asking their members to sacrifice themselves is an extreme step, so it 
would be logical to assume that only under extreme circumstances would a group be 
willing to resort to this method. Extreme circumstances are situations in which, 
according to the group, its main cause or its organizational existence are in grave 
danger.155 Based on the material collected from the various Palestinian groups’ 
websites, the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism’s terror-attack 
database, the archives of the newspaper Ha’aretz, the Palestinian Information 
Center, and the IDF Website, three main types of motives emerged as reasons for 
conducting the suicide attacks:156  
1. Desire for organizational revenge or retaliation – due, for example, to an 
Israeli attack on the organization's leaders, members, sites or offices.  
2. Desire for national revenge or retaliation – due, for example, to an Israeli 
attack against Palestinians who are not members of the organization claiming 
responsibility for the attack.  
3. Desire to achieve a tactical (i.e., specific, short-term) political goal, such as 
disrupting security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian authorities, or 
achieving a strategic (i.e., general, long-term) political goal, such as forcing Israel to 
withdraw from occupied territories.157  
 
 
                                                 
155 Ariel Merari, ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) 
The Root Causes of Terrorism, 2005 
156 For the basis of this analysis, the motivations for the Palestinian suicide bombings are derived from the 
reasons the suicide bombers gave themselves in statements they made prior to conducting the operation as well 
as from published statements of organizational representatives, family members and friends. 
157 Adapted from Robert J. Brym, Bader Araj, Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction,2006,  accessed 
from http://z3950.muse.jhu.edu.library3.webster.edu/journals/social_forces/v084/84.4brym_tab02.html; A 
fourth motivation was individual in nature and thus not included in this analysis of the organizational motives: 
the individual’s desire for personal revenge or retaliation due to an Israeli action against the suicide bomber or 
his or her relatives or friends, or desire to regain one's reputation due to the suicide bomber (or a family 
member) having engaged in shameful behaviour, such as collaboration with the enemy. 
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TABLE 2158 
 
Motivations for Suicide Bombings 
 
 
 
During peak periods of suicide bombings in the second Intifada coordinated 
activities of several organizations could be observed (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Fatah, etc.) and were in that sense "national" campaigns. 
Brym and Araj (2006), divided events that elicited suicide attacks into two broad 
categories: reactive and proactive (see Table 3 below). Reactive precipitants include 
Israeli actions that elicited a Palestinian reaction in the form of a suicide attack. Such 
actions include the assassination of organizational leaders and members, the killing 
of Palestinian civilians, and other actions such as the demolition of houses owned by 
the families of people involved in anti-Israel activities. Proactive precipitants include 
political, religious or ideological events that elicited a suicide attack without 
provocation by specific Israeli actions. In such cases, the organizations used 
symbolically significant anniversaries, elections or negotiations as opportunities to 
further their goals by means of suicide attacks.159 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
159 Robert J. Brym, Bader Araj, Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction, 2006. 
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TABLE 3160 
Precipitants of Suicide Bombings 
 
 
According to the data Brym and Araj collected, the majority of suicide attacks 
were precipitated by specific Israeli actions. In that sense their timing was not of the 
Palestinians' choosing. In fact, Israel's response made it more difficult for suicide 
attacks to be conducted. Especially after the peak in suicide missions of March 
2002, Israel's actions (including the construction of the security wall cordoning off 
much of the West Bank from Israel) significantly decreased the number of suicide 
bombings (successful, not attempted) and increased the time between precipitant 
and reactive attacks.161 This will be discussed in more depth below. Nevertheless, 
even during the Intifada's less violent second half, suicide bombings were often 
brought about by Israeli actions. For example, the suicide bombing in Beersheba on 
August 31, 2004 was declared to be in response to the targeted killings of Hamas 
leaders Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Yet those assassinations had 
occurred four and five months earlier. In contrast, in the first half of the Intifada, the 
response time for reprisal attacks was typically no longer than three weeks, often 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
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less.162 This analysis of precipitants leads to two conclusions: 1. Most suicide 
bombings were advertised as revenge or retaliatory attacks by the groups, and 2. 
Suicide bombings were able to be deterred through Israel’s harsh counterterrorism 
tactics, such as targeted killings and the building of the Wall.  
Organizations tend to operate in a calculated, strategic way. To place this 
hypothesis into the Palestinian context, Brym and Araj examined the organizational 
rationales for suicide attacks. Thirteen percent of the 165 rationales that they 
identified mentioned long-term strategic goals such as ending the Israeli occupation.  
A further 21 percent mentioned short-term tactical goals such as disrupting security 
cooperation between Israel and the PA. Seven percent mentioned that suicide 
bombings were calculated to achieve religious goals – in particular, the defense or 
spread of Islam. However, this leaves a majority of rationales – 59 percent – that fall 
into the reactive category. Even at the organizational level, where, according to Pape 
(2003), calculated, strategic considerations govern action, they found that six out of 
10 organizational rationales focused on avenging Israeli attacks on the organizations 
and the Palestinian people or retaliating for such attacks in order to maintain 
organizational morale.163 Of course the organizations responsible for suicide attacks 
follow a higher level of strategic logic than the suicide bombers themselves. But it is 
nonetheless misleading to make the claim across-the-board that predominantly 
strategic considerations regarding the re-conquest of territory underlie suicide 
bombings. In the Palestinian context, whether the timing or the objectives of suicide 
attacks is examined, the reality is more complex.  
Pape's claim that suicide bombings are relatively successful in terms of 
achieving strategic goals can be questioned – particularly in the Palestinian case 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Robert J. Brym, Bader Araj, Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction, 2006,  accessed from 
http://z3950.muse.jhu.edu.library3.webster.edu/journals/social_forces/v084/84.4brym_tab02.html 
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study. Pape defines success as the withdrawal of occupying forces.164 There was 
just one such withdrawal during the second Intifada – Israel's pullout from Gaza in 
2005. But it is unlikely that the pullout can be viewed as a consequence of 
Palestinian suicide attacks. This may be the view of Hamas and some of the other 
organizations. Hamas’ official statement following the Gaza pullout included the 
phrase, "Four years of resistance surpassed 10 years of bargaining."165 And in early 
September 2005, the "general leader" of Hamas’ military wing, Muhammad Deif, 
said to his comrades that "without… your love of martyrdom, the liberation of Gaza 
could not have been achieved." 166 
However, the geographical location of suicide bombings and the geographical 
origin of the bombers themselves do not support this conclusion. During the second 
Intifada, Gaza was neither the target of a large number of suicide attacks nor were a 
large number of suicide bombers recruited from there. Only 18 percent of all suicide 
attacks took place in Gaza, the same as in the West Bank. Nearly two-thirds of 
suicide attacks took place in Israel proper (see Table 4). Only 26 percent of suicide 
bombers came from Gaza, the majority came from the West Bank (72 percent).167 
Thus, turning back to Pape’s claim that suicide attacks are a decisive factor in 
leading to territorial concessions, if this were the case here, then the concessions 
should have been made in the West Bank, not Gaza. 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House. 
165 Robert J. Brym, Bader Araj, Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction, 2006,  accessed from 
http://z3950.muse.jhu.edu.library3.webster.edu/journals/social_forces/v084/84.4brym_tab02.html 
 
166 Taken from the Palestinian Information Center, quoted in Robert J. Brym, Bader Araj, 2006 
167 For population data, see Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2005a. 
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TABLE 4168 
Geographical Location of Suicide Attacks and Geographical Origin of Suicide 
Bombers 
 
 
Nevertheless, suicide bombings did have an effect on Israeli actions. But the 
effect was often the opposite of what was intended by the organizations. Palestinian 
moderates wanted Israeli public opinion to soften and Israel to withdraw from the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza. Extremists wanted to create deep rifts in Israeli 
society and to dissolve Israel as a Jewish state. But suicide bombings cannot be 
seen as a rational toll to achieve any of these objectives.169 Polls conducted among 
Israelis demonstrated that the suicide attacks helped hardliner Ariel Sharon win the 
elections in 2001 and, in general, radicalized Israeli public opinion throughout the 
second Intifada.170 The suicide bombing attacks also caused Israel to reoccupy 
Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank and Gaza in 2002. Israel had 
withdrawn from these areas in 1995-97 following negotiations agreed upon in the 
1993 Oslo Accords. But in March 2002, 135 Israeli civilians were killed in suicide 
attacks, the most lethal of which was the so-called Passover massacre at the Park 
Hotel in Netanya, in which 30 Israelis lost their lives. Just one day after the Passover 
massacre, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield. Twenty thousand reservists 
                                                 
168 Source: http://z3950.muse.jhu.edu.library3.webster.edu/journals/social_forces/v084/84.4brym_tab05.html 
169 cf. Elster 2005; Weber 1947: 115-18. 
170 Arian 2001, 2002; Eldar 2005; Elran 2006. 
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were called up in a large-scale mobilization that was not seen since the 1982 
invasion of Lebanon. It was the biggest military operation in the West Bank and 
Gaza since the 1967 war, and the two territories were almost completely reoccupied 
within weeks. If the strategic aim of the suicide bombings in March was to force 
Israel to withdraw completely from the occupied territories, they achieved just the 
opposite. Furthermore, substantial West Bank territory was incorporated on the 
Israeli side of the security wall that Israel built to make it more difficult to launch 
suicide attacks. Therefore, on a larger scale and in the long run, the suicide 
bombings also made it more difficult for the Palestinians to gain any territorial 
concessions from Israel. On the contrary, Israel appropriated more Palestinian land 
as a result.   
Therefore, in the Palestinian context, one can conclude that the use of suicide 
bombings was a problematic strategy that rarely achieved strategic territorial 
concessions from Israel and was often counterproductive, leading to unintended, 
negative consequences. In sum, the suicide bombings were little effective in 
achieving strategic objectives and political concessions.   
 
3.2.1 A Closer Look at the Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
 
The asymmetrical balance of power between Israelis and Palestinians and 
the ineptness and inability of the Palestinian political body to deliver the promised 
peace of the Oslo Accords deepened the frustration and despair among the people 
on the one hand, and created the desire to consider alternatives other than 
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negotiations on the other. The gigantic prison, to borrow Ilan Pappe’s term,171 the 
occupation regime established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip only helped 
define the nature and dynamics of these alternatives. As Israel enjoys a superpower 
status in the region, Palestinians are left with bitter and very limited options: either to 
give in to Israel’s military superiority or to resist. Regular warfare is unthinkable. The 
Israeli army possesses the means and the know-how to inflict (as it does) irreparable 
damage on the Palestinians.  A head-on collision with one of the world’s best 
equipped armies is certainly irrational, if not suicidal. Symbolic resistance through 
stone throwing did not seem to be a viable, satisfactory option. For the twenty-year-
old electrical engineering student at Birzeit University, Diya Taweel, resistance was 
not throwing stones at a powerful military machine, as his sister recalls from 
discussions with him. For him, it had to be much more: 
“Once I asked him if he threw rocks. He said he didn’t because there was no 
point. He said if you go to throw a rock you are committing suicide because  
a rock doesn’t do anything. If you want to face their guns, you have to have 
something better than a rock.” 
      (Neda Taweel (Baker 2001)) 
 
What was the alternative to a rock? The search for an easy-to-make, cheap, 
effective, almost risk-free, precise and easy to use weapon was dictated by the need 
to reciprocate the brutality of the use of fighter jets, helicopters and tanks on densely 
populated areas. Although coined ‘collateral damage’, the Israeli killing and injuring 
of thousands of Palestinian civilians on an ongoing basis shattered the moral 
deterrent of resorting to suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians. This feeling 
was compounded by the fact that “the Palestinians had suffered so many civilian 
casualties since the Intifada began that Palestinians found joy in any suffering 
                                                 
171 Lecture on ‘The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinians’ held by Ilan Pappe in Vienna, Austria on 6 December 
2008. 
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inflicted on their enemy. There was a feeling that ‘they should suffer too…”172  
Suzanne Goldenberg of The Guardian makes the same point in her observations 
about suicide bombings: 
“This is a conflict that has been fought without rules. On one side stands an 
army of volunteers, ready to kill and be killed, intent on inflicting the 
maximum […] casualties. They can strike anywhere, at any time…On the 
other side stands a regional superpower which unleashed F-16s and Apache 
helicopters, gunboats and tanks against Palestinian refugee camps and 
towns, and assassinated leading activist.”  
       (Goldenberg 2002b) 
 
Hafez (2006) explains the reasoning of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other 
groups that adopted suicide bombings in their struggle against Israel to be as 
follows: 
1. Negotiations failed to deliver on the legitimate rights and aspirations of the 
Palestinian people. 
2. Armed resistance is the best means to raise the costs of the Israeli 
occupation and ultimately push them out of Palestinian lands. 
3. Given Israel’s superior military capabilities and forces, conventional attacks 
inside Palestinian lands occupied in 1967 are likely to fail. 
4. Suicide bombings inside the Green Line (1949 armistice borders) are more 
effective in fighting the Israelis because they terrorize their populations, 
destroy their economy, drive away immigrants and tourists, and force the 
Israelis to choose between life without the occupation or death with the 
occupation. 
5. Israel is an armed, militarized society with a “citizen army.” Therefore, it is 
legitimate to attack its people anywhere in historic Palestine, even if they do 
not don military garb. 
6. Attacking Israeli civilians is the price Israel pays for attacking Palestinian 
militants and civilians.173 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo (ed.) 
The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism ( 9-11 June 
2003), Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2003 
 
173 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace 
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3.2.1.1 Military Considerations 
 
Other than the tactical organizational considerations for the use of suicide 
bombing attacks described above, there are two other reasons why this method 
became the most prevalent tactic among the Palestinian organizations. First, suicide 
attacks are considered to be very effective in terms of increasing the number of 
fatalities per attack (as opposed to conventional weapons). While the average 
number of fatalities in shooting attacks is 2.11, the average number of fatalities in a 
suicide attack is 8.11.174 Second, in most cases where suicide bombers are 
dispatched, the dispatching organization does not lose more than one member, 
unless the operation is executed in several places at the same time. This prevents a 
more rapid depletion of suicide potentials in the organization. 
The Palestinian factions lost many lives through the previous use of 
conventional hit-and-run operations without inflicting very much harm on the IDF. 
Thus, they not only switched tactics but also switched from military targets to “softer” 
– i.e. civilian – targets, which could terrorize the Israeli population at large, weaken 
the Israeli economy, and drive settlers away from the occupied territories. In 
justifying the strategy of suicide bombings to internal critics, Hamas’ and Islamic 
Jihad’s principle motivations were not religious but instrumental in nature. In other 
words, suicide bombings were promoted because they were viewed as more 
effective than conventional methods of resistance and the best means to achieve the 
strategic aims of the Palestinian people.175 According to Azet al-Rushuq, a member 
of Hamas’ Political Bureau abroad, “This weapon [suicide bomber] is our winning 
card, which turned our weakness and feebleness into strength, and created parity 
                                                 
174 Ibid 
175 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
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never before witnessed in the history of struggle with the Zionist enemy. It also gave 
our people the ability to respond, deter, and inflict harm on the enemy; it no longer 
bears the brunt of punishment alone.”176 
This concept of a “balance of terror” was also confirmed by Muhammad 
Nazzal, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau abroad, in an interview on al-Jazeera 
television177. Nazzal argued that military operations within the occupied territories 
resulted on average in one Israeli death for every 12 Palestinians killed. In contrast, 
operations within Israel’s 1948 borders resulted in nine Israeli deaths for every 
Palestinian suicide bomber.178 He concludes that suicide bombings equalized the 
Palestinians strategic power since they do not have fighter planes, Apache 
helicopters, tanks, and so on. The suicide operations created a balance of forces. 
Although the accuracy of Nazzal’s overall assessment of the equalizing power of 
suicide bombings may be contested, his claim that suicide bombings have narrowed 
the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli deaths is supported by the evidence (see Figure 4 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 Azet al-Rushuq, “Cessation of the Martyrdom Operations is an Urgent Israeli-American demand”, al-Hayat 
(London), May 22, 2002.  
177 Al-Jazeera television program “Opposite Direction,” August 20, 2002 
178 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
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Figure 4179 
Percentages of Palestinians & Israelis killed/injured, 2000-2003 
 
A Palestinian youth explained it this way: 
“If it is considered moral and justifiable for the Israeli army to kill over 19 
Palestinian civilians, including many children, and destroy their houses on 
top of their heads just to kill a wanted Palestinian activist, why is it not OK 
for Palestinians to go after settlers and soldiers while other Israelis stay 
indifferent as we are getting slaughtered on a daily basis? We do not have a 
highly advanced weaponry with which to face a regular army. All we are in 
control of are our bodies. We do not like or want to die. But if this is what it 
takes to terrorize them as they brutalize us all the time, why not do it?” 
       (Palestinian youth)180 
 
Dr Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, secretary-general of the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, uses the same rationale to explain the logic behind using ‘body bombers’ 
against Israeli targets: 
“Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its 
army is trained to a very high standard…We have nothing with which to 
repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is 
                                                 
179 Hafez, Mohammed; Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary 
Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study; Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:165–185, 2006 
180 An extract from an interview conducted in March 2003 by Dr. Hisham Ahmed in the course of his research 
on Palestinian resistance. The name of the interviewee was kept anonymous for security reasons at his request. 
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easy and costs us only our lives. Human bombs cannot be defeated, not even 
by nuclear bombs.”181  
         
According to Abdulaziz Al Rantisi, a Hamas leader in Gaza who was 
assassinated in an Israeli helicopter missile strike on 17 April 2004, “Hamas uses 
these tactics and means of struggle because it lacks F-16s, Apaches, tanks and 
missiles, and so we use any means that we have […] because we are under 
occupation and are weak”182. A suicide attack serves as a weapon of retaliation and 
deterrence. But above all, it is intended to have a “profound negative impact on the 
Israeli public’s sense of personal security, as it is aimed at causing devastating 
physical damage, through which it inflicts profound fear and anxiety”183. 
Furthermore, such attacks are used to “instill a feeling of helplessness in the 
[targeted] population” and to make them conclude “they have no way of protecting 
themselves against such attacks”184. In other words, 
“What the Palestinian suicide bombers are doing with these actions is 
telling the Israelis that we can reach them anywhere. We are there. As long 
as you don’t recognize us and don’t want us to have a state, Israel can claim 
that it’s establishing security, but they must also know that we can reach 
them anywhere. This is what the Palestinian suicide bombers are 
demonstrating by their actions. Israelis will not have security as long as 
they don’t want to give us our state.”185 
 
A report by Hamas, published in its London-based journal, Falastin al-
Muslima (Islamic Palestine), catalogued the achievements of suicide bombings for 
the Palestinian struggle in instrumental terms. In part one the report states that in 
1999, settlements grew at a rate of 12 percent; in 2000, they grew at a rate of eight 
percent; and in 2001 at a rate of five percent. Moreover, fewer people came to live in 
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182 Goldenberg 2002a. 
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185 Nura Karmi (2003), Coordinator of Women’s Programs for Sabeel, the Ecumenical Liberation 
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Israel in 2001 (about 43,000 immigrants), whereas in the previous year, it was 
60,000. Many Israelis are leaving Israel to live in the US and Canada and elsewhere 
due to the worsening security situation. Finally, fewer Israelis use public 
transportation and restaurants; more are using medication to remain calm.186 In part 
two, the report claims that suicide bombings contributed to a decline in tourism in 
Israel, resulting in many tourist workers losing their jobs; 35 hotels and 50 tourist 
services had to close down. Unemployment on the whole went up as well.187 In part 
three, the report states that despite the low number of Israeli soldiers killed during 
the Intifada, its psychological impact on the IDF was tremendous. The report claims 
that as many as 11,200 have deserted the army, refusing to serve in the occupied 
territories.188 Although these claims may be questionable, the report is a reflection of 
Hamas’ instrumental reasoning behind the use of suicide bombers. 
Another claim that is often made in support of suicide bombings is their 
effectiveness in relation to the strategy of negotiations. The more radical Palestinian 
factions have consistently argued that negotiations have led to a dead end. An 
alternative strategy was needed and necessary to achieve the national aspirations of 
the Palestinian people. In light of Hezbollah’s “victory” in southern Lebanon in mid-
2000, when Israel withdrew its troops from the security zone, and in light of the PA’s 
failure to establish a viable and sovereign Palestinian state in late 2000, a violent 
uprising was considered the best strategy to force the Israelis to withdraw from 
Palestinian lands. In a debate between Yasser Abd Rabbo, Minister of Media and 
Culture, and Ramadan Abdulla Shalah, General Secretary of Islamic Jihad, which 
                                                 
186 Falastin al-Muslima, “al-Istitan Taraja wa-malyoun Israili Harabou lil-Aysh fi al-Kharaj” [Settlements are 
declining and a million Israeli have fled to live abroad], April 2002, quoted in Hafez (2006) 
187 Falastin al-Muslima, “al-Siyaha Tadharart wal-Numou Taqalas wal-Tajirah al-Kharijiya Tarajat” [Tourism 
has suffered, growth has slowed, and International Trade has declined], April 2002, quoted in Hafez (2006). 
188 Falastin al-Muslima, “Irtifa Halat al-Farar wal-Intihar wa-Asiyan al-Awamer” [The number of (military) 
desertions, suicides, and disobedience of orders have increased], April 2002, quoted in Hafez (2006). 
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was aired on al-Jazeera television, Abd Rabbo requested a halt to suicide bombings. 
His warned that “it is obvious that Sharon wants to destroy the Palestinian Authority, 
its institutions and infrastructure. He has used the suicide operations as a pretext to 
do so. He wants to take advantage of the September 11 attacks [on America] to 
paint the Palestinians with the same brush as al-Qaeda’s terrorism so he can avoid 
the formation of a Palestinian state. Therefore, we must not fall into his trap.”189 He 
went on to argue that “we need the support of the international community so we can 
balance against the Israeli occupation that legitimizes itself by portraying 
Palestinians as terrorists. Moreover, we should not carry out operations against 
civilians because it gives Israelis the excuses they need – and the international 
legitimacy – to harm the Palestinian public and destroy its accomplishments and 
institutions.” Abdulla Shalah’s responded by arguing that “years of negotiations have 
not achieved the basic goals and rights of the Palestinian people. History has 
shown, whether history with the Israelis or history of the oppressed people around 
the world, that resistance is the only way to achieve your objectives.”190  
In another debate on “martyrdom operations” aired on al-Jazeera, political 
analyst Hani al-Masri, who was one of those who signed a communiqué that called 
for an end to suicide bombings, claimed that even though suicide bombings had 
achieved certain objectives, in general they were harmful for the national goals of 
the Palestinian people.191 Specifically, suicide bombings had militarized the uprising 
and given Israel an excuse to use its superior military capabilities to suppress the 
resistance. Even if the Palestinians were now, with the use of suicide bombings, 
                                                 
189 Al-Jazeera “Opposite Direction” program hosted by Faisal al-Qasim, “Al-Sulta al-Falastinia wa-Harakat al- 
Muqawama” [The Palestinian Authority and the Resistance Movements], aired on December 18, 2001, quoted 
in Hafez (2006) 
190 Ibid. 
191 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
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able to kill more Israelis than before, that in itself was not reason enough to continue 
with the strategy of suicide attacks. The goal was not to kill more people, but to 
achieve the objectives of the Palestinian people. Al-Masri argued that suicide 
bombings had unified the Israelis behind the most extreme and racist elements in 
Israeli society. This had made it difficult if not impossible for the Palestinians to 
negotiate a fair and just settlement to the conflict. Finally, al-Masri concluded that 
after the September 11 attacks on America, international support had turned against 
the Palestinians because of the suicide attacks against civilians. 
 In response to al-Masri’s arguments, Muhammad Nazzal, political bureau 
member of Hamas, countered that suicide operations were instrumental at their 
core. Nazzal argued that it is not the resistance that led to an unfavourable 
conclusion of the struggle, but rather the failed strategy of negotiations among 
unequal powers that gave Israel control of over 80 percent of the land (of historic 
Palestine). According to Nazzal, the resistance was preventing such a conclusion by 
depriving the Israelis of security, harming their economy, and disrupting their 
occupation. As for the charge that suicide bombings kill civilians, Nazzal offered a 
standard reply that is common to most of the resistance groups: In a war between 
two states, those who fight are combatants and those that do not are civilians. 
However, with regard to the Israeli occupation, this is not the case. It is not a 
struggle between two armies or two states. It is a struggle between a colonizing 
power with mightier forces and a modernized army, and a helpless people with 
modest arms. According to Nazzal, Israeli society is a militarized colonialist society 
with few genuine civilians. “We define civilians as those who do not carry arms and 
do not fight. In the case of Israel, this applies to those who are less than 18 years old 
and those who are elderly; the rest are combatants. We do not kill children. We 
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could easily go to preschools or public places where children hang out or attack the 
elderly, but we do not. The rest, however, whether men or women, are forcefully 
conscripted into the army and once a year they are recalled for at least 40 days and 
in cases of war or emergency.”192 
The secular Palestinian groups adopted suicide terrorism, at least in part, to 
compete with their Islamic rivals in the factional struggle over public support. In 
interviews with Fatah members, they claim that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which 
emerged from the ranks of Fatah, adopted suicide bombings at least in part to 
compete with Islamists who seemed to be outperforming them. Many Fatah 
members believed that Fatah had originally initiated the uprising and Hamas only 
joined later. But when it adopted suicide bombings, Hamas seemed to take the lead 
in the struggle to liberate Palestine. One of the Fatah militants termed this 
development as “healthy competition” in the same way that European football 
(soccer) teams compete with each other by constantly striving to be creative in their 
strategies.193 In reality, the adoption of suicide bombings was more than just “healthy 
competition”. It was about recapturing the spotlight that seemed to be unfairly taken 
from them by the Islamist factions. Another reason why Fatah adopted suicide 
bombings was because they felt Israeli escalations, including the targeted 
assassinations of its leaders, especially Raed al-Karmi in January 2002, called for a 
commensurate response to deter Israel from similar attacks. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades initially emerged as different factions with names such as Kateb al-Awda 
                                                 
192 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and leader of Hamas until he was assassinated in March 2004, also 
rejects the notion that Israeli society contains civilians: “Are there any civilians in Israel? They are all soldiers, 
men and women, except those religious persons, who do not serve in the army, the rest are all soldiers. The only 
difference is that they wear civilian clothes when they are in Israel, and military clothes when they come to us. 
The 20,000 or 30,000 reserve soldiers, where did they come from? Are they not part of the Israeli people? Were 
they not civilians?” Al-Hayat, May 22, 2002. 
193 Quoted in Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
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(Returnees Brigades) or Kateb al-Shahid Thabet Thabet (The Martyr Thabet Thabet 
Brigades). These groups then merged under the umbrella organization Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades. From December 2001 to January 2002, these factions avoided 
suicide bombings, but beginning in 2002, they employed them with vengeance. They 
were the first to send female suicide bombers, which may have elicited Islamic Jihad 
and later Hamas to send female bombers of their own (Hamas only sent one).194 
The instrumental reasoning of the Palestinian organizations suggests that 
strategic, not religious or cultural, considerations are the reasons why they adopted 
the use of suicide bombings. However, the importance of religion, nationalism, or 
community in motivating individuals to carry out suicide attacks should not be 
underestimated. What motivates organizations is not necessarily what motivates 
individuals. A careful reading of the individual Palestinian suicide bombers’ last will 
suggests multiple motivations that include religious inspirations, desire for 
vengeance, and commitment to family, community, and Islam. Moreover, the 
Palestinian organizations exerted a great deal of effort and resources to honor, 
venerate, and celebrate the “heroic” deeds of their martyrs, thereby promoting a 
culture of martyrdom based on religious appeals and rituals to convince the 
Palestinian public of the value of suicide bombings. To understand the motivations of 
individual bombers, we need to look at the interactions between strategic 
considerations, religious frameworks, nationalist appeals, and community ties. If the 
organizations sense that the public whose support they are seeking perceives the 
use of suicide bombers in a positive light, and this public also shows support for 
                                                 
194 Hafez interviews with Muhammad Daraghmeh, Associated Press journalist covering the Fatah armed 
groups in the West Bank, on December 12, 2003 in Ramallah; Tayseer Naserallah (Abu Basel), member of 
Fatah and Palestinian National Council, on December 16, 2003 in Nablus; and Fayeq Qanan, Secretary General 
of Fatah Movement (Tulkarem), on December 19, 2003 in Tulkarem. See also Human Rights Watch, Erased In 
a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, October 2002 (New York: Human Rights 
Watch), and Mia Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding,” 
Political Science Quarterly 119, 1, Spring 2004. 
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other organizations who are making use of suicide attackers, then chances are that 
they will also adopt this tactic and invest in the ‘marketing’ and glorification of their 
actions.195 Decisions about whether to increase or reduce the number and 
magnitude of the suicide operations, or whether to change the targets of the suicide 
attacks, can also be seen to be as a direct consequence of the support that the 
organizational leadership believes they are receiving from their ‘constituency’.  
From the above considerations, it can thus be concluded that the use of suicide 
bombers would most likely be suspended under the following three conditions. First, 
if the organizations’ goals have been achieved. Second, if Israel finds effective ways 
of containing the suicide attacks and the organizations’ leadership become aware 
that this strategy is no longer beneficial. Third, if the public the organizations seek to 
represent no longer condones the use of this method.  
A review of attacks committed by Hamas in the years 1993 to 2004 shows that 
the percentage of attacks employing suicide bombers gradually increased over the 
years to 63.4 per cent of the total of actions perpetrated by the organization.196 Ami 
Pedahzur found a similar profile in the operations of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
The percentage of suicide attacks lies at 64.3 percent of the total of attacks 
perpetrated by the organization. With regard to Fatah (and its military wing, Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades), it appears that the heads of the military arm of Fatah, who joined 
in the use of suicide terrorism only in the beginning of the year 2002, nearly ten 
years after Hamas and the PIJ had already instigated the method, quite capably 
internalized the lessons of their precursors.197 Fatah became the organization 
making the greatest use of suicide bombing attacks (85.7 percent of the total of 
                                                 
195 Gill, Paul: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing, 159 IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 
196 Ami Pedhazur Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp.16-17 
197 Ibid. 
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actions) in the conflict.198 The fact that all Palestinian organizations employed similar 
modes of action may in fact indicate a trend of mutual imitation. However, at the 
same time, it is worth noting that all these organizations share the same enemy – 
Israel. Therefore, it follows that the constraints created by the Israeli defense 
strategy have had an effect on all of the organizations’ modes of action and their 
ability to carry out these particular methods.  
 
Figure 5199  
Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles 
(Sept 1993) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 Ibid 
199 Source: Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Center 2006 
104 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategic Organizational Tool 
Figure 6200 
Suicide Attacks from 2000 - 2008 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Religious Dynamics  
 
 
To understand the acceptance of suicidal violence in Palestinian society one 
must also understand the cultural shift that has characterized Muslim societies since 
the 1970s. After decades of western secularization, the Muslim world witnessed an 
Islamic revival characterized by the spread of Islamic networks, social movements, 
and political parties. Networks of charity and non-governmental mosques were 
created by Islamic activists free from the “corrupting” influence of the secular state. 
The Iranian revolution in 1979 reinforced the trend toward Islamic resurgence and 
activism as Islamists appeared to be effective agents of social change.201  
                                                 
200 http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/Sept_Monthly_Summary_2008-en.pdf 
201 It is outside the scope of this report to discuss the causes and dynamics of Islamic revivalism witnessed since 
the 1970s. For an introduction to theories on Islamic activism, see Chapter 1 of Mohammed M. Hafez, Why 
Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 
105 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategic Organizational Tool 
Palestinian society did not escape this phenomenon. Large segments of the 
Palestinian population living in the West Bank and Gaza became increasingly 
religious as a result of Islamic revivalism.202 The rise of Hamas as a possible 
competitor of the nationalist camp in 1988, the success of the Islamic Bloc in various 
universities in the West Bank and Gaza since the 1980s, the increase in Islamic 
charity networks, especially in Gaza, created resources and a clear legitimacy for 
the Islamic movement.203 Although Fatah remained the dominant organization 
representing Palestinian aspirations for independence, Hamas’ ranks increased 
quickly during the first Intifada.  
Islamists in Palestine maintain that Islamic lands have been stolen by the 
Jews in alliance with powerful western forces.204 Given this great injustice, it is the 
obligation of every Muslim inside and outside Palestine to wage a jihad of liberation. 
This notion of jihad as an individual obligation is also proclaimed by Fathi Shiqaqi, 
one of the founders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.205  It also received support from 
many other Islamic scholars. To justify their claim for the necessity of sacrifice in 
Palestine, Hamas and Islamic Jihad referred to the abundant Islamic texts 
concerning jihad and martyrdom in the Quran and prophetic traditions. These 
passages urge Muslims to fight persecution and injustice in the path of God and not 
                                                 
202 Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2000). 
203 Sara Roy, “The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine,” Middle East Report (Spring 2000), 24-27; 
International Crisis Group, “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A 
Legitimate Target?” ICG Middle East Report 13 (April 2, 2003), 1-31; Ian Fisher, “Defining Hamas: Roots in 
Charity and Branches of Violence,” New York Times, June 16, 2003. 
204 Hafez, Mohammed, Manufacturing Human Bombs: Strategy, Culture and Conflict in the Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Unpublished Research Paper, 2004). 
205 See chapter 2 of Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Moshe Dayan 
Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv University, 2001). 
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to fear death because those killed in battle will be rewarded by God.206 In interviews 
with Hamas supporters at al-Najah University in Nablus and Bir Zeit University in 
Ramallah, Hafez asked about the logic behind militarizing the uprising and deploying 
suicide bombers against the powerful Israeli state, which had not shown any 
willingness to concede an inch in the face of Palestinian violence. Militants frame 
their contemporary struggle against Israel as part of the Islamic tradition of jihad and 
martyrdom by the weak against the strong, the righteous over the unjust.207 By 
putting the emphasis on martyrdom as opposed to suicide, it becomes very difficult 
to criticize the bombers directly. One may question the goals and tactics of their 
organizations, just as one may question the policies of states at war, but one rarely 
questions the heroism of individual martyrs in the same way societies rarely question 
the gallantry of their fallen soldiers.208 Iyad Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist, perhaps 
put it best: “You can say, ‘I condemn terror, I condemn killing civilians,’ but you can’t 
say, ‘I condemn martyrs,’ because martyrs are prophets.”209 Suzanne Goldenberg 
concludes that 
“Religious indoctrination is no longer central to the preparation of the 
bombers – especially for secular groups such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. But the iron 
fist of Ariel Sharon – the incursions into West Bank towns and refugee 
camps by Israeli armour and helicopter gunships, the mass arrests and 
lengthy curfews – has only increases the determination of those who would 
embrace martyrdom.”210  
        
Islam is used by the organizations as a mobilizing ideology to 
indoctrinate believers into not accepting oppressions and subjugation. 
                                                 
206 Keith Lewinstein, “The Revaluation of Martyrdom in Early Islam,” in Margaret Cormack, ed. Sacrificing the 
Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 78-91. 
207 Hafez, Mohammed, Manufacturing Human Bombs: Strategy, Culture and Conflict in the Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Unpublished Research Paper, 2004). 
208 Ibid. 
209 See interview with James Bennet, “The Bombers,” New York Times, June 21, 2002. 
210 Goldenberg 2002a. 
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Undoubtedly, it is the fact that life under occupation is intolerable and 
unbearable which leads Palestinian youngsters to sacrifice their bodies and 
their targets to draw attention to the Palestinian cause. Ahmed (2003) writes 
that “it has no longer become a far-fetched conclusion that Sharon, by virtue 
of his reckless assault on Palestinians, has created a societal factory of 
suicide bombers not only among Muslims, but also among Palestinian 
Christians, hitherto unaccustomed to consider resorting to such measures.”  
         
3.2.1.3 The Group Process 
 
A number of social psychological processes come into effect once an 
individual has joined an organization for the purpose of perpetrating a suicide attack. 
First, he is cast into a social reality that affirms his “newborn” identity as a future 
“martyr”. The suicide bombers are organized into small cells and given intense and 
personal spiritual training.  An important element in creating this “social reality” 
involves the use of language. The would-be suicide bomber isn’t referred to as a 
terrorist or even as a freedom fighter. Instead, he is depicted as a “martyr” even 
before he carries out the attack, namely as a “living martyr” (al Shahid al hai). The 
“living martyrs” are subject to indoctrination which contains elements of glorification 
of their own group, religion and their special saintly status. They are told their 
families will not only be guaranteed a place in heaven, but will also be given 
considerable rewards in this life.211  
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Friedkin212 argues that some organizations inculcate their members with a 
sense of duty and portray individual suicide as an honorable sacrifice for the sake of 
their oppressed community. Thus, the suicide operations become ‘obligatory 
altruistic suicides’ (as opposed to egoistic ones in Durkheim’s terminology, see 
discussion in chapter 1.6). They are also fed extensive anti-enemy propaganda213. 
The enemy (Israel) is referred to as the “enemy of God” and is analogized to groups 
known for their inhumanity (Nazis), or destructiveness (barbarians, Vandals), or 
referred to as despicable criminals (murderers).214 With these linguistic tactics an 
idealized in-group is perceived to be fighting a dehumanized enemy. In this battle 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ or ‘right’ against ‘wrong’, both sacrifices and atrocities are 
justified. As Berman and Laitin note “the empathy for anonymous innocent”215 is 
missing. This perspective eases their adjustment to a life in constant conflict by 
creating a social reality wherein aggression against the evil enemy is the only option.  
Certainly, such strategies of delegitimation and dehumanization are not unique to 
suicide terrorism; they are often part of any aggressive behavior toward fellow 
human beings including state terrorism, for example. 
Berman and Laitin observed that it would be difficult to keep up suicide 
attacks, even if they seemed to be the only efficient tactic, if the suicide bombers 
themselves did not have other motivations as well. Religious motivation alone, such 
as the “religious promise of eternal grace”, is not enough of a reason. Other more 
secular motivations may be the belief that their individual sacrifice will benefit the 
                                                 
212 Friedkin, N.E. (in press). The interpersonal influence systems and organized suicides of death cults. In E.M. 
Meyersson-Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
213 Moghadam, 2003. 
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215 Berman and Laitin, p. 13. 
109 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategic Organizational Tool 
nation and grant them a place in history.216 Besides religion, many suicide attacks 
have been perpetrated in the name of ethnicity and nationalism. Palestinian suicide 
terrorists perceive their actions as “dying for their land”, in combat against the Israeli 
occupation.217 
  This is not to say that every suicide bomber who commits him/herself to 
suicide missions for religious reasons is an expert on the Koran. Nor is every suicide 
bomber about to commit a suicide mission for political reasons an expert on political 
ideology. What is more probable is that the suicide bombers place their trust in 
“epistemic authorities” who explain what the organization’s ideological strategy asks 
of them at a given time218. The main two types of “epistemic authorities” are the 
expert and the group. A good example of expert epistemic authority is the role Sayid 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlalla played in the use of suicide bombings by Hezbollah. 
Fadlalla is Hezbollah’s supreme spiritual leader to whom the commanders looked to 
for approval of using suicide tactics. At first Fadlalla expressed moral reservations 
about perpetrating suicide attacks, but he subsequently gave them his full support. 
This spiritual “seal of approval” resulted in a series of suicide attacks in Lebanon that 
has since made history.  
The second trusted “epistemic authority” for an individual is the group or 
community, whose consent establishes whether suicide bombings are justifiable and 
desirable. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Palestinian community’s 
support for suicide bombings increased steadily from 1996 to 2002. Whereas in 
March 1996 it was still ‘only’ around 20%, it rose to 70-80 % in favor by June 
                                                 
216 Kruglanski, Arie and Golec, Agnieszka, “Individual Motivations, The Group Process and Organizational 
Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” in E.M. Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for 
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217 Moghadam, 2003. 
218 See Kruglanski, Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Ellis, Bar, Pierro & Mannetti, in press. 
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2002.219 The suicide bombers are dependent on expert and group authorities to tell 
them what to do, even on a personal decision such as the taking of their own life.  
In this regard, Friedkin points out that it is in the organization’s vital interest 
that its members do not have “minds of their own”, do not value their own judgments 
and opinions and are susceptible to the group’s influence.220 Therefore, the 
organizations cut off their members’ access to external support to purposefully 
diminish their self-weight or authority and train the future martyrs in isolated places, 
away from family and friends. The organization compels the suicide bomber to 
sacrifice individuality and personal needs in the name of the cause.221 The 
organizations use public commitment and social pressure to create martyrs who are 
“reliable and committed”, and who will not change their minds midway through the 
task and put the whole organization at risk, wasting weeks or months of 
preparations.222 As Merari (1990, p. 208) explains, the final element of the group 
process that the suicide bomber is trained in is the method of public commitment 
that creates a psychological “point of no return”.  
According to Merari (July 13, 2000), practically none of the suicide bombers in 
the Palestinian case have changed their minds midway. However, a more recent 
study by Berman and Laitin shows cases where Palestinian suicide bombers have 
defected between the years 2000 and 2003. A change of mind constitutes a problem 
that the organizations have to guard against by using various tactics of social 
pressure. 
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Nicole Argo, a Ph.D. candidate at MIT, conducted interviews with intercepted 
Palestinian suicide bombers held in Israeli prisons. She illustrates how feelings of 
community were expressed in the motivations of the would-be bombers.223  
Following is a sample of five suicide bombers reflecting on their motives:  
“I didn’t decide in one moment [to carry out an attack]. I had been 
thinking about it from the beginning of the Intifada, looking for an 
opportunity and an organization to help me do it. There were few 
factors affecting the decision – the stress of the occupation, the 
humiliation of my cousin being searched by soldiers, the 
killings…against kids – and the action was in honour of the kids 
who were killed… I did this because of the suffering of the 
Palestinian people. The falling of shuhada [those martyred by 
Israeli forces]…and the destruction everywhere in Palestine…I did 
this for God and for the Palestinian people. I didn’t think about the 
consequences of the operation – if it would make things better or 
not. I don’t understand politics…but that we are able to react 
against their bombings and their killing of inhabitants of the camp is 
important. My mission made them (the camp) happy, even though 
they were punished a lot [for it] in Jenin. The land and trees and 
houses were punished; nothing remains that they did not punish. I 
believe the operation would hurt the enemy…Also [a] successful 
mission greatly influences society. It raises the morale of the 
people; they are happy, they feel strong. I know the bombing will 
hurt the Israelis and prove to them that we are still ready to fight. 
[So much] happened to our camp because of the destruction – 
someone told me the operation would be a benefit to the camp, to 
create pressure on the Israelis in order that they retreat from the 
territory…The most important thing was that we should make an 
operation in the heart of Israel after the [Israeli military] penetration 
in order to prove that we were not influenced by the military attack.” 
 
This shows that in the case of the Palestinian suicide bombers, one cannot 
separate nationalism from religious revivalism. Religious revivalism, nationalist 
conflict, and community ties underline the culture of martyrdom that characterised 
the second Palestinian Intifada. The suicide bombers are dying for “God and 
country”. The different groups framed martyrdom as an act of redemption, 
empowerment, and defiance against unjust authorities. Volunteers for suicide 
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attacks were not brainwashed victims of opportunistic organizations, nor were they 
manipulated or fooled by calculating terrorists. Rather, they were more inspired by 
the opportunity given to them by the different groups to fulfill their obligation to God, 
sacrifice for the nation, and avenge a grieving people. 
 
3.2.1.3.1 The Individual Radicalizes Within a Group Setting  
 
At the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stands a deep sense of injustice 
beyond profound frustration and despair.  In their struggle against the occupation, 
the Palestinian organizations resorted to suicide bombings, demonstrating the failure 
of other attempted tactics. Israel’s continued repression created an abnormal state 
of mind in Palestinian society. The lack of normalcy in daily life and the profound 
frustration the Palestinians feel created a variety of psychological motives for 
resisting the Israeli occupation through the use of suicide bombings. And the various 
groups used this to their advantage. 
Almost every Palestinian young male has suffered some form of hardship or 
humiliation as a result of the Israeli occupation, such as arrest, beatings, injury or 
deportation.  Every Palestinian has felt the stranglehold of Israeli military control on 
their lives. Ariel Merari, a psychologist at Tel Aviv University, depicted that “intense 
struggles produce several types of people with the potential willingness to sacrifice 
themselves for a cause.”224 Munir al-Makdah, a trainer of suicide bombers, explains 
that “much of the work is already done by the suffering these people have been 
subject to… Only 10 percent comes from me. The suffering and living away from 
their land has given the person 90 percent of what he needs to become a martyr. All 
                                                 
224 Hisham Ahmed, ‘Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’: Causes and Consequences’, Torje Bjorgo 
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we do is provide guidance and help strengthen his faith and help set the objectives 
for him.”225 
Social psychologists argue that conformity is a big factor in explaining 
behavior in a group setting. Leaders of the organizations make sure that the suicide 
bombers conform to the norm until moments before the suicide bombing. Fellow 
group members closely guard the bomber. This guards against a mindset change of 
the bomber. In the Palestinian case, if the would-be bomber showed any signs of 
weakness, a senior trainer was called to reinforce his determination226. Eyewitness 
reports of suicide bombings in Israel consistently described three or four men 
dropping the bomber off at the destination. 
In intermittent phases, the bombers are dispatched from some Palestinian 
areas more frequently than other areas. This may be because the bombers are 
trained in the group together, and after the first bombing the next in line feels 
pressured to become a bomber as well. There are many examples of this. In May 
2003, three university students from Hebron carried out attacks in Israel over the 
course of three days. A fourth suicide bomber from Hebron followed one month later. 
Twelve suicide bombers from Nablus conducted attacks between December 2, 2001 
and March 30, 2002. After that, no suicide bombings were carried out by Nablus 
residents in the following five weeks. Then, ten suicide bombers from Nablus broke 
this phase between May 7 and August 6, after which again no bombers from Nablus 
emerged for another two months before four more carried out their operations 
between October 27, 2002 and January 5, 2003. However, when there were no 
bombers from Nablus, they came from Jenin. For example, between 25 May, 2001 
and 12 August, 2001, there were seven suicide bombers from Jenin. Then there 
                                                 
225 Cited in Davis 2003, 154. 
226 Hassan 2001. 
114 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategic Organizational Tool 
were no bombers from Jenin for almost two months. Between October 7, 2001 and 
December 9, 2001, three Jenin residents went on suicide missions. Then, there 
were no bombers from Jenin until March 5, 2002, when another five went on suicide 
missions before June 5, 2002. Again, there was a two-month period with no suicide 
bombers from Jenin. However, four bombers followed between August 4 and 
October 21. Of the eighteen months covered here, there is only eight weeks of 
overlap between the two towns dispatching suicide bombers. What is interesting is 
that this pattern of intermittent phases can also be seen in Bethlehem, Hebron, 
Tulkarem and Kalkilya.  This pattern of intermittent phases is an illustration of how 
domestic competition factors played out between the different Palestinian factions. A 
Hamas suicide bombing by its cell in Nablus, for example, would create pressure on 
the rival Nablus cells of Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PFLP to carry out 
suicide bombings as well for fear of losing the support of the local community. Along 
with Pedahzur and Perliger’s social network analysis of Palestinian organizations 
(2006), this finding also supports Bloom’s thesis (2005) that inter-organizational 
rivalry factors played an important role in the development of Palestinian suicide 
bombings. 
 
 
3.3 Individual Motivations Used to the Organizational Advantage  
 
 
Several studies and research have focused on the pathological aspect of 
violence (Gordon 2002, Post 1990), socialization factors (Atran, 2003, Post 2005, 
Sageman 2005), the applicability of the rational choice theory (Gupta 2004), 
religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), and revenge for personal suffering (Margalit 
2003), although this list is by no means complete. These studies have all contributed 
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to a better understanding of individual motivations, but their generalizations are 
problematic. These studies only focused on the “supply side” of joining an 
organization, and by only focusing on the individual factors that contribute to creating 
a large pool of recruits, they ignore the obstacles to membership.227  
The leaders of the organizations carefully choose who can join their ranks. 
This is important so as to ensure the secretive nature of their work. The risk of a new 
recruit being an informant or going back on their commitment to carry out the attack 
is too high.  As will be outlined below, the role of familial and friendship ties is also 
key to understanding how members are selected, since pre-existing familial and 
friendship ties do play a role in the recruitment process. The motivations to become 
a suicide bomber should be viewed as a process (depicted in Figure 7 below). The 
individual is aware that his/her social status may increase due to their membership 
in the organization. Post et al’s interviews with intercepted suicide bombers (2005) 
reveal that they are aware of the potential of increasing their social status and that 
this is a main motivator in joining an organization. Yet although this awareness may 
have existed before, only after the individuals experience a catalyst (i.e. traumatic 
event) does the desire to join become significant. According to Silke (2003), the 
catalyst could be a response to personal suffering, revenge for imprisonment,228 an 
act of violence by opposition forces229, a response to restrictions on movement, a 
response to personal desperation, or frustration of personal goals.230 The list of 
catalysts and examples is infinite. 
                                                 
227 Gill, Paul: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing159 IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159. 
228 Yusef Ali Mohammed Zughayer (22) and Suleiman Musa Dahayneh (24) both served time in 
Israeli prisons. They conducted a double suicide bombing on November 6, 1998, in Jerusalem. 
229 Taysir Ahmed Ajrami (22) carried out a suicide bombing on November 26, 2001. His suicide note said the 
attack was in response to the killing of five Palestinian children the previous week by an Israeli mine. 
230 Three bombers carried out three separate acts over the course of one weekend in Israel. All three 
had attended Hebron Polytechnic University, which had been closed by IDF forces months earlier. 
116 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategic Organizational Tool 
 
Figure 7231 
 
The path to becoming a suicide bomber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In their analysis of suicide bombers, Kimhi and Even (2004) show that the 
social environment rather than a personality flaw induces people to join militant 
organizations. Propaganda, proclamations supporting suicide bombings from 
epistemic leaders (as described above), and a sense of threat due to ongoing 
conflict creates a pool of willing recruits for organizations.232 Propaganda that turns 
the suicide bomber into a celebrity plays a large role in persuading others to make 
the same decision. Through interviews with terrorists, Silke (2003) describes the 
process of becoming a terrorist as primarily an issue of socialization. Studies on the 
recruitment processes of terrorist organizations highlight the important role of pre-
existing familial or friendship ties. Post et al. (2005) found that familial ties and 
                                                 
231 From: Gill, Paul,A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing; International Journal of Conflict and 
Violence, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 142-159, 2007. 
232 Gill, Paul: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing, 159 IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 
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friendship ties are key to the recruitment process of Palestinian groups. Examples 
include husband and wife bombers in Palestine, a sister of a deceased Islamic Jihad 
militant in October 2003, a sister of an imprisoned Fatah operative in May 2003, a 
nephew of a prominent leader of Hamas in March 2001, and a nephew of a 
prominent Fatah leader in May 2005. Examples of best friends carrying out double 
suicide bombings include attacks in December 2001, January 2003, September 
2003 and March 2004. Seven members of the same Palestinian football club carried 
out a series of suicide attacks in late 2002 and early 2003.233 
With respect to the individual motivations for carrying out a suicide attack, 
these can be political/nationalistic, religious, ideological, economic, community, 
sociological, psychological, personal, or familial.234 Hamas claims to have thousands 
of self-recruited individual bombers (most of whom it allegedly has to turn away).235
   
The reasons for this may be the experiences of deep personal traumatization and 
loss that leads some to seek out the ideological message of those promoting jihadist 
methods. This message helps traumatized individuals to find a framework for 
addressing their emotional suffering and sense of dismal future.
 
 Yet, however the 
organizations’ ideologies supporting suicide terrorism may address the psychosocial 
needs of the individuals, the rationale behind the decision to become a suicide 
bomber must also be considered.236  
However, traumatic stress alone is insufficient to cause an individual to 
consider becoming a suicide bomber. The majority of Palestinians have been deeply 
                                                 
233 Hammer and Zidan 2003. 
234 Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational 
Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26.2 (February/March 2003).   
235 See: Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to Human Bombs,” The New Yorker (November 19, 
2001). Anne Speckhard, unpublished interview with Zacharia Zubeidi, leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 
in Jenin, who also claimed to have hundreds of volunteers for suicide missions (March 2005).  
Speckhard & Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism (2005, in press).  
236 Anne Speckhard, from unpublished interviews with Palestinians. 
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traumatized, and yet most carry on with daily life despite enduring emotional pain 
and do not become suicide bombers. Traumatic experiences may form the 
psychological basis that make individuals open to the ideologies of the groups 
promoting suicide bombing. But it is not a decisive factor. The ideologies promoting 
suicide bombing must be present to provide the traumatized individual with the 
outlet, with a means of empowerment to strike back, to defend his community, to 
express his pain, and make sure that the enemy also feels that pain. The individual 
seeks to find meaning in and end to his suffering in an honorable way – avenging 
the community and becoming a hero. Ultimately, the traumatized individual seeks to 
enact justice in a situation in which s/he, rightly or wrongly, perceives no other way 
to seek justice. This process and actions take place in a manner that is justified by 
the group and by the local community.237 
However impelling the individual motivations for carrying out suicide attacks 
might be, the survival instinct and the fear of death are still a powerful psychological 
factor. The above reasons and motivations do not suggest that any of the 
characteristics mentioned are either necessary or sufficient for an individual to 
become a suicide bomber. One need not be a traumatized adolescent, politically 
oppressed, and in need of asserting oneself and lacking legitimate outlets to become 
a suicide bomber. On the other hand, a person could be one or all of the above and 
yet not become a suicide bomber.238  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
237 Anne Spekhard, “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders,” 2004. 
238 Kruglanski, Arie and Golec, Agnieszka, “Individual Motivations, The Group Process and Organizational 
Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” in E.M. Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for 
Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
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3.3.1 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers  
 
Although gender did initially play a role in the organizational motivation for 
choosing whom to send on suicide missions, the preference being given to males, 
the Palestinian organizations began to open this option to women as it became more 
and more difficult to send male bombers across increasingly secure checkpoints. 
Women could more easily hide explosives by simulating pregnancy, and respect for 
the cultural modes of modesty at first prevented thorough searches of women 
(though with the increase in female bombers this changed). Furthermore, the first 
suicide bombings carried out by females had tremendous shock value.   
  In her interviews with family members of female Palestinian bombers, 
Barbara Victor239
 
claimed that strict role assignments in a very controlled society 
made the choice of martyrdom seem more attractive to those women who were 
unable or unwilling to fulfill their prescribed social roles (due to infertility, discovery of 
an illicit sexual relationship or pregnancy, etc.) and thus unable to return to the 
“normal” roles of becoming wives and mothers. 
However, more recent interviews by Anne Spekhard with would-be female 
Palestinian bombers imprisoned in Israel suggest that the inability to fulfill “normal” 
roles is only a marginal motivator. One interviewee laughed when she was asked 
about Victor’s theories, saying that they are implausible.240 “For this you want to 
explode yourself? For infertility? This is stupidity. For having had illicit sexual 
relations? You will die for this? No. I can speak to God and He will forgive me.” She 
went on to say that people often search for such explanations, especially with regard 
to female bombers, and explained, “Every girl can decide for herself…if you want to 
                                                 
239 Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, Rodale Books, 
2003. 
240 Anne Speckhard unpublished Palestinian interviews March 2005. 
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die and you know you want to die. This is what is going on with exploding 
ourselves.”241 
Even so, an important difference between male and female suicide bombers 
is that men seeking to retaliate against a powerful enemy have many more options 
than women in conservative societies. Militant organizations in conservative 
societies are often unwilling to arm women to fight in battles or even to allow women 
to “martyr” themselves in scenarios in which they are likely to be killed. By limiting 
the possibilities for women to respond to traumatic stress (and, in particular, giving 
them few ways in which to either fight against or flee the sources of that stress) 
conservative societies might be forcing some women to be permanently frozen in a 
dissociative state. This in turn makes them more open to the option of becoming a 
human bomb than they would be otherwise.  
The leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, Zacharia Zubeidi 
appears to support this view. He reports, “Girls come begging for such operations 
[human bombings] much more than boys. Twice as many girls ask.” When asked 
why he thought this was so, he answered, “Emotions of girls are higher than boys. 
Their feelings are much deeper than boys’. God created girls more sensitive.” 
However, he added, “We decided no girls. No one took them since the Intifada 
began, so this pool increased. A guy can let a little of what’s inside out by going to 
shoot on an operation – shoot and come back. A girl has few choices. She cannot 
go and shoot. Every girl has just one way – a [bombing] operation.”242 
A woman who chooses to become a bomber, taking on the traditionally male 
role of warrior, does briefly attain a sense of power in life. But this is quite short-lived 
given the path a suicide bomber takes. Hence, these are likely only secondary 
                                                 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
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motivations following traumatic stress. Likewise, in some societies a woman can 
attain “celebrity status” only after death; a status that is very difficult for a woman to 
attain in life in most traditional societies.  
 
3.4 Societal  Motives and Public Support 
 
 
 
The question that remains to be answered is what explains the extent of 
societal support for this type of strategy? Why were the organizations able to 
convince the broader public of the appropriateness of suicide bombings? 
The changes in the characteristics of suicide bombers during the second 
Intifada are not only related to the changes in the organizations’ policies. They also 
reflect changes in the attitude of the Palestinian society toward suicide bombings. 
Previous studies have shown that social support had a significant effect on the 
willingness of individuals to commit suicide attacks during the second Intifada. 
Clearly, neither suicide bombers nor the organizations sending them out operate in a 
vacuum, and they are influenced by the social environment and the support of the 
Palestinian society. Kimhi and Even, (2004) argue that although it is not always 
possible to make a distinction between the unprompted support of the Palestinian 
people and the social support directed by the organization, it seems that they are 
influenced by the environment, which encourages suicide attacks. Social support 
such as public assemblies, posters of the suicide bombers in the streets, and 
financial support for the families of suicide bombers has contributed toward 
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establishing the collective perception of suicide attacks as a legitimate act of national 
liberation in Palestinian society.243 
The level of public support for suicide operations seems to affect both the 
group’s willingness to use this tactic and the number of volunteers for suicide 
missions. In choosing tactics and targets, the groups tend to act in accordance with 
the population’s approval. During the last six months of 1995, for example, Hamas 
refrained from carrying out suicide attacks because its leadership realized that such 
actions would not be supported by the Palestinian population and would thus have 
had a negative effect on the organization’s popularity. The great increase in the 
frequency of suicide attacks during the second Intifada reflected the increased 
willingness of Palestinian youth to be recruited for acts that the community generally 
regarded as ultimate patriotism and heroism. Songs praising the shaheeds were the 
greatest hits, the walls in the streets and alleys of Palestinian towns in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip were covered with graffiti applaud them244.  
 
Graffiti of exploding bus, Dheishah refugee camp 
                                                 
243 168 IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 160–168; Revital Sela-Shayovitz: Suicide Bombers in Israel: Their 
Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity in Terrorist Organizations. 
244 See Ariel Merari ‘Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ in Torje Bjorgo 
(ed.) The Root Causes of Terrorism, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting on the Root Causes of Terrorism ( 9-11 
June 2003), Oslo. 
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In this environment, the groups considered having a public license to continue 
the suicide attacks, and they also had a constant flow of eager youths ready to 
become the next heroes.  
 
TABLE 5 
Public Support for Suicide Bombings 1996-2004245 
 
The surveys conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center 
(JMCC) and Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) showed 
that many forms of violent action toward Israel have a positive value attached to 
them in Palestinian areas. They show strong support for military actions against the 
IDF, Israeli civilians, and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. Over the course of 16 
surveys, undertaken between May 1997 and February 2006, JMCC survey data 
averaged 60.9 percent support for military operations against Israeli targets. The 13 
surveys conducted by PCPSR between August 1995 and March 2005 showed 88.1 
percent support for any military operation against Israeli military targets. Support for 
armed attacks against Israeli civilians averaged 51.7 percent over 19 surveys 
between August 1995 and June 2006 (PCPSR). Support for armed attacks against 
                                                 
245 Hafez, Mohammed; Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary 
Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study; Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:165–185, 2006 
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Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza averaged 86.6 percent over 12 surveys 
between August 1995 and December 2004 (PCPSR). Support for these acts was 
consistently higher amongst those who were educated, young, female, living in 
refugee camps, earning a higher income, and Hamas supporters. Over the course of 
19 surveys undertaken between June 1995 and February 2006, JMCC data showed 
52 percent support for suicide bombings against any Israeli target. Support for 
specific suicide bombings in PCPSR surveys showed even higher levels. The Maxim 
Restaurant bombing in 2003, which killed 20 Israeli civilians, received 74 percent 
support. The Beer Shiva suicide bombing in 2004 received 77 percent support, while 
69 percent supported the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in April 2006 that killed 11 
civilians. 
JMCC survey data also revealed a negative correlation between support for 
suicide bombings and optimism about the future (see Figure 8). This finding 
corresponds with the hypothesis that anxiety about the future turns individuals 
toward authoritarian and escalatory tendencies.246 In normative terms, suicide 
bombings correspond with this escalatory tendency because they violate almost 
every ethical norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill innocents and 
not to commit suicide). In strategic terms, suicide bombings cause more 
casualties.247 
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Figure 8248 
Levels of support for suicide bombings versus optimism levels 
 
Since the first Palestinian suicide bombing in April 1994, despite their use in 
only 12 percent of incidents suicide bombings have accounted for 78 percent of 
Israeli deaths through violent actions.249 Seventeen JMCC surveys included both of 
the following questions: “Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?” and “Do 
you support suicide bombings?” When optimists outnumbered pessimists, support 
for suicide bombings averaged 40 percent. When optimists were in the minority, 
support averaged 65.6 percent.  
Other factors the may also contribute toward increasing or decreasing support 
for suicide bombings and/or organizations’ use of violent means of resistance 
include political conditions such as harsh counterterrorism policies, poverty, a sense 
of relative deprivation and/or the initiation of peace processes. An example of 
political conditions reducing societal support for suicide bombings occurred in 
February 2005. Journalists reported that the suicide bombing by Abdallah Badran, a 
                                                 
248 Source: Collated JMCC survey data. 
249 Mipt database of terrorism incidents (www.mipt.org). 
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member of Islamic Jihad, was not celebrated. The suicide attack was the first since 
the Sharm el-Sheikh summit on February 8, 2005, at which then Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas announced a cease-fire. The Palestinian 
community did not print posters of the new martyr. No celebration was planned for 
his funeral. One local stated; “Things were getting better and then no sooner do we 
have money coming in again then it is stopped by this suicide bombing”250. No 
suicide bombings took place in the following sixteen months. In other words, 
surrounding political conditions, coupled with a shared sense of threat (or lack 
thereof) can contribute toward either increasing or decreasing support for suicide 
bombings. 
After having analysed the roots of the conflict and the organizational 
motivations behind the use of suicide bombings, let us now turn to examining how 
effective, from a political and strategic point of view, the use of suicide bombings 
was in terms of helping the Palestinian organizations achieve their stated objectives, 
both at the local and national level. The next chapter focuses on suicide bombings 
as a strategy both in the struggle against the Israeli occupation and as a strategy in 
inter-organizational rivalry.  
 
                                                 
250 Cited in Urquhart 2005. 
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4 Suicide Bombings as Strategy in the Struggle Against 
Israel & Inter-organizational Rivalry 
 
The first suicide mission (car bomb) performed by a Palestinian organization 
took place on 16 April 1993. On a late Friday afternoon, Sahar Tama Nabulsi, a 
Hamas operative, drove into the parking lot of a restaurant run by members of the 
nearby Mechola settlement in the Jordan valley. This restaurant was known as a 
meeting place for soldiers who regularly dined there before going home on leave or 
returning to base. The operation marked a dramatic change in the Palestinian 
struggle. 
The reaction of policymakers in Israel to this first Palestinian suicide bombing 
incident was of great astonishment. This was because until then, the phenomenon of 
suicide terrorism was mostly limited to Lebanon. However, Hamas had already 
adopted ‘in principle’ the idea of using suicide operatives four years before the 
attack. In its leaflet no. 68, which was distributed after a series of arrests of its top-
ranking officials in 1989, Hamas summoned its operatives to begin engaging in 
suicide missions against Israeli targets. 
The question is why did Hamas wait four years from the time of their call for 
suicide operations in 1989 until the actual implementation? The answer can be 
found in the same rational approach that generally guides an organization’s 
leadership. In their view, violence is a means and not an end. An organization’s 
decision whether to use violence or not, and which tactic to choose, depends on the 
expected benefits of the method. Therefore, what did eventually lead Hamas to 
begin sending suicide bombers in 1993? Despite the fact that research on suicide 
terrorism in general, and the study of the Palestinian case in particular, is still not 
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comprehensive, the question of the objectives Hamas had in mind by initiating 
suicide attacks has led to two polarized academic views.  
 
4.1 Suicide Bombings as a Strategy for Implementing the Oslo 
Accords? 
 
The first approach holds the view that the aim of Hamas’ suicide attacks 
was to force Israel to fulfill its part of the Oslo Accords, which it signed with the 
Palestinian Authority in September 1993.251 This view is based on the 
complications that came up when it came to implementing the Accords after the 
agreement was signed. For example, according to Oslo, Israel was supposed to 
withdraw from Gaza and Jericho between 13 December 1993 and 13 April 1994, 
but did not comply with this timetable. Also, Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
disagreed on the size of the Palestinian police force that was to be stationed in 
the cities that Israel evacuated. They also were in dispute on Israel’s right to 
pursue ‘terror suspects’ in these territories. When talks on these issues reached 
a deadlock, Hamas conducted two suicide attacks within a week of each other. 
The first was on 6 April and the second on 13 April 1994. Several days later, on 
18 April, the Knesset approved the decision to withdraw its forces after Yitzhak 
Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, maintained that the only way to cope 
with the great losses inflicted by suicide bombings was to withdraw from 
Palestinian territories.252  
                                                 
251 Pedahzur, Ami; 'Suicide Terrorism' (Polity Press, 2005) 
252 On April 18, 1994, Rabin gave a major speech in the Knesset explaining why the withdrawal was necessary: 
“Members of the Knessett: I want to tell the truth. For 27 years we have been dominating another people against 
its will. For 27 years Palestinians in the territories get up in the morning harboring a fierce hatred for us, as 
Israelis and Jews. Each morning they get up to a hard life, for which we are also, but not solely responsible. We 
cannot deny that our continuing control over a foreign people who do not want us exacts a painful price... There 
is no end to the targets Hamas and other terrorist organizations have among us. Each Israeli, …each bus, each 
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According to this approach, Israel thus gave in to Hamas’ suicide bombing 
tactic. Withdrawal began on 4 May 1994. Even though the result apparently 
came unexpected for Hamas leaders, considering the circumstances and the 
assessments expressed by Rabin (see footnote 252) and others, it would have 
been reasonable for them to conclude that suicide attacks had accelerated Israeli 
withdrawal. And they did come to this conclusion. Hamas leader Ahmed Bakr 
(1995) said that “what forced the Israelis to withdraw from Gaza was the Intifada 
and not the Oslo agreement.”253 Another Hamas leader, Imad al-Faluji (1995) 
judged that  
“all that has been achieved so far is the consequence of our military 
actions. Without the so-called peace process, we would have 
gotten even more. . . .We would have gotten Gaza and the West 
Bank without this agreement. . . . Israel can beat all Arab Armies. 
However, it can do nothing against a youth with a knife or an 
explosive charge on his body. Since it was unable to guarantee 
security within its borders, Israel entered into negotiations with the 
PLO. . . . If the Israelis want security, they will have to abandon 
their settlements . . . in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem.”254 
 
Furthermore, these events seem to have persuaded other organizations’ 
leaders that future suicide attacks could eventually lead to still greater 
concessions. Fathi al-Shaqaqi (1995), leader of Islamic Jihad, said,  
“Our jihad action has exposed the enemy weakness, confusion, 
and hysteria. It has become clear that the enemy can be defeated, 
for if a small faithful group was able to instil all this horror and panic 
in the enemy through confronting it in Palestine and southern 
Lebanon, what will happen when the nation confronts it with all its 
potential. . . . Martyrdom actions will escalate in the face of all 
pressures. . . [they] are a realistic option in confronting the unequal 
                                                                                                                                                        
home, is a target for their murderous plans. Since there is no separation between the two populations, the 
current situation creates endless possibilities for Hamas and the other organizations.  
253 Quoted in David C Rapoport, Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 2006, p. 166 
254 Ibid. 
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balance of power. If we are unable to effect a balance of power 
now, we can achieve a balance of horror.”255 
 
Confirmation of this approach, which posits that suicide attacks were used 
to force Israel to implement its part of the agreements, came with the next wave 
of suicide attacks near the end of 1994 and early 1995. This time, the suicide 
attacks were perpetrated in response to the delays in the implementation of the 
second stage of the agreements. Israel was supposed to withdraw from highly 
populated areas in the West Bank.  Between October 1994 and April 1995, 
Hamas and the Islamic Jihad conducted seven suicide attacks. The attacks 
stopped only after the Palestinian Authority requested Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
to stop their operations.256 As a consequence of these events, Israel set 1 July 
1995 as a target date for withdrawal. But once again, delays on the part of Israel, 
supposedly to build bypass roads for Israeli vehicles in order to avoid evacuated 
territories, led to renewed suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. On 24 
July and 21 August 1995, two suicide attacks took the lives of eleven Israelis. 
Less than two months later, Israel agreed to pull back from West Bank cities 
even before the construction of bypass roads, which it had previously insisted 
upon. The withdrawal began on December 12, 1995. As in 1994, Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad came to the conclusion that their suicide bombings had been 
effective. Hamas’ spokesman in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal, explained that new 
attacks were necessary to change Israel’s behavior: “Hamas needs military 
muscle in order to negotiate with Israel from a position of strength. Arafat started 
from a position of weakness, which is how the Israelis managed to push on him 
the solution and get recognition of their state and settlements without getting 
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anything in return.”257 After the agreement was signed, Hamas leaders also 
argued that suicide operations contributed to Israel’s withdrawal. Mahmud al-
Zahhar (1996), a spokesman for Hamas, said,  
“The Authority told us that military action embarrasses the PA 
because it obstructs the redeployment of the Israeli’s forces and 
implementation of the agreement. . . . We offered many martyrs to 
attain freedom. . . . Any fair person knows that the military action 
was useful for the Authority during negotiations.”258  
 
The organization’s leaders also stressed that stopping the attacks only 
discouraged Israel from withdrawing. An early August Hamas communiqué (No. 
125, 1995) read,  
“They said that the strugglers’ operations have been the cause of 
the delay in widening the autonomous rule in the West Bank, and 
that they have been the reason for the deterioration of the living 
and economic conditions of our people. Now the days have come 
to debunk their false claims . . . and to affirm that July 1 [a promised 
date for IDF withdrawal] was no more than yet another of the 
“unholy” Zionist dates. . . . Hamas has shown an utmost degree of 
self-restraint throughout the past period. . . . but matters have gone 
far enough and the criminals will reap what their hands have 
sown.”259 
 
The first approach appears to be a good explanation for the suicide attacks. 
Yet its basic assumption that the goals of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were 
the same as those of the Palestine Authority, who sought to accelerate the 
implementation of the Oslo Accords, are flawed. The reason is that this approach 
does not take into consideration the deep-rooted rivalry between Hamas and the PIJ 
on the one hand, and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority on the other.  So the 
idea of this type of cooperation between the organizations at that time is not quite 
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convincing. The organizations also did not agree on the terms of the Oslo Accords. 
In fact, some even believed it was a sell out.260  
The second approach analyzing the Palestinian organizations’ use of suicide 
bombings does account for this rivalry. It also takes into consideration the influence 
of internal political considerations on taking up the suicide bombing strategy. The 
Palestinian case is not simply a struggle against an occupying force; it is also an 
internal struggle for power and dominance among rivals. The West Bank and Gaza 
Strip had been occupied by Israel for nearly thirty years before the first Palestinian 
suicide bombing. Why did it take so long? Robert Pape argues that frustration with 
Oslo and settlement expansion caused the tipping point. Actually, Palestinian suicide 
bombings also coincided with an intensified struggle for political dominance among 
the Palestinian factions, specifically between Hamas and Arafat’s PLO261. Since 
suicide bombings have had obviously negative results, such as the loss of 
international sympathy and the construction of Israel’s security wall, this suggests 
that although the Israeli occupation may have been the fuel of the suicide campaign, 
ending the occupation was not the primary objective. The attacks were also used by 
the groups to win converts and supporters as well as to build identity over time.  
 
4.2 Suicide Bombings and Inter-organizational Rivalry 
 
The first approach argued that the aim of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad in using suicide bombings was to speed up the implementation of the Oslo 
Accords. In contrast, the second approach argues that their aim was to sabotage the 
Accords and weaken the Palestinian Authority. The Oslo Accords were problematic 
                                                 
260 Pedahzur, p- 58 
261 The Washington Institute, Policy Watch #1050: Special Forum Report, ‘Suicide Terrorism in the Middle 
East: Origins and Response’ 
133 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Suicide Bombings as a Strategy Against Israel & Inter-organizational Rivalry 
for Hamas and the PIJ for two reasons. First, the Accords meant an end to their 
vision of the establishment of an Islamic state on all of historic Palestine. Second, 
the Accords granted a more dominant role to Fatah in the institutions of the 
Palestinian Authority and excluded Islamic organizations from making and 
implementing policies in the PA even though they enjoyed widespread popular 
support already at that time.262 
When the religious Hamas movement was established in late 1987, it was 
clear that there would be tensions between it and the more national political Fatah 
party, and more differences than common grounds. Although both Hamas and Fatah 
agreed on the importance of ‘armed struggle’ to achieve Palestinian aspirations, 
Fatah mainly had national aspirations whereas Hamas’ ideology integrated both 
national and religious elements. Hamas wanted to liberate all of Palestine as well as 
‘Israel proper’. Fatah wanted Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
and to establish a Palestinian state in these territories with (East) Jerusalem as its 
capital.  
Opposing ideologies were not the only disagreements among the two groups. 
The Hamas leadership felt that Fatah’s increasing legitimacy was endangering the 
political viability of Islamic movements in the West Bank and Gaza. The 
organizations were threatened by this new reality and so their leadership decided to 
fight against it. In the beginning, Hamas had two main advantages over Fatah. First, 
before the Oslo Accords were signed, many of Fatah’s leadership were in exile in 
Tunisia and other Arab countries. The Hamas leadership, on the other hand, 
operated from its central base in Gaza. Second, together with the rhetoric used 
against Israel in order to rally the Palestinian masses, Hamas relied on the traditions 
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of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. They founded a network of welfare 
institutions that granted aid to the poor Palestinian populace. Yasser Arafat 
understood the threatening potential of Hamas early on and began to work against it. 
Hamas responded by increasing its military actions against Israeli targets, which 
earned the organization even more public support.  
Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad agreed that suicide attacks would 
destroy Israeli hopes that the Accords would put an end to terrorism and gain 
security for Israel. The Israeli public’s diminishing support for the agreements was 
meant to put a stop to their implementation. They were also meant to undermine 
Fatah’s status as perceived by both the Israeli leadership and the Palestinian public.  
Three suicide attacks conducted by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad against 
Israeli targets did not further their goals, nor did they lead to the collapse of the Oslo 
process. However, their suicide campaign that began in February 1996 did have 
significant results. Hamas declared that the four attacks carried out by the 
organization in the cities of Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv in February and 
March 1996 were in retaliation for the assassination of Yehiya Ayash (‘the 
Engineer’), the mastermind behind developing the organization’s method of suicide 
attack. Ayash had been assassinated by Israel not long before. However, generally 
the leaderships of organizations do not engage in acts of revenge. Reprisals for 
actions perpetrated against them are mainly dictated by their goals263. In the case of 
this campaign of suicide attacks, Hamas had two goals. First, it wanted to show 
Israel that killing the person most responsible for sending out suicide attackers 
would not put an end to the suicide attacks. And second, Hamas wanted to halt the 
progress of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. 
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To achieve these goals, Hamas hoped Binyamin Netanyahu, then leader of 
the right-wing Likud Party, would be elected in the elections scheduled for May 
1996. In contrast to Shimon Peres, Prime Minister at the time, who was committed to 
the Oslo process, Netanyahu was quite open about his hawkish attitude towards the 
peace process and expressed his reservations about his willingness to implement 
the agreements in the future. 
If these were the two goals Hamas set out for itself, then it would appear that 
it had accomplished them. Even after the death of Ayash, the organisation was able 
to conduct highly lethal suicide actions that claimed many lives. In this manner it 
demonstrated to Israel that its capabilities were still intact. Moreover, Netanyahu 
won the elections.  He managed to defeat his Labor opponent (Peres) just six 
months after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, leader of the Labor 
Party. As surveys at that time indicated, Rabin’s murder, which stunned Israeli 
society, was supposed to have been converted into sweeping support for the Labor 
party264. However, the suicide attacks led to decreasing support for the Labor Party. 
The gap between the Labor and Likud Party gradually diminished until on election 
day, Netanyahu defeated Peres by a small margin. 
Hamas and the PIJ won a victory in another sense. Suicide actions 
perpetrated in those years responded to the general feelings of the Palestinian 
people. A survey conducted in February 1995, shortly after the double suicide attack 
by the PIJ at a roadside bus stop for soldiers at Beit-Lid, showed that 46 percent of 
Palestinians supported continuing with the suicide attacks against Israeli targets. 
Only 34 percent were opposed. Hence, in terms of internal Palestinian policy, the 
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suicide attacks proved to be an important political tool.265 Islamic organizations 
appeared more determined and daring than Fatah, which led to higher support rates 
for them. 
 
4.2.1 Hamas vs. Fatah 
 
Fatah and Hamas have a long history of trying to destabilize one another. 
Interfactional rivalry between Hamas and Fatah began with the first Intifada on 
December 8, 1987. This first uprising against Israel's occupation was initially led by a 
number Palestinian political factions. Yasser Arafat's Fatah organization brought 
these factions together under its control, creating the Unified National Leadership of 
the Uprising (UNLU). In January 1988, within just two months of the Intifada, Fatah 
and the UNLU faced their greatest challenge. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
founded an umbrella organization called Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya 
(Movement of the Islamic Resistance), which forms the Arabic acronym HAMAS 
(meaning "zeal" in Arabic). The younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
confronted the more pragmatic leadership of the movement, claiming that they had 
an obligation to wage jihad against Israel. Hamas then began to challenge Fatah, 
which they perceived as trying to "dominate control of the uprising."266 During the 
Intifada, both organizations competed for public support by distributing leaflets with 
contradictory messages about ideology, demonstrations, and civil strikes. In this 
way, Fatah and Hamas both wanted to claim being the guiding force behind the 
uprising. 
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Arafat, on the other hand, used the first Intifada to reinforce his status as an 
international leader of the Palestinian people. For example in 1988 he did this by 
accepting the UN General Assembly resolution 181, which called for a partition of 
Palestine into two states - one Jewish and one Arab. Acceptance of this resolution 
amounted to an implicit recognition of Israel.267 Israel and the international 
community saw this as an opportunity for peace talks and began working towards 
that end. Arafat responded by urging a peace conference based on U.N. Security 
Council resolutions 242 and 338, which called for Israel to withdraw from the 
territories it had conquered in 1967. Two weeks later, at least fifty-five states had 
recognized Palestine's independence,268 thus making the PLO—and by default 
Fatah—“an instant, makeshift government.”269 
It was now apparent that Hamas and Fatah had competing strategies. Fatah 
wanted to create an independent state to be recognized by the international 
community. Its strategy was to demonstrate its pragmatism to the world. Hamas 
wanted to gain political ground through an unwavering rejection of all negotiations 
leading to a two-state solution. The result was that Arafat and Fatah now had a 
stronger status at the international level, but had lost credibility among the 
Palestinians, because the latter considered Fatah's implicit recognition of Israel as a 
sign of weakness. Furthermore, some Palestinians interpreted Arafat and Fatah's 
failure to drive out Israel from any part of the occupied territories through armed 
struggle as a sign of their weakness and of their secular and nationalist ideology.270 
Thus, political scientist Mark Tessler notes, "Hamas extended its influence in both 
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the West Bank and Gaza during 1988 and became an important voice giving 
direction to the uprising, second only to that of the UNLU."271 
By the end of 1988, some analysts believed that Hamas was about to 
overtake Fatah and the PLO as the leading power in the occupied territories. As 
political scientist Glenn Robinson noted, "Certain events contributed to the 
perception that Hamas had emerged —or was on the verge of emerging—as the 
dominant factor in the occupied territories. … leading one commentator to suggest 
that 'if really free elections were held in the [occupied] territories, the fundamentalists 
would win more seats than the PLO.'"272 
Hamas’ ideology, a combination of asceticism and nationalism, clearly spoke 
to an increasing number of Palestinians.273 As its popularity increased, Hamas 
pressured women to dress modestly, attacked stores selling liquor, clashed with 
leftists and killed collaborators suspected of working with Israel. Hamas also 
increasingly attempted to delegitimize Fatah. In January 1989, Hamas and the PFLP 
jointly published a leaflet calling for an alternative to the PLO's leadership of the 
UNLU.274 Later that year, Hamas’ rising popularity and violence prompted Israel to 
arrest hundreds of its activists and militants and declare Hamas an illegal 
organization. According to Israeli political scientists Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, 
the arrests created a "vacuum that opened in the senior- and middle-level 
leadership."275 As a result, Hamas restructured its leadership so that Israel’s 
measures of arrests and assassinations would not completely incapacitate the 
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organization. Israeli terrorism expert Boaz Ganor also confirms that "the 
institutionalizing stage came in 1989, during which the movement worked on 
strengthening its infrastructure while establishing low-level ranks of command on the 
regional level."276 
Hamas’ clashes with the IDF only improved its standing among the 
Palestinian people. Israeli journalists Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari note that "Hamas 
had become a factor to be reckoned with. … It had built an impressive infrastructure 
and held the power to ease or impede progress toward a political solution."277 This 
became evident in 1990 when Hamas and the PLO leadership, at the request of 
Yasser Arafat himself, met in Amman, Jordan, to invite Hamas to join the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC).278  
In 1991, the competing strategies of Fatah and Hamas came to a climax. 
Arafat attempted to consolidate his position as the international leader of the 
Palestinians and authorized a delegation to join the Jordanian delegation to the 
Madrid Conference.279 Hamas vigorously attacked this as a "conference of selling 
the land."280 That year, Hamas formed its military wing, the ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades (named after a famous Islamist killed by the British in 1935), whose lethal 
attacks both against Israel and other Palestinian factions brought Hamas increased 
popularity.281  
International support had clearly helped Fatah gain power in the late 1980s. 
But violent resistance was proving to be a successful strategy at home. Hamas’ 
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increasing popularity in the Palestinian territories was proof of that. Fatah now faced 
a dilemma. It could try to gain international support by renouncing violence, or it 
could take up Hamas’ strategy and gain Palestinian support through violence. Arafat, 
until then, had made no choice. He had called for both "martyrdom"282 and a "just 
peace" with Israel.283  The result was that without a clear line by the leadership, the 
Palestinians were in complete disarray. In fact, they were the farthest they had ever 
been from achieving statehood, even when the violence began.  
At the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, Arafat released a 
number of Hamas detainees and even cooperated with Hamas on military 
operations. Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad formed a coalition (named the 
"National and Islamic Forces") in order to coordinate between the groups.284  But 
Hamas soon stepped up its operations and emerged as a threatening opposition 
once again. One media report noted that there were "concerns among senior PA 
officials over the possibility that Hamas [was] trying to reap political capital among 
traditionally-minded Palestinians."285  In an attempt to secure his power, Arafat 
reportedly offered Hamas an alliance in January 2001, which Hamas again 
refused.286  In June 2001, Hamas also turned down Arafat's offer to join a new 
Palestinian cabinet.287 
A poll conducted among Palestinians in August 2001 showed that Fatah's 
popularity in the PA had decreased sharply to 26 percent, whereas for the first time 
a higher percentage (27 percent) supported Hamas.288  Inter-factional tensions and 
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violence followed.  In October, when a Hamas operative killed Col. Rajah Abu 
Lihyah of PA security, the clashes that followed led the PA security to move against 
Hamas in Gaza, and declare an emergency.289 
Why did Hamas refuse to merge with Fatah and become the counterpart to 
Israel's "national unity" government? According to documents the IDF seized in 
Gaza in 2002, Hamas took advantage of Fatah's weakness. Its confidence had 
grown to the point where it saw itself as one of "the influential forces in the Arab-
Zionist equation."290  In these documents, Hamas observed that the PA had 
"collapsed, its infrastructure has been destroyed, and it suffers rifts and divisions … 
in short, the PA has been dismantled and must be reassembled according to new 
conditions."291  Hamas was convinced that these "new conditions" would legitimately 
give it a dominant role in any new order, and that it would gain nothing by 
legitimizing the PA. 
It seems Hamas also realized that its suicide campaigns not only demoralized 
Israel but also destabilized the PA. Every Hamas attack on an Israeli target brought 
forth an Israeli reprisal, namely against the PA. Israel not only conducted "targeted 
killings" and mass arrests of Hamas operatives, it also often struck at PA 
infrastructure (e.g., police stations, government buildings, Arafat's compound in 
Ramallah). On the whole, Israeli retaliatory actions actually weakened the PA (and 
its Fatah offshoot) more than Hamas ever did.292 Perhaps this was also Hamas’ 
intention. 
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Hamas was thus able to kill two birds with one stone. By attacking Israel, it 
increased its popularity among the Palestinians, and it drew an Israeli retaliation that 
damaged the PA and also set the course for Fatah's disintegration. Given these 
added ‘benefits’ for the suicide attacks, Hamas had no reason to stop them.293 
Public opinion and support of suicide bombings also played an important role. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, after a short decline in public support for suicide 
attacks, there was a clear change in the Palestinians’ opinion of using suicide 
attacks.  A survey conducted in 1998 among Palestinians showed that, for the first 
time, support of attacks against Israeli targets had risen to 50 per cent. This shift in 
public opinion became evident when the Al-Aqsa Intifada began two years later in 
late September 2000. When the second Intifada erupted, the number of suicide 
attacks increased dramatically. And at the forefront of these actions stood Hamas.  
Khaled Mishal, chief of the organization’s political bureau, explained that whereas 
the first Intifada had had a more popular nature and was mainly characterized by 
demonstrations, it was now time to resort to an “organized mobilization of military 
hardware and suicide bombers”, the standard of reference being the Lebanese 
model of armed resistance294. According to Mishal, the imbalance of power between 
Israel and the Palestinians would prevent Hamas from being victorious over Israel. 
Therefore, acts of resistance (and particularly suicide attacks) would give Hamas 
more advantages due to its endurance and the determination of the public it 
represented. At that time (2000), more than 60 percent of the Palestinian population 
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was in favor of continuing violent attacks on Israel, and 63 percent believed that 
Palestinian resistance organizations should copy Hezbollah’s methods.295 
Without a doubt, the suicide attacks conducted by Hamas shortly after the Al-
Aqsa Intifada began significantly affected the agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. The suicide attacks destroyed any hope the Israeli public may 
have had regarding the peace process. The result was that Ariel Sharon, then head 
of the Likud party and a blatant opponent of the peace process, was elected Prime 
Minster of Israel in February 2001 with a sweeping majority unparalleled in Israeli 
politics. 
Indeed, the Palestinian organizations thus accomplished two aims. First, they 
were able to bring about the definitive collapse of the Oslo Accords, and they 
created a strategic balance of terror with Israel although its power was far greater 
than theirs. And second, for the first time these organizations were also able to 
influence the political agenda of Palestinian public opinion. The broad support for 
suicide attacks among the Palestinian public, as well as the increase in support for 
Hamas, also affected the other Palestinian organizations. The fear of losing their 
own public standing created a sense of pressure which led them to change their 
strategies. Soon, organizations that in the past had condemned the idea of suicide 
bombers – including leftist factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine –began to send out suicide bombers as well.296 
However, the height of these developments was Fatah’s decision to take up 
suicide attacks. For Fatah, this was indeed a revolution.297 Many of Fatah’s 
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members had served in the Palestinian Authority’s security forces and before the 
second Intifada began had renounced any involvement in suicide actions. In fact, 
many of them had been in charge of preventing precisely these kinds of actions. 
During the first weeks of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Fatah limited itself to smaller violent 
actions, but these were lost in the mayhem caused by the suicide attacks executed 
by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.298 
A survey conducted in July 2001 showed that Palestinian approval for attacks 
against civilians inside Israel had risen to 58 percent. Seventy percent felt that 
attacks on Israel, and not the pursuit of a political process, were more likely to 
advance Palestinian goals. The survey also showed an additional important finding 
which explains why Fatah chose to join the path of suicide violence. While Arafat’s 
and Fatah’s popularity had declined sharply between July 2000 and July 2001, 
support for Islamic organizations had risen in almost identical proportion.299 
Fatah’s leadership could not ignore these developments. As events during the 
Intifada escalated, Fatah founded the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.300 The goal of the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which relied on the Tanzim infrastructure – a network of 
local organizations uniting the younger members of Fatah among them, was to serve 
as a counterweight to the suicide brigades of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad: 
the Izz-a-Din al Kassam brigades and the Al-Quds Brigades. The new Fatah suicide 
squads were authorized by the leaders of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority301. On 
18 February 2002, Fatah carried out its first suicide attack. In the following months, 
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the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades became the most active group in executing suicide 
attacks. The number of suicide operations conducted by Fatah at the time even 
surpassed those of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and almost reached the number of 
attacks conducted by Hamas.302  
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In the summer of 2002, Israel defined suicide terrorism as a ‘first-degree 
strategic threat’ and began to deal with it more intensely. Among other things, it 
increased the number of ‘targeted assassinations’, reoccupied most of the 
Palestinian territories and stepped up the erection of the separation wall that was to 
divide the territories of the Palestinian Authority from ‘Israel proper’. These 
measures made it very difficult for the Palestinian organizations to conduct suicide 
attacks within Israel itself.  
At this point, Hezbollah’s involvement in the Palestinian arena became 
apparent. The reasoning that led the Hezbollah leadership to abandon suicide 
attacks when Israel withdrew to the ‘security zone’ in southern Lebanon in 1985 was 
also evident in the actions of Palestinian groups affiliated with the organization.305 
Although they had not given up dispatching suicide bombers, the organizations also 
conducted other types of attacks. One method was to launch more Qassam rockets 
from the Gaza Strip to surrounding Israeli settlements. Another was to adopt 
guerrilla warfare tactics inside the Palestinian territories themselves. One such 
attack was the remote-controlled explosion of two IDF armored personnel carriers in 
Gaza on 11 and 12 May 2004. The shift to this type of warfare points towards the 
strategic logic behind the actions of Hamas and the other Palestinian organizations 
and their ability to adjust their tactics to changing circumstances.306 The Hamas 
leadership did not change its principles entirely, but an approach emerged within 
Hamas that did not entirely rule out dialogue with Israel. Rather it outlined the 
conditions (both political and territorial) that would allow such a dialogue to take 
place.  
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4.2.1.1 Assessment of the Armed Struggle Against Israel 
 
At this point, it is necessary to examine whether any real progress was made 
for the Palestinian struggle in general. Did any of the Palestinian factions achieve 
their goals? The answer is not so obvious. The erection of the wall and Israel’s 
reoccupation of extensive Palestinian territories made the lives of many Palestinians 
unbearable and led to serious doubts regarding the accomplishments of the armed 
struggle.  The persistence of an Israeli military presence in Palestinian territories 
makes it difficult to improve the quality of life of the population in the area and 
perpetuates the sources of conflict.  
An attempt to assess which one of the various organizations benefited the 
most from the use of suicide bombings to influence political processes reveals 
Hamas as the winner and Fatah as the loser. Nonetheless, the Palestinian case is 
rather complex. Hamas successfully damaged the Oslo Accords process and tipped 
the scales of Israeli public opinion in favor of withdrawing from the West Bank and 
Gaza during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It forced Israel to decide to pullout of Palestinian 
territories that were not part of the peace agreements. Moreover, Hamas and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad gained significant status in the Palestinian political arena 
and had to be accounted for in any future division of political power.  
At the same time, Israel’s ‘war on terror’ and its policy of ‘targeted 
assassinations’ landed a strong blow to Hamas’ leadership. Hamas was left in the 
position of a strong popular movement aspiring for authority over some of the areas 
to be evacuated by Israel. But, at the same time, the backbone of its senior 
leadership had been eliminated. Putting in place a new generation of leaders would 
take a long time. Furthermore, Israel’s effective foiling policy forced Hamas and 
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Islamic Jihad to reduce their suicide bombing campaigns, rather than any other 
factor.  
A final word about Fatah: it is more apparent now that this organization was 
drawn into the use of suicide bombing. In the case of Fatah, this tactic was not used 
to promote strategic or political interest but was a means of political survival. In 
effect, Fatah’s use of suicide attacks during the Al-Aqsa Intifada was the ‘last nail in 
the coffin’ of the Oslo Accords. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
main accomplishments the Palestinian suicide bombings brought about will be 
attributed in the future to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rather than Fatah. 
Fatah’s role in this context will probably be made light of. As for internal Palestinian 
politics, Fatah’s use of suicide bombings did not help the organization protect or 
resume its former higher political standing. Over the years, the image of the 
Palestinian Authority gradually wore away in the Palestinian public’s eye due to its 
failures and corruption. If the public remains loyal to the PA, it will be due more to its 
long-lasting commitment to this institution as the flag-bearer of Palestinian liberation 
rather than due to its use of suicide bombers.  
In the next chapter I will discuss in more detail in how far Israel’s 
counterterrorism measures affected the strategic use of suicide bombings by the 
various Palestinian organizations. What effect did Israel’s tactics have on the 
Palestinian groups’ motivation and capabilities to carry out suicide attacks? 
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5 Israel’s Counterterrorism Measures & Their Effects 
 
 
Do counterterrorism tactics really lead to an endless cycle of conflict and 
violence? Mia Bloom argues that Israel’s counterterrorism methods both provoked 
the Palestinian factions to increase their attacks against Israeli targets and increased 
the public support they received: "Surprisingly enough, Israelis rallied around the 
extreme right, thinking that hawkish policies would deter future attacks. In fact, the 
long-term ramifications on the Palestinian polity will encourage rather than deter 
future attacks."307 Bloom also criticized Israel’s offensive measures to deter 
Palestinian violence: "The Israelis and Palestinians appear to be in a dead-locked 
battle of assassination-suicide bombing-assassination-suicide bombing in an 
unending causal loop… encouraging yet more 'martyrs.'"308 She concludes, “…in the 
long run, the number of attacks will increase because groups vying to lead the 
Palestinians will use violence as their main source of recruitment and 
mobilization.”309 
Bloom was not the only scholar to focus on the individual motivations of the 
Palestinians as being the crucial element in explaining the intensity of violence and 
in doubting the effectiveness of Israel’s counterterrorist actions. According to Scott 
Atran, “repeated suicide actions show that massive counterforce alone does not 
diminish the frequency or intensity of suicide attacks."310 Even Richard Boucher, then 
State Department spokesperson under the hawkish Bush administration, doubted 
                                                 
307 Mia M. Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding', Political 
Science Quarterly 119/1 (Spring 2004) 80. 
308 Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing’, 84. 
309 Ibid, p. 87.  
310 Scott Atran, ‘Mishandling Suicide Terrorism’, Washington Quarterly 27/3 (Summer 2004) 67. 
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the effectiveness of Israel's actions against the Palestinian factions, primarily 
targeted killings, when he stated in July 2001 that "Israel needs to understand that 
targeted killings of Palestinians don't end the violence, but are only inflaming an 
already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm."311 
If, as Bloom and others predicted, counterterrorism really does breed more 
violence because it increases motivation amongst the Palestinians, why then did the 
suicide attacks decline from their peak in 2003-2004 by over one-third (from 184 to 
119 attempts).312 Moreover, why did successful suicide operations decrease by more 
than 40 percent (from 26 to 15)?313  I share Frisch’s view (2006) that it is not the 
individuals’ motivation that counts militarily or politically, but rather their 
organization’s capabilities. These are largely determined by their opponent's 
counterterrorism actions. This can be seen in three main elements in the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict:  
1) Palestinian violence declined dramatically since its peak in 2002.  
2) None of the explanations identifying motivation as the main cause of the 
intensity and efficiency of the Palestinian resistance - relative deprivation, 
vengeance, outbidding or motivation to spoil a peace process – sufficiently 
explain the decline in both the intensity and efficiency of Palestinian violence.  
3) A reduction of Palestinian capabilities was at stake, and this reduction in 
these capabilities was directly linked to successful Israeli counterterrorism.314 
 
Even if Israel’s offensive actions, such as the assassinations of the two Hamas 
leaders Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his successor Abd al-Aziz al- Rantisi in March 
                                                 
311 Richard Boucher, State Department briefing, 2 July 2001, available at 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/4656.htm> quoted in Gal Luft, ‘The Logic of Israel's Targeted 
Killing’, Middle East Quarterly, 10/1 (Winter 2003) 4. 
312 Hillel Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
and Violence“, Journal of Strategic Studies, October 2006,Volume 29, Number 5. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Frisch, p.2 
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and April 2004, increased the desire to engage in violent reprisal attacks, Hamas 
and the other factions targeted by Israel were forced to operate at a reduced level of 
efficiency. Eventually they had to accept the lull in fighting in March 2005, which 
supports the argument that the organizational capabilities are far more important 
than motivation, and that these capabilities are largely determined by Israel’s 
successful counterterrorism measures.315 This chapter will look at how Israeli 
counterterrorism measures affected the Palestinian organizations’ capabilities in 
carrying out their attacks, and will analyze the trends of the Palestinian resistance 
and its efficiency both in terms of the losses the organizations suffered and the 
damage caused to the Israeli side.  
 
5.1 How Israel’s Countermeasures Affected the Organizational 
Capabilities of the Palestinian Resistance Groups 
 
After the killing of the two Hamas leaders in April 2004, a Hamas official 
promised, "Our revenge will come a hundredfold for the blood of Rantisi and 
Yassin!"316 Vengeance was a major rhetorical and propaganda tool used by the 
groups. Barry Weingast and Rui de Figueiredo suggest that vengeance and tit-for-tat 
dynamics are often retaliatory. Indeed, most Palestinian suicide bombings were 
closely linked to actions perpetrated by Israel: the massacre at the al-Ibrahimi 
Mosque in Hebron by an Israeli settler who killed over 30 worshipers in 1994, the 
opening of the tunnel beneath the western wall of the Temple Mount in 1996 that led 
to a week-long clash between Israel and Palestinian security forces, the targeted 
                                                 
315 Frisch, p. 3 
316 A Volcano of Vengeance - Fury as Israel Assassinates Second Hamas Leader’, The Australian, April 19, 
2004. 
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assassinations of Palestinian commanders such as the Hamas engineer Yahya 
Ayash in early 1996.317  
However, contrary to Weingast and de Figueiredo’s perception that terrorism 
and suicide bombings in particular are motivated by vengeance, Andrew Kydd and 
Barbara F. Walter stress rationality as the key factor. They support the view that 
violent actions were largely used by Hamas and the PIJ to spoil the prospects of 
peace negotiations just when they seemed most promising.318 According to Kydd 
and Walter, the increase in violence and suicide bombings made the moderate 
voices on the Palestinian side appear weak, creating doubt on the Israeli side that 
political concessions would bring peace and calm, thus reducing their motivation to 
conclude a deal with the Palestinian side. However, it is important to note that the 
authors failed to analyze the peace accords themselves as the cause for the 
violence.  
Mia Bloom also supports the view that organizations using violence are more 
motivated by their desire to outbid domestic rivals and increase their popularity on 
the home front. As noted in Chapter 4, Bloom also believes that Hamas and the PIJ 
used suicide bombings to challenge the political dominance of Fatah.319 Steven 
David, author of ‘Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy Of Targeted Killing’, was among the 
few who predicted the effectiveness of Israeli offensive moves at the height of 
Palestinian suicide bombings. He predicted that Israel’s targeted killings would erode 
the organizations’ infrastructure over time.320 This analysis draws a parallel with 
                                                 
317 Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, ‘Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political Extremists and Political 
Violence’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 
September 1998). 
318 H. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, 
International Organizations 56 (Spring 2002) 264. 
319 Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, 80. 
320 Steven R. David, ‘Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy Of Targeted Killing’, Mideast Security and Policy Studies 
No. 51 (Ramat-Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University) 7-8. 
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David’s hypothesis that Israeli counterterrorism decreased Palestinian capabilities, 
not their motivation. Consider the trends in Palestinian violence since 2000 
compared to Israel’s actions, described below. 
 
5.2 Measuring the Cost of Palestinian Violence 
 
 
Overall, Palestinian violence between September 2000  and March 2005 (when 
the major Palestinian factions accepted a “lull” (tahdiyya) in the fighting) increased 
sharply in the first two years before declining just as sharply in 2003 and 2004. 
Looking at Israeli fatalities over this time period, there was an increase in deaths in 
2001, a dramatic peak of fatalities in 2002 (when Israeli deaths almost doubled), 
followed by a drop of more than fifty percent in 2003 and a further fifty percent 
decline in 2004.321 Thus, Israeli fatalities (and casualties) were reduced by 75 
percent from 2002 to 2004 (see Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6322 
Israeli Fatalities of Palestinian Violence in Gaza, West Bank and Israel  
 
                                                 
321 Frisch, p. 7 
322 Source: Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006; http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS70.pdf 
154 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Israel’s Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects 
Looking at the total number of attacks rather than Israeli casualties produces 
a similar curve. If one considers suicide bombings specifically, the curve depends on 
whether one is counting all attempted attacks (including the ones Israeli forces 
prevented), successful attacks or fatalities. The data available shows that there was 
a sharp increase in successful suicide attempts from 2000–2002 (from 4 to 35 to 60), 
followed by a sharp decline in the two following years (equivalent to a 75 percent 
drop from the peak in 2002 and less than one half the successful suicides carried out 
in 2001).323 Figure 11 below depicts the total number of attempted attacks, including 
those prevented by the Israeli security forces, perpetrated during the time period 
2000 to 2004.  
 
Figure 11324 
 
Total Number of Perpetrated Attacks vs. Thwarted Attacks, 2000-2004 
 
 
 
                                                 
323 Ibid. 
324 Source: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ 
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Figure 12325 
Suicide Bombing Attacks, 2000-2006 
 
Let us look more closely at the possible reasons why the suicide attacks 
decreased so dramatically after 2002.  As can be seen from Figure 12 above, suicide 
bombing attacks decreased sharply after ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ was executed. 
Operation Defensive Shield was a large-scale military operation conducted by the 
Israel Defense Forces on March 29, 2002. It was the largest military operation in the 
West Bank since the 1967 Six-Day War. The operation began with an incursion into 
Ramallah, followed by invasions into the largest cities in the West Bank, and their 
surrounding localities (Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Bethlehem, Jenin and Nablus).326  
According to The Guardian, during the three weeks of Operation Defensive 
Shield at least 500 Palestinians were killed and 1500 were wounded. According to 
the Palestine Red Crescent Society, more than 4,258 people were arrested by the 
Israeli military. The Israeli offensive left 29 Israeli soldiers dead, and 127 wounded. 
In addition to loss of life, the operation caused massive economic losses due to 
                                                 
325 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Palestinian+terrorism+2006.htm 
326 'Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10 (Report on 
Jenin)', United Nations, May 7, 2002 
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destruction of property and the inability to reach workplaces.327  Large sectors of the 
Palestinian population were left homeless by the operation.  
The effects of Operation Defensive Shield were an initial drop in half (46 
percent) of the number of suicide bombings -- from 22 in February-March to 12 in 
April-May -- and a 70 percent drop in executed attacks between the first half of 2002 
and the second half (43 January-June, 13 July-December). While 2003 had a total of 
25 executed suicide bombings in comparison to 56 in 2002, the main difference was 
the number of attacks which did not come to realization (184) either due to Israeli 
interception or problems in the execution. 2003 also saw a 35 percent drop in the 
number of fatalities from 220 deaths in 2002 to 142 deaths resulting from suicide 
bombings.328 
Until the autumn of 2004, Hamas carried out the greatest number of attacks, 
after which the PIJ became the dominant organization.329 In 2006 the decline in the 
number of suicide bombing attacks continued, following the trend begun in 2002. 
During the year 2006, four suicide bombing attacks were carried out, compared with 
seven in 2005 and 14 in 2004. Three were carried out by the PIJ and one by Fatah. 
Hamas did not carry out any suicide attacks in 2006.330  
 
 
 
                                                 
327 Ibid. 
328 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/sp/pa_t/det_8feb_05.htm 
329“The nature and extent of Palestinian terrorism,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at Israel 
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Figure 13331 
Realized and prevented suicide bombing attacks 2000-2006 
 
After Operation Defensive Shield, the Palestinian organizations experienced a 
decreasing ability to carry out suicide bombing attacks, although there was an 
increase in their motivation to do so. In 2003 there were 184 attempted suicide 
attacks, compared to 112 in 2002. However, only 26 out of the 184 attempted 
attacks in 2003 were successful, compared to 60 out of 112 in 2002. Over time, 
however, the effectiveness of Palestinian suicide attacks decreased, which led to a 
decline in motivation to carry out such attacks. Measuring all attempted suicide 
attacks, there was a peak in 2003 with 210 attempts, until there was a decline in 
2004 to 134 attempts. The number of attempted suicide acts in 2004 was still nearly 
three times the number of attempts made in 2001 at 55 attempts. By 2005, however, 
it was down to 22.332 However, in 2006 there was again a sharp increase in the 
motivation of the organizations to carry out suicide bombing attacks. According to 
data collected by the Israel Security Agency, 279 potential suicide bombers were 
arrested in the West Bank, a rise of 80% compared with 2005 (154 potential suicide 
                                                 
331 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Palestinian+terrorism+2006.htm 
332 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006; http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS70.pdf 
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bombers detained). The Israeli security forces prevented 71 attempted suicide 
bombing attacks in 2006, most of them originating in the West Bank, some in the 
Gaza Strip. Most of the attempts were carried out by PIJ and Fatah operatives from 
the areas of Jenin and Nablus. 
 
5.3 Measuring Palestinian Capabilities in Waging Violence 
 
 
As the data above shows, the Palestinian organizations were indeed motivated 
to engage in suicide bombings throughout the period between September 2000 and 
most of 2004. The problem was not a lack of motivation, as cited in the literature, but 
declining capabilities and increasingly successful Israeli countermeasures. This also 
led to reduced damage and fewer casualties on the Israeli side. Effectiveness is 
undoubtedly an important element in any organizational decision to continue the use 
of violence. Frisch (2006) even goes as far as comparing militant organizations to 
business firms who seek maximum sales at minimum cost.333 The ratio between the 
number of operations on one hand and casualties inflicted on the other side is an 
indicator of the effectiveness of a particular operational method. If one compares the 
ratio between total number of suicide attacks to Israeli fatalities, that is to say the 
effects of the suicide attacks on the Israeli side, then what becomes evident is that 
Palestinian overall efficiency peaked in 2002 (at .09 fatality per act of violence), 
declined in 2003 (.05) and fell sharply in 2004 (.03), about the same efficiency rate of 
2001 (see Table 7 below). 
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Table 7334 
Measuring the Effectiveness of Palestinian Suicide Bombings 
 
 
The efficiency of suicide bombings dropped by 75 percent from 1.6 fatalities 
per attempted suicide bombing in 2001 to 0.4 fatalities in 2004 (see Table 7). In 
2005, mainly after the lull, there was a sharp drop in the number of attempted and 
successful suicides. The lethality of suicide bombings increased again in 2004 as 
both attempted and successful bombings decreased that year. This shows that the 
Palestinian groups’ more selective policy of attempted suicide attacks led to greater 
efficiency.335 
 
5.4 Targeted Killings 
 
 
In response to the Palestinian suicide bombings, Israel regularly assassinated 
the different Palestinian organizations’ top-level leaders (often causing collateral 
deaths of family members and civilians in the process). Israel also frequently 
imprisoned and tortured second-level leaders. The organizations such as Hamas 
                                                 
334 Source: Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, available at 
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf. Pp. 20-22. 
335 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006; http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS70.pdf 
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were branded as terrorist organizations internationally and their bank accounts were 
frozen. These retaliatory actions were entirely predictable and were meant to 
undermine the organizations’ ability to act. The reasoning was that the higher the 
costs to the organizations were, the less likely the latter would continue their strategy 
of suicide bombings. However, although the costs to the organizations were very 
high, these costs did not prevent them from engaging in suicide attacks.336  
On the contrary, Ganor (2005) stipulated that targeted killings could lead to a 
boomerang effect, causing the number of suicide attacks to increase after such hits. 
In Ganor’s view, targeted killings increased the suicide bombers’ motivation as well 
as reduced the organizations’ operational capabilities. Kaplan et al. (2005) 
developed a “terror-stock model” of suicide bombings based on a theory proposed 
by Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003). Within this model, Kaplan et al. (2005) found 
that, whereas preventive arrests reduced the number of suicide bombings, targeted 
killings actually increased suicide bombing attacks because the killings intensified 
and increased the number of recruits to the ‘terror stock’. This is also in line with 
Ganor’s boomerang effect. 
One of the main indications of the growing human costs to Palestinian 
organizations was the increasing number of top military and political personnel they 
were losing to Israeli targeted killings. These took the form of Israeli attacks from the 
air (mostly in Gaza) and undercover special forces operating in the West Bank. As a 
recent study by Asaf and Noam Zussman demonstrates, while suicide bombers were 
usually only secondary in the organization to which they were recruited, this was not 
the case of those Israel targeted for assassinations. The great majority were not only 
considered key operatives in the organization by the Israelis, they were also typically 
                                                 
336 Israel’s tactic of demolishing the houses of suicide bombers also did not deter other individuals from 
volunteering to carry out suicide attacks. 
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acknowledged as such by the Palestinian organizations themselves after they were 
killed.337 The Palestinian groups rarely accused the Israelis of hitting “the wrong 
man”. On the contrary, the biographical and propaganda material issued after their 
deaths often enhanced the targeted operatives’ importance to the organization 
beyond Israel’s justifications for targeting them.338 According to a Palestinian source, 
Israel conducted 209 targeted killings until the end of 2004.339 Targeted killings 
reached their peak in 2002, with 78 Palestinians assassinated. As Palestinian 
attacks reached their peak in that same year, Israel continued to pursue its 
assassination policy with the same intensity, even after the effectiveness of 
Palestinian attacks declined. So, even though from 2003 to 2004 fatalities resulting 
from Palestinian violence declined by 36 percent, Israel still conducted 55 targeted 
killings, a decline of just less than four percent compared to the previous year. This 
relentlessness in employing targeted killings was also a sign of the growing 
asymmetry between Israel’s military and intelligence capabilities compared to 
Palestinian capabilities. Israel’s capabilities were improving while that of the 
Palestinians’ was declining.  Even after the lull, Israel was reluctant to give up its 
strategy of targeted killings. Even when the number of Israeli fatalities decreased 
sharply from 142 to 54 in 2005, the number of Palestinians Israel assassinated in 
relation only decreased from 55 to 33.340 This means that Israel continue its 
assassination of Palestinians even when the latter’s attacks had clearly declined. 
 
 
                                                 
337 Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman ‘Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counterterrorism 
Policy’, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper No. 2005.02 (January 2005) 4-5. 
338 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006; http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS70.pdf 
339 See <http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/list_of_assassination_english.htm>. 
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Table 8: 341 
 Israeli Targeted Killings 2000-2005  
 
The survey of attempted and successful Palestinian attacks cited above (see 
Table 7) raises the question of why the intensity of Palestinian violence declined.  As 
can be seen from Israel’s targeted assassination policy and tactics of collective 
punishment, the Palestinians certainly did not lack motivation to carry out attacks. So 
why was there such a sharp decline in the number and effectiveness of their 
attacks? On the contrary, looking at the factors that affected the wellbeing of the 
Palestinians as a whole, there should have been an increase in Palestinian 
operations. Israel’s military presence in the West Bank meant that the Palestinians 
had to bear arduous restrictions on their movement, which was a constant source of 
anxiety and frustration. And there was little improvement between 2002 and 2004; 
757 barriers restricted Palestinian movement in the West Bank in October 2003, 
dropping slightly to 719 by November 2004.342 Military incursions into Gaza, either 
into the towns and refugee camps of Rafah and Khan Yunis located near the 
evacuated Israeli settlements in the south, or into the Beit Hanun area in the 
northern part of the Gaza strip, in fact increased in response to the growing number 
                                                 
341 Source: List of Palestinians who were assassinated during the al-Aqsa Intifada, 
http://www.phrmg.org/aqsa/list_of_assassination_english.htm. 
342 Figures derived from maps accessed from <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/ >. 
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of rockets launched at Israel within the green line. A minimal decline in Palestinian 
fatalities by less than five percent and a similarly minimal reduction in restrictions on 
freedom of movement between 2003-2004 can hardly explain the 36 percent 
reduction in the total number of suicide attack attempts during that year. On the 
contrary, the attacks should have increased. So why didn’t they? 
 
Table 9: 343  
Palestinian Deaths from September 2000 to September 2004  
 
As noted earlier, Israeli casualties of Palestinian violence had declined by 75 
percent by 2004 from its peak in 2002. Overall Palestinian violence declined from its 
peak in 2002 and then stabilized in 2003-2004.  On the other hand, Palestinian 
frustration remained constant or perhaps even increased, at least until the death of 
Arafat in November 2004. However, violence, principally by Hamas and the PIJ (who 
objected to any peace process), should have increased during the summer of 2002 
when, for the first time, President Bush committed the United States to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. In September 2002, this commitment became 
the basis for the road map, which aimed at establishing a Palestinian state within 
three years. This should have prompted Hamas and the PIJ, whose ideologies and 
                                                 
343 Source: http://www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/4_years_Intifada_anniversary.htm. 
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aims are in opposition to the PA’s, to increase their attacks and play the role of 
‘spoiler’.  
Violent attacks (including suicide attacks) by both Hamas and the PIJ did 
increase in 2004. In that year, Hamas perpetrated 555 attacks, compared to 281 in 
2003, an almost 200 percent increase. The PIJ perpetrated 106 attacks compared to 
71 the previous year.344 Some of the increase in attacks by Hamas may have been 
motivated by revenge, especially for Israel’s targeted killings of their leaders. Yet, 
even if this credibly explains Palestinian motivation, it hardly accounts for the 
declining performance levels, especially after Arafat's death and the presidential 
elections in January 2006. Hamas and the PIJ should have been worried about the 
possibility of a renewed peace process. Instead, they accepted the lull and Hamas 
more or less maintained it despite repeated Israeli strikes against Palestinian groups.  
The sharp increase in attacks in 2003 – 2004 by Hamas and the PIJ are 
harder to explain in terms of internal competition and outbidding according to the 
indicators proposed by Bloom - support for suicide bombings and the popularity of 
the groups over time. Regarding support for suicide bombings, this only declined by 
three percent in June 2004 (to 62 percent) compared to 65 percent in October 
2003.345 However, this indicator can hardly explain the increase in violent attacks by 
Hamas and the PIJ. Nor does the popularity of the groups over time explain the 
radical increase. Bloom’s outbidding argument posits that groups such as Hamas 
and the PIJ should have increased suicide attacks during periods of declining 
popularity. Yet, the popularity of Hamas dropped only slightly (from 23 percent in 
2003 to 21.7 percent in 2004), while the popularity of the PIJ remained constant or 
                                                 
344 ‘2004 Terrorism Data’, available at <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=23521>. 
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slightly increased (5 to 5.5 percent).346 Even more critically, the popularity of Fatah, 
Hamas’ major opponent, declined even more than the popularity for Hamas (29 to 
26.4 percent). In any event, neither of these factors can explain why Hamas’ attacks 
nearly doubled from 2003 to 2004. Nor can they explain why in light of the decrease 
in support for Fatah, the number of attacks it perpetrated actually declined from 117 
in 2003 to 97 in 2004. Fatah should have increased the number of its attacks to 
outbid Hamas.347  
Another related argument posits that Hamas increased its attacks to assert its 
dominance in Gaza in light of Israel’s plans to withdraw from Gaza. But this is also 
hardly convincing. If that were so, why did Hamas accept the lull in fighting six 
months before Israeli troops were scheduled to withdraw from Gaza? This suggests 
that the decrease in attacks was not due to a lack of motivation but rather to greatly 
reduced Palestinian capabilities. It appears that Israel’s offensive and defensive 
moves against Palestinian organizations were indeed highly effective, albeit 
questionable. 
 
5.5 The Security/Separation Wall  
 
Another effective Israeli countermeasure was the Separation Wall it built and 
completed in August 2003. Work began on the first part of the route, about 100 
kilometers in length, to cordon off Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarem, which were the 
Palestinian cities that had sent the most number of suicide bombers in the past, 
primarily to Israeli towns closest to the former green line (Netanya and Hadera).348 A 
                                                 
346 JMCC polls June 2002-June 2004 available at <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html>. 
347 Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 18. 
348 http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm (Accessed December 13, 2005.) 
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further extension running northeast to close off the West Bank from northern Israel 
was completed in December 2003, creating a barrier between the two towns of 
Nablus and Jenin and the two Israeli towns, Afula and Beit Shean.349  
 
  
The Separation wall in Qalqiliya350 An aerial view of the Wall, which annexes 
parts of the West Bank to Israel, February 
17, 2004351 
 
 
Although a discussion of the political aspects of the building of the barrier is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that many human rights 
organizations on both sides, as well as the Hague-based International Court of 
Justice have ruled that this wall is a violation of human rights. Its true purpose is 
actually to annex more Palestinian territory, and was not built for security purposes 
at all. In fact, according to Gush Shalom, an Israeli peace initiative, “a country can 
                                                 
349 'Data on the Separation Barrier – April 2004', available at http://www.btselem.org 
350 Photo: Palestine Monitor 
351 Photo by Nir Elias/Reuters, 2/18/04, Al-Jazeera.info 
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never achieve security and peace by enclosing an entire people behind a wall. The 
imprisonment of a desperate people is a certain recipe for violence and hatred.”352 
  
B'tselem map of the Separation Wall as approved  
by the Israeli Cabinet Feb 2005, cutting deep into  
Palestinian territory353 
 
 
                                                 
352 See: http://www.gush-shalom.org/media/seperationmap_eng.swf 
353 http://www.btselem.org/Download/Separation_Barrier_Map_Eng.pdf 
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Going back to the effect the wall had on Palestinian suicide attacks, since its 
completion the patterns of Palestinian attacks have changed significantly. First, the 
number of attacks, and particularly suicide attacks, dropped. In 2003, 19 suicide 
attacks were carried out compared to 6 in 2004 and 5 in 2005. From the time the 
Wall was completed to June 2004 only three attacks, which originated in the 
northern West Bank, managed to penetrate Israel: in two of them, the perpetrators 
used gaps in the area where the Wall was still incomplete. In comparison, between 
September 2000 and June 2003, 73 suicide attacks from the West Bank succeeded 
in penetrating the same section354. It was noticed that potential and successful 
suicide attacks were funneled into areas where the Wall was not yet completed. 
These gaps in the route of the planned Wall were identified by the Palestinian 
groups as the weakest points in the Israeli defense line.  
Second, the Wall also influenced the targets selected for attacks: 37 attacks 
took place in Gaza and the West Bank. As easier access routes to Israel were 
blocked by the Wall, the entry routes gradually moved to the area between Rosh 
Ha’ayin and Kafr-Kassem, where the wall was incomplete. Out of the nine suicide 
attacks which took place in the last six months of 2003, only four took place in 
central Israel. The others focused on areas which were not protected by the Wall: 
Sdeh-Trumot, Rosh-Ha’ayin, Ariel, and two attacks in Jerusalem, which was 
surrounded by the barrier but not completely sealed.355  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
354 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2004. 
355 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006. 
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Figure 14356 
 
Suicide bombings by Hamas, PIJ and Fatah parallel to political and military events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third effect of the Wall was on the routes potential suicide bombers had to 
follow since the summer of 2003. Previously, they had to overcome roadblocks and 
random checkups on their mission. The building of the Wall, however, forced them to 
take longer routes to selected targets or to substitute the selected targets for more 
accessible ones. This is exemplified by the successful and unsuccessful suicide 
attacks. For example, suicide bombers who were sent by the PIJ in Jenin to targets 
inside Israel were forced to travel eastward and had to penetrate Israel from the 
Jordan Rift Valley, where no wall exists. Suicide bombers had more chance of being 
caught, as they had to overcome greater distances. The organizations then turned 
southward and tried to cross the barrier into the Jerusalem area, choosing targets in 
the relatively accessible Jerusalem area. When it became harder to access 
                                                 
356 http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/final_05/pedahzur_ppt.pdf 
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‘important’ targets, the suicide attacks began to be perpetrated against ‘lesser 
important’ targets. For example, suicide bombers from Jenin targeted ‘‘non-
important’’ targets such as a single person in Sdeh Trumot (Beth She’an Valley), or 
a residential house in Kfar Ya’abetz (a small village north of Netanya).357 
 
5.6 Comparing Offensive to Defensive Measures in Reducing 
Palestinian Capabilities 
 
Analyzing Israeli fatalities on a monthly basis offers a good indicator of the 
effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism in reducing Palestinian capabilities. A good 
example is looking at the period in 2002 when Palestinian suicide attacks peaked. In 
terms of the effectiveness of Palestinian violence, as mentioned above, the tides 
turned after the two Israeli offensives conducted in March (Defensive Shield) and 
June 2002 (Determined Path). During these operations, the major West Bank towns 
under the jurisdiction of the PA were reoccupied and then continuously penetrated 
and policed by Israel.358 Palestinian militants lost any sanctuary they had as Israeli 
troops pursued them without reprieve. These Israeli offensives also resulted in a 
substantial increase in ‘preventive’ arrests. When the preventive arrests shot up to 
2,682 by April 2002 (compared to 1695 in the previous year), just after the first 
offensive, and to 4,694 by January 2003 (a 128 percent increase within a year), the 
number of Palestinian attacks as well the efficiency of suicide bombings began to 
decline. This was largely due to the IDF’s increased accessibility to the suspects.359 
                                                 
357 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006. 
358 For an excellent analysis of the March offensive and indeed on the tactical novelties of the IDF, see 
Catignani, 'The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counterterrorism 
Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada', 63-67 
359 Data from <http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp.> 
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A comparison between violent attacks in the West Bank and Gaza offers an 
even more striking confirmation of the importance of Israeli offensive and preemptive 
measures of denying Palestinian resistance groups a sanctuary. In the West Bank, 
attacks more than halved from 2,089 to 1,025 from 2002 - 2003. The number of 
attacks dropped to 841 in 2004, just over one-third of the attacks that took place two 
years earlier. By contrast, in Gaza, where Palestinians had a continuous yet porous 
sanctuary, there was almost no decline in the number of attacks from 2002 to 2004 
(2,906 to 2,771 attacks).360 
In the short term, contrary to expectations of the Israeli military, not all offensive 
measures proved to be equally effective. The use of targeted killings was evenly 
distributed between Gaza and the West Bank. Thus, between the outbreak of 
hostilities and September 2004, 44.8 percent of the targeted killings took place in 
Gaza, roughly proportional to Gaza’s share of the total Palestinian population in 
Gaza and the West Bank.361 Nevertheless, violence increased in Gaza and 
decreased sharply in the West Bank during this period. This indicates that targeted 
killings cannot explain the variation in trends of violence between these two areas. 
However, in the long run, targeted killings, especially those directed against the 
political leadership, did have a major effect. After all, Hamas leaders made reaching 
a ceasefire contingent on stopping targeted killings and then went on to accept a 
unilateral “lull” despite an escalated Israeli response against Palestinian factions.362 
Israel did not only react offensively but also toughened its defense. So it is 
difficult to say whether the reduction of Palestinian capabilities was the result of 
offensive or defensive measures. Some of the decline in casualties within Israel 
                                                 
360 Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 18. 
361 http://www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/4_years_Intifada_anniversary.htm. See also Edward Kaplan, 
Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal and Claude Sambani, 'What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a 
Terror Stock Model', Studies in Conflict and Terror Studies 28/3 (May-June 2005) 234. 
362 Byman, Daniel. 'Do Targeted Killings Work?' Foreign Affairs, 85/2 (March-April 2006) 101-02. 
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could also be the result of defensive measures, principally the building of the wall 
(see discussion above).  One must note that a greater reduction of fatalities occurred 
among Israelis living in the West Bank (from 196 deaths in 2002 to 18 in 2004 
amounting to 90 percent) where there was no continuous barrier. In comparison,  
there was only a 75 percent reduction in fatalities for Israeli's living in Israel proper 
(from 231 to 56), suggesting once again the effectiveness of offensive actions over 
defensive ones. In other words, Israel’s strategy of targeting key leaders of the 
organizations was more effective than simply trying to separate and enclose the 
Palestinians in a fenced enclave. As Ben-Israel, Setter and Tishler point out “… it is 
more important to act against the leadership of terrorist organizations than against 
the activists in the field, and it is more effective to act against key activists playing a 
role in producing terrorism than against the terrorists who actually carry it out. By the 
same principle, it is more effective to prevent a terrorist from entering one’s 
population centers than to attempt to stop him while he is already carrying out his 
'mission'.”363  
 
5.7 From Suicide Bombings to Less Effective Qassam Rockets 
 
 
Forcing the enemy to undertake less effective means of violence is one more 
indication of the effectiveness of Israel's countermeasures. As Ender and Sandler 
noted in their seminal work more than a decade ago, perpetrators of organized 
violence substitute new techniques of violence to replace those that are no longer 
                                                 
363 Isaac Ben- Israel, Oren Setter, and Asher Tishler, 'R& D and the War on Terrorism: Generalizing the Israeli 
Experience', in Andrew James, ed., Science and Technology: Policies for the Anti- Terrorism Era (Oxford: IOS 
Press), forthcoming. 
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efficient.364 Looking at data on the means of violence used by the Palestinian groups 
in Gaza clearly demonstrated that suicide bombings declined in the face of both 
offensive and defensive measures. As perpetrating suicide bombings became more 
difficult, Palestinian ballistic and mortar activity increased significantly compared to 
other means (side bombs, suicide and car bombings, road side shooting).365 From 
2003 to 2004, Qassam rocket attacks increased by nearly 300 percent (from 105 to 
309), mortar attacks by nearly 200 percent (from 708 to 1231) with declines in 
attempted suicide bombings and the 40 percent decline in successful suicide attacks 
(from 26 to 15).366 These substituted techniques, however, were less effective.  
Whereas suicide attacks comprised less than one percent of the attacks between 
2000 and 2005, they caused nearly half of Israeli fatalities since 2000 (525 of 1048 
fatalities). Qassam rocket and mortar attacks proved to be less effective. Over 610 
Qassam attacks on Israel within the green line yielded only two fatalities between 
2001 and 2004 and eleven in the following year. Launching Qassams has proved 
dangerous and costly to the Palestinians themselves; tens of Palestinian fighters 
have died launching them and others have been killed when they misfire.367  
 
 
 
                                                 
364 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 'The Effectiveness Of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-
Intervention Analysis', American Political Science Review, 87/ 4 (Dec. 1993) pp. 829-844. Isabelle Duyvestey, 
'The Paradoxes of Terrorism: an Attempt at Theory' (paper presented at WISC Conference, Istanbul, August 
2005) 12. 
365 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006. 
366 '2004 Terrorism Data', 7. 
367 For a recent article by a Palestinian analyst describing the use of Qassams as detrimental to Palestinian 
interests, see Umar Hilmi al-Ghawl: 'Su'al al-Yawm: Ayu Muqawama Nuridu?' Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 13 April 
2006. 
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5.8 Short and Medium-Term Gains  
 
In the short run, Israel might have prevailed against the Palestinian factions in 
persuading most of them to accept a lull in fighting in February 2005. But in the long 
run, Israel has far from eradicated Palestinian sources of violence, either militarily or 
politically. Militarily, the Palestinians have been far less successful in waging 
successful suicide bombings after Israel’s offensive and defensive countermeasures 
took effect. But Palestinian resistance has not ceased, it has simply taken other 
forms. This suggests that the organizations’ infrastructure of planning and executing 
attacaks remains largely in place. Politically, the situation remains problematic. The 
Palestinian Authority's loss of control to factions and militias, Muhammad Abbas’ 
failure as a leader that all of the Palestinians respect and support, and Hamas’ 
assumption to government coupled with Israel’s refusal to accept its election to 
power, has effectively ruled out the option of Palestinian statehood. Nor are the 
prospects very promising. In fact, developments since Hamas’ rise to power - the 
growing rivalry between the presidency and the government, the violence between 
PA security forces loyal to the presidency and the in-fighting between Hamas and 
Fatah - has only reduced the prospects of a Palestinian center able to come to an 
agreement with Israel.  
Neither do peace prospects with Israel look promising. From the day Israel 
withdrew from Gaza, they set about ensuring that Gaza would fail economically. 
Even before Hamas was elected in 2006, Israel had already been blockading Gaza. 
The Palestinians had to appeal to US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and 
James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, to pressure Israel to allow even 
a few trucks into Gaza each day. Israel agreed, then went back on their agreement. 
Even Yossi Alpher, a former official in the Mossad intelligence service and an ex-
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adviser on peace negotiations to the then prime minister, Ehud Barak, conceded that 
the blockade of Gaza is a failed strategy that might have strengthened Hamas. "I 
don't think anyone can produce clear evidence that the blockade has been 
counterproductive, but it certainly hasn't been productive. It's very possible it's been 
counterproductive. It's collective punishment, humanitarian suffering. It has not 
caused Palestinians in Gaza to behave the way we want them to, so why do it? I 
think people really believed that, if you starved Gazans, they will get Hamas to stop 
the attacks. It's repeating a failed policy, mindlessly."368 
                                                 
368 Quoted in http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/04/israel-gaza-hamas-hidden-agenda 
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6 Conclusion  
 
 
Many of the recent studies on political violence have focused on individual 
motivation. This analysis, however, suggests that organizational capabilities rather 
than motivation explain the effectiveness of Palestinian suicide bombings. 
Palestinian capabilities were largely dictated by the effective offensive and defensive 
measures employed by Israel’s security forces. This paper has demonstrated that 
the Palestinian organizations used suicide bombing attacks as a strategic tactic, but 
as Israel’s counterterrorism campaign became increasingly effective, this led to 
declining Palestinian capabilities. The decline occurred despite continuously high 
motivation levels amongst Palestinians to engage in resistance in general, and 
suicide bombings in particular. Israeli counterterrorism methods reduced the effects 
and effectiveness of Palestinian violence considerably. Within two years after the 
peak level of Palestinian violent resistance, the costs to the Israeli state and society 
dropped by 75 percent.369 Theoretically, the Israeli case shows the validity of the 
arguments made by Arreguin-Toft, Sandler and Acre and others, who demonstrated 
the existence of the substitution effect in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The 
substitution effect has also proven true for suicide bombings. Substitution appears 
when the efficiency of any particular means of violence declines. Suicide bombings, 
although efficient at first, became an inefficient means of resistance when Israel 
began killing key operatives, conducting massive preventive arrests, and building the 
‘security wall’. In this sense, suicide bombings are no different than any other tactic 
which is susceptible to overexposure in fighting a superior enemy. So far, the 
substitutes the Palestinians have used have not proven to be nearly as effective or 
                                                 
369 Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities,” 2006 
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lethal as suicide bombings. However, even though Palestinian violence after 2005 
declined, and its efficiency is reduced, resistance still remains. This suggests that 
only a fair and just peace process that addresses all of the needs and concerns of 
the Palestinians as an occupied people can end Palestinian violence against Israel. 
On the other hand, the peace process will not end internal conflicts and violence 
between the different Palestinian factions.  However, finding a solution to both 
political factors is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This report addressed Palestinian suicide bombers perpetrating attacks against 
Israel, so its conclusions may not extend beyond this case. What is valid for the 
Palestinian organizations may not be valid for other organizations around the globe 
that use suicide bombings tactics to achieve their political aims. The case of 
Palestinian suicide bombers supports the view that religious and nationalist appeals 
that portray self-sacrifice as martyrdom are instrumental in producing volunteers for 
suicide attacks. The Palestinian volunteers were not motivated to carry out suicide 
bombings because they are the best possible tactic in the face of the political 
environment or rational calculations of costs and benefits. This is the rationale of the 
organizations that recruit them. Individuals, on the other hand, are inspired by the 
redemptive nature of self-sacrifice.370 Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades framed religious and nationalist appeals to manipulate individual minds. 
They combined religious texts and historical narratives with rituals to create a culture 
that honors martyrdom. According to Hafez, these two factors -the cultural context of 
Islamic revivalism and the political context of nationalist conflict - allowed those 
appeals to be embraced by the broader public and potential bombers. The 
                                                 
370  Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
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Palestinian groups effectively used the desire for national empowerment in the face 
of powerlessness to shake the passive masses into action and motivate individuals 
to undertake “heroic” acts. The Palestinian groups also effectively used the desire 
for vengeance that individuals perceive when members of their community are 
humiliated or traumatized by the enemy. 
The case of the Palestinian suicide bombers shows that although the 
Palestinian groups appeared to be religious outwardly, they had strategic 
organizational considerations in adopting suicide bombings as a method of 
resistance in light of their inferior capabilities vis-a-vis the Israeli army. Thus, it is a 
mistake to equate suicide bombings with religious fundamentalism. Both religious 
and secular Palestinian factions saw the value of using suicide attacks.  
At the level of society, the Palestinian case shows that the wider community 
condoned “martyrdom operations” under two conditions: (1) the Palestinian 
community felt a deep sense of victimization and threat by Israel, both politically and 
nationally, and (2) legitimate authorities in the Palestinian community promoted or at 
least acquiesced to extreme violence. This shows that the phenomenon of 
volunteering for suicide bombings is closely connected with the broader political 
context in Palestinian society. The Palestinian organizations, no matter how 
appealing their ideologies and political rhetoric were, could not have generated such 
high numbers of volunteers for suicide attacks without the presence of opportunities 
and threats in the society.  
Israel’s experience with Palestinian suicide bombers offers many lessons on 
how to and how not to deal with campaigns of suicide bombings. First, in the first 
three months of the uprising, Israel’s excessive use of force, including live bullets, 
rockets, tanks, and targeted assassinations, escalated the conflict. Israel’s reaction 
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to the initially nonviolent Palestinian resistance with brutal violence and punitive 
collective measures gave the Palestinian militant organizations the legitimacy to use 
violence in return and attack Israeli civilians. Israel’s iron fist policy only resulted in a 
backlash that produced more deaths in the long run.371 
 In the case of the Palestinians, the adoption of suicide bombings during the 
first two years of the uprising was due to a miscalculation that Israel would succumb 
to the pressure caused by the suicide attacks on its civilians and withdraw from the 
occupied territories, just as it had withdrawn from southern Lebanon in May 2000. 
The popular belief was and is that Hezbollah’s armed resistance forced the Israeli 
forces to withdraw. However, only after Israel refused to make major concessions 
and intensified its counter-insurgency methods against the Palestinian groups, did 
the latter begin talking about a ceasefire. After Operation Defensive Shield and other 
incursions, more and more Palestinians came to recognize that militarizing the 
uprising had been a strategic mistake.372 As one Palestinian commentator put it, 
“When the [al-Aqsa] uprising began, we aspired to liberate the West Bank, Gaza, 
and Jerusalem. By the end of 2001, our demands regressed to calling for a return to 
the status quo of September 28, 2000. A little later we lowered our expectations to 
the point that we are content to return to the conditions on March 29, 2002, the eve 
of [Israel’s Defensive Shield] incursion into the West Bank. [In 2003], none of us 
aspire[d] to more than having President Arafat left unharmed.”373 
                                                 
371 Hafez, 2006. 
372 Gideon Alon and Amira Hass, “IDF: Voices Growing in Fatah for end to suicide attacks,” Ha’aretz, August 
13, 2002; Khaled Abu Toameh, “Arafat’s economic adviser calls for cease-fire,” Jerusalem Post, December 5, 
2002; Danny Rubinstein, “Nonviolence: Why didn’t we think of that before?” Ha’aretz, August 3, 2003. 
373 Wahid Abdelmajid, “al-Intifada al-falastiniya bayn khayari al-murajaa wal-tarajua” [The Uprising between 
two Options: Rethinking or Retreat], al-Hayat, October 8, 2002. See similar remarks by Nabil Amr, former 
minister of Information in the Palestinian Authority, in Khalid Amayreh, “Palestinians split on ‘armed 
Intifada’,” al-Jazeera, October 19, 2003. 
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The third lesson is closely related to the second. Given that the organizations 
calculate the costs and benefits of different methods of action, and they chose 
suicide bombings because they were considered an effective means to achieve their 
goals, the costs to the Palestinian organizations should have been raised in ways 
that targeted only the militants without harming innocent civilians. By harming 
civilians in the process of targeting the Palestinian factions, Israel gave legitimacy to 
the organizations’ armed struggle and increased their support from the Palestinian 
society. One way is to offer the Palestinian organizations an alternative, less violent 
means to resist the occupation. A policy of carrot and stick, so-to-speak. Israel’s 
relentless military pressure and refusal to grant any concessions forced Hamas and 
the other factions to accept a ceasefire in late 2001 and 2003. However, Israel’s 
refusal to accept a ceasefire and insistence that the PA dismantle ‘the terrorist 
infrastructure’ left the Palestinian groups with no real alternative. Very few 
organizations, no matter how serious the predicament in which they find themselves, 
will agree to surrender and declare defeat without a bitter fight to the end. In other 
words, Israel’s policy of a stick without a carrot left the Palestinian groups no way out 
other than violent resistance. Rather than create opportunities to pursue political 
initiatives, Israel in effect insisted on an unconditional surrender. Such reasoning is 
not logical in the face of fragmented and decentralized militant groups who have – 
and are fighting for - the sympathy and support of the population. Although Israel is 
too superior militarily to be defeated in a full-on confrontation, Hamas and other 
groups are too strong politically to be made to surrender unconditionally. As a result, 
until recently, Palestinian factions continued their attacks against Israel despite 
having recognized that violence had not achieved its intended aims.  
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6.1 The status quo 
 
 
In 2007, only one suicide attack occurred in Israel - the double suicide 
bombing in Dimona, Israel, on February 4, 2008. It was the first suicide attack in over 
a year.374  The most recent Hamas-claimed suicide bombing had occurred more than 
three years earlier, on January 18, 2005. Even Islamic Jihad had significantly 
decreased its suicide attacks before its most recent suicide bombing, on January 29, 
2007.375 It seems that Palestinian organizations had abandoned suicide bombings as 
a tactic. 
The end of Palestinian suicide bombings does not come as a surprise, despite 
how effective they have been. Since the first Palestinian suicide bombing in 1994, 
suicide attacks have claimed the lives of 866 Israeli victims (not including the 
bombers). Compared to other forms of violent resistance the Palestinian groups 
have engaged in since the 1967 War, 659 victims have died as the result of all other 
types of confirmed Palestinian attacks in Israel376. If fatalities were an indicator of the 
effectiveness of a given tactic, then suicide bombings can be said to have been by 
far the Palestinian groups’ most effective tactic. But if this tactic was so effective at 
inflicting casualties, why did Palestinian organizations abandon it?377 
The answer is manifold. They are either unable or unwilling to conduct suicide 
attacks anymore, or both. The Palestinian factions may be unable to launch suicide 
                                                 
374 Schechter, Erik. 2004. Where Have All the Bombers Gone? Jerusalem Post, August 6. 
375 The one suicide bombing in Israel in 2007 was a joint Islamic Jihad–Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attack on a 
bakery in Eilat, on January 29. See the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorism 
Knowledge Base, “Terrorist Incident Reports: Incidents by Tactic,” accessed January 14, 2008, available from 
http://www.tkb.org/IncidentTacticModule.jsp. 
376 Schechter, Erik. 2004. Where Have All the Bombers Gone? Jerusalem Post, August 6. 
377 Yoram Schweitzer, a research fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, notes 
that “The rockets are much less effective in terms of fatalities, and this is very crucial. This is a weapon of 
harassment, rather than a weapon of killing. It’s good for harassment, but at the end of the day, the number of 
casualties has the largest psychological effect.” Quoted in Dion Nissenbaum and Cliff Churgin, “2007 May Be 
Safety Milestone for Israel,” McClatchy-Tribune News Service (December 7, 2007), p. 1. 
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bombings because of Israel’s preventive security measures, such as the security 
wall or its extensive intelligence network. In 2006, Israel’s security measures 
prevented all but two Palestinian suicide bombers from entering Israel. And since 
2005, Palestinian militant operations in Israel have been increasingly rare. Only a 
few suicide bombings and attacks with firearms have occurred. However, the 
effectiveness of Israel’s security measures does not explain why Hamas stopped 
conducting suicide bombings a full two years before the PIJ’s attack in 2007. If these 
security measures really do explain the almost total abandonment of Palestinian 
suicide bombings as a tactic, then both groups should have ceased these attacks at 
around the same time.378 
Palestinian organizations may have been able to launch only one suicide 
bombing in 2007 (with Hamas taking a three-year break from the tactic) due to a lack 
of resources such as financial support, materials, or potential suicide bombers, 
although this seems highly unlikely. Even though Iraqi funding for the families of 
Palestinian suicide bombers stopped in 2003379, the Palestinian organizations do not 
seem to have a shortage of resources. According to the Terrorism Knowledge Base 
Iran currently contributes funding to both Hamas and Islamic Jihad.380 If this is the 
case, it seems unlikely that Iran would instruct Hamas to stop using suicide 
bombings two years before the PIJ. It is unlikely that Hamas or any of the other 
Palestinian organizations did not have enough money or resources in 2007 to 
conduct more than one successful suicide bombing. 
                                                 
378 Schechter, Erik. 2004. Where Have All the Bombers Gone? Jerusalem Post, August 6. 
379 From the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000 to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein distributed more than $35 million to the families of killed Palestinian militants and civilians. These 
disbursement included payments of $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers. See Associated Press, “Saddam 
Pays $225,000 to Families of Slain Palestinians,” St. Louis Post–Dispatch, (March 14, 2003), p. A15. 
380 Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hamas” and “Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),” 
Website, accessed January 14, 2008, available from 
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=49 and http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=82, respectively. 
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It is also unlikely that the reason for the decline in suicide attacks was a 
shortage of volunteers and recruits with which to conduct the operations. From 
December 2005 to June 2006, a time during which Hamas launched no suicide 
bombings, Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians increased 
from 40 to 56 percent. In a December 2006 public opinion poll, conducted in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip381, 56.5 percent of those surveyed supported the 
continuation of armed resistance against Israel.382 This level of Palestinian support 
for armed resistance against Israel suggests that Palestinian organizations would 
have had enough willing recruits for suicide bombing operations.  
For its part, Israel did not stop its oppressive measures against Palestinians. 
On the contrary, following the election of Hamas to head the PA in early 2006, Israel 
and the international community began blocking aid to Gaza with the intention of 
forcing the people of Gaza to rethink their support for Hamas. Instead, Hamas 
consolidated its control of the Gaza Strip, reinforcing its separation from the Fatah-
dominated West Bank. According to Israeli media, one of the first acts of Ismail 
Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister elected in 2006, was to send a message to the 
Bush White House offering a long-term truce in return for an end to Israeli 
occupation. His offer was not even acknowledged.383 Instead, the daily Jerusalem 
Post reported, Israeli policymakers sought to reinforce the impression that “it would 
be pointless for Israel to topple Hamas because the population [of Gaza] is 
                                                 
381 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) 
382 In this poll, 20.7 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “the peace process is not successful in 
ending occupation [sic] and should be stopped in favour of resort [sic] to armed action” and 35.8 percent agreed 
with the statement that “the peace process should not be stopped because it still might succeed, but at the same 
time armed action should continue.” This poll sampled 1270 Palestinian adults and had a margin of error of ±3 
percentage points. See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Survey Research Unit, “Palestinian 
Public Opinion Poll No. 22 (December 14–16, 2006),” accessed January 14, 2008, available from 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/p22e1.html. 
383 Jonathan Cook, in Counterpunch, November 17, 2008: “They are all Hamas: The Real Goal of Israel’s 
Blockade of Gaza”, available at http://www.counterpunch.org/cook11172008.html. 
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Hamas”.384 In short, if anything has made Palestinian organizations unable to 
conduct suicide bombings, it is Israel’s security measures. However, these measures 
do not explain why Hamas took a three-year break from conducting suicide bombing 
operations. 
The answer may be that, in addition to Israel’s security measures, Palestinian 
groups have become unable and also actually unwilling to conduct suicide 
bombings. One explanation for this unwillingness may be that suicide bombings 
have not been as effective in inducing terror as the number of Israeli fatalities 
suggests. The Palestinian organizations took a tactical shift away from suicide 
bombings, while at the same time continuing their strategic goals of resistance. If this 
is the case, the Palestinian organizations would need a more effective or terrifying 
tactic to replace suicide bombings. Missile attacks, which include mortar and rocket 
attacks, may be such a substitution. These attacks have increased in direct 
proportion to the decrease in suicide bombings. The question remains, though, 
whether missile attacks are more effective at inducing terror than suicide bombings. 
The number of fatalities suggests that they are not: from the beginning of the second 
Intifada in September 2000 through March 2007, 29 people were killed as a result of 
missile attacks.385 However, missile attacks may create a level of terror beyond the 
actual number of fatalities. Yet even if this were the case, this would only affect those 
Israelis living within missile range of the Gaza Strip, since Palestinian organizations 
have only rarely launched missiles from the West Bank. If Palestinian organizations 
believe they can achieve their strategic objectives of forcing Israel to make 
concessions by inducing terror on only a small percentage of the Israeli population 
                                                 
384 Ibid. According to this thinking, collective punishment of the population in Gaza is justified because there 
are no true civilians in Gaza. 
385 Only three victims died in such attacks on Israeli targets before the second Intifada began. 
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(namely those living within missile range), then the shift from suicide bombings to 
missile fire makes strategic sense. But this reasoning also seems unlikely.  
It is also unlikely that the tactical shift from suicide bombings to missiles was a 
strategic shift to reach accommodations with Israel. The most obvious proof in 
support of this argument is that no accommodation has taken place between 
Palestinian organizations and Israel since the second Intifada began. In fact, even 
though Hamas proposed and upheld a ceasefire in 2007 and 2008, neither Hamas 
nor the PIJ has seriously considered the possibility of abandoning violent resistance 
or even recognizing Israel. These were the two preconditions, however, that the PLO 
had to meet in 1989 before entering into negotiations with Israel. A recent PCPSR 
survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shows that such an accommodation would 
be unlikely. Only 28 percent of those who support Hamas also support the Clinton 
final status conditions, which form the basis for the round of Palestinian-Israeli 
negotiations that began in November 2007.386 In comparison, 63 percent of 
supporters of President Mahmud Abbas’ Fatah party support the Clinton parameters. 
So, if Palestinian unwillingness to conduct suicide bombings is based neither 
on a strategic shift towards accommodation nor a tactical shift towards coercing 
Israel more effectively, then what is the reason for the shift away from suicide 
bombings? One possibility is that Palestinian organizations may have other strategic 
objectives other than coercing Israel. In this context, Palestinian organizations 
should not be viewed as ‘hives of fanatical ideologues intent upon Israel’s 
destruction’ but as ‘firms marketing different brands of Palestinian resistance’387. 
                                                 
386 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Survey Research Unit, “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 
No. 26 (December 11–16, 2007),” accessed January 14, 2008, available from 
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387 Nathan W. Toronto, “Where Have All the Bombers Gone?”, 20/04/2008, available at 
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186 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Conclusion 
Their primary objective may be to maintain or advance their organization’s relevance 
in Palestinian politics. Changing Israel’s behavior may be a secondary objective. The 
Palestinian organizations advance their political relevance by gaining public support 
and approval for defending the one genuine path—according to them—to defeating 
Israel. As long as support for armed attacks against Israel among the Palestinian 
population is high, there will be competition amongst the Palestinian groups for the 
largest share of “the resistance market”.388 
The circumstances surrounding the February 4, 2008 suicide bombing seem 
to support this argument. After a three-year pause in suicide attacks, Hamas 
conducted this attack in a city that had not been struck before, and when there had 
not been any Palestinian suicide bombings for a year. The surprise effect of the 
attack made it potentially effective for gaining popular Palestinian support for Hamas’ 
brand of resistance. At first, Hamas did not claim the attack, but the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades and two other groups did. Only then did Hamas publish its claim in 
response, stating that it had waited for security reasons. Israeli security forces then 
demolished the homes of the Hamas suicide bombers. Because of the boldness of 
the Dimona attack, Hamas stood to gain popular support. When other organizations 
claimed the attack, Hamas had to do the same and provide evidence that it was the 
actual perpetrator. Hamas could not let others profit from the attack at its expense. 
These dynamics between the groups provide a valid explanation for the end 
to Palestinian suicide bombing attacks over the last three years. Consider 
Palestinian organizations as resistance firms responding to the circumstances that 
Israel imposes on them. Israel’s preventative security measures undoubtedly kept 
some suicide bombers from entering Israel. But Israel’s active security measures 
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have had such a damaging effect on Palestinian organizations’ capabilities that 
suicide bombings ceased to be cost-effective. In other words, as long as the 
Palestinian organizations bore the brunt of Israeli security measures, then it became 
less likely that they could continue suicide bombings. Israel began its policy of 
targeted killings in December 2000, shortly after the start of the second Intifada. By 
2004, this tactic had achieved significant results against Hamas. In that year, Israeli 
security forces killed the two principal leaders of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and 
Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, within a month of each other. Then, in January 2005, Hamas 
launched its last suicide bombing for three years. 
Missile attacks, the alternative to suicide bombings, have not exactly been a 
disadvantage, either. Although missile attacks kill fewer people and affect far fewer 
Israelis on a daily basis than suicide bombings did, they nevertheless do elicit a 
response from the Israeli government. The missile attacks are enough to induce the 
Israeli government to take action against the Palestinians. This is evidenced by the 
economic blockade of the Gaza Strip, whose lifting the Israelis have made 
contingent on the cessation of missile attacks. These Israeli responses are an 
advantage for Palestinian organizations: more Palestinians either blame Israel for 
their harsher conditions or exhibit greater sympathy for the organizations’ causes, or 
both. In addition, by launching missiles into Israel, Palestinian organizations 
demonstrate that they are still doing something to resist Israel’s occupation, which 
also boosts their market share amongst Palestinians.  
Only time will tell if this shift to missile attacks will hold. But if the IDF keeps 
up its targeted killings and daily incursions into the Palestinian territories, and if 
months or years continue to pass between suicide attacks, then this will be 
increasing proof that competition between Palestinian organizations is a major factor 
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in the timing and type of attacks that they launch. Palestinian organizations are in a 
continuous struggle against each other as much as they are in a continuous struggle 
against Israel. Perhaps Israeli authorities are banking on this fact as well, in their 
strategy against the Palestinians. 
 
6.1.1 Palestinian Interfactional Rivalry & the Collapse of Palestinian 
Resistance 
 
The Palestinians have a bitter joke: What would happen if the Palestinian 
Authority disappeared? The answer: How could you tell?389  
The dysfunction and corruption of the Palestinian Authority was one of the 
main reasons Palestinian voters threw out Fatah in the legislative elections of 
January 2006. The Palestinians took their chances with Hamas for many reasons.  
One was the Islamic movement's reputation for discipline, unity and honesty.  
Hamas seemed to act with clear goals and unity, its spokesmen faithfully sticking to 
the party line. However, power has proven to be a trap for Hamas, deepening its 
divisions and causing new ones. While Hamas was fighting with Fatah in Gaza and 
trying to strengthen its control over the security forces, it was unable to control its 
own leaders in exile in Syria. Hamas was also unable to control its military wing, 
which has little regard for Ismail Haniya, Hamas’ prime minister.  
  Israel's invasion of Gaza in response to the abduction of an Israeli soldier in 
July 2006 has made Hamas’ divisions more evident. At the same time, Israel’s 
invasion of Gaza has further undermined Palestinian moderates, pushing the 
Palestinians to the extremist stance taken by those living abroad.  However, this 
                                                 
389 Steven Erlanger, ‘Palestinian Divisions Deepen’, The International Herald Tribune, 4 July 2006, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/03/news/hamas. 
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may serve Israel's short-term goals of weakening or destroying the Hamas 
government, and portraying it as incapable of making peace, as it had done with 
Arafat.  
Israel has a long tradition of playing off Palestinian divisions and deepening 
them. It favored one or another of the groups in the original PLO; it encouraged and 
supported Hamas in the 1980's as an alternative to Yasser Arafat; it tried to deal 
only with Palestinian mayors and clan leaders in the West Bank and Gaza before 
Arafat and his lieutenants returned from exile in 1994 after the Oslo peace accords. 
Israel was quite aware of the tensions between the domestic Palestinian leaders 
(most of whom had experience with Israelis, albeit in jail) and the exiled 
revolutionaries who had returned and quickly grabbed economic and military power. 
Israel is also skilled at stirring up Fatah-Hamas rivalries, trying to create a form of 
chaos in the occupied territories.390  
Hamas has had to face several misfortunes in this latest crisis, both internal 
and external. The newly elected Hamas government could not pay salaries or 
provide social benefits because of the economic embargo that their election 
provoked. And Hamas was unable to persuade its militants, who take their orders 
from abroad, even to discuss a diplomatic solution with Israel.391 Instead, with Israel 
conducting its "Operation Summer Rains," sending troops into Gaza and bombing 
power plants and ministries, Hamas was risking its hold on power and its power 
centre in Gaza itself.  
  But the Hamas leaders abroad, such as Khaled Meshal, Mousa Abu Marzouk 
and Muhammad Nazzal, are not interested in domestic issues. Ali Jarbawi, a dean at 
Birzeit University, explains that "The farther you are from the real problems on the 
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ground, the more radical and inflexible you tend to be. That was true of Arafat in 
exile, and it's true of Meshal in Damascus."392  According to Nasser al-Kidwa, a 
nephew of Arafat who was the Palestinian foreign minister in the former Fatah-led 
government, Meshal, who is operating out of Syria and is said to fear losing 
influence to those inside the territories, has actively manipulated the current crisis. 
"Meshal's aim is to send a clear message about who is in control of Hamas - first to 
those in Hamas, and then to Palestinians generally."393   
In the absence of a real state, the competition for power among the 
Palestinians, particularly among armed groups, commanders and clans, means that 
those on the extreme ends tend to set the agenda.394 While Hamas kept its own 
militants from shooting Qassam rockets or conducting suicide attacks against Israel 
for about 16 months until the end of 2006, it did not stop others from doing so. It 
could not turn its back on "the resistance". Finally, its own militants, responding to 
popular anger over the deaths of Palestinian civilians in Israeli strikes, pushed 
Hamas to give up the cease-fire altogether. That gave Israel a pretext to move in 
with force to try to strangle the Hamas government at its power centre in Gaza. 
Once Israel decided that the Hamas government could not control its militants, it 
concluded that the rocket attacks would never end without military intervention.  
 As for Fatah, after its humiliating defeat in the January 2006 legislative 
elections, Fatah leaders attempted to hinder the new Hamas-led government from 
functioning.395 Before handing over their ministries to Hamas, many Fatah ministers 
promoted their followers and filled positions with Fatah supporters. This left Hamas 
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393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Yaghi, Muhammad,“The Growing Anarchy in the Palestinian Territories,” May 16, 2006, The Washington 
Institute, Policy Watch #1103 
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in a position where it either had to accept these changes or face a full-on 
confrontation with the civil service.396  
To increase internal pressure on the Hamas government, Fatah declared that 
Hamas was responsible for the international isolation of the PA and the worsening 
economic situation. Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades also increased attacks against 
Israel, attempting to undermine Hamas’ status in the resistance. Fatah's 
obstructionist actions made it evident that it believed the Hamas government would 
collapse. And to regain power more quickly Fatah was working to expedite Hamas’ 
failure rather than undertaking internal reform.  
Hamas’ response to these growing domestic challenges to its authority and 
international isolation was two-fold. It blamed the failings of the PA on Israel, the 
United States, and Fatah. Seyam declared, "If this government fails due to internal 
pressures supported by outside forces, then we will turn the tables on all of them."397 
Hamas also threatened to dissolve the PA, and created an extralegal military force 
responsible to Hamas’ leadership and not to the government.398 Meshal said in April 
2006, "If the Authority is unable to support the resistance, then to hell with the 
Authority -- we don't need it."399 
The international isolation of Hamas has not only increased the polarization 
within Palestinian society itself, it has also aggravated the rivalry between Fatah and 
Hamas, and increased tensions in an already very weak security environment. 
Whether the Palestinian population will ultimately blame Hamas or the international 
community for the deteriorating situation remains to be seen.  
                                                 
396 Ibid. 
397 Erlanger, 2006 
398 Ibid. 
399 Yaghi, Muhammad,“The Growing Anarchy in the Palestinian Territories,” May 16, 2006, The Washington 
Institute, Policy Watch #1103 
192 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Conclusion 
At its core, the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah is simply one over power. 
After months of international isolation and growing unrest in the Occupied 
Territories, Abbas decided to dismiss the entire Hamas administration, dissolve 
parliament and call early presidential and parliamentary polls. The Hamas leadership 
of course responded to this announcement with strong protest, describing the plan 
as a "coup d'état against the will of the Palestinian people".400 The threats against 
the Hamas government intensified unrest, particularly within the Gaza Strip, to levels 
not witnessed for many years. During a cabinet session in Gaza in December 2006, 
Haniya declared Abbas’ election call both "unconstitutional" and one designed to 
"cause confusion".401 It was also clear that Israel was eager to aggravate the conflict 
between the two factions so that it could place the blame on them for the collapse of 
the Palestinian resistance and the failure to create a Palestinian state.   
After the war against Lebanon in 2006, Washington signaled its willingness to 
revive the peace process with "moderate forces" on the condition that "extremist 
forces" are sidelined.402 This is a part of an American-Israeli strategy to divide and 
rule, to set Palestinian against Palestinian.  But the differences between the 
Palestinian factions and parties are about means not aims. It does not make very 
much sense to separate moderates from extremists. All of the factions, including 
Hamas, are prepared to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of Israel’s 
withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state 
with its capital in Jerusalem, and the resolution of the refugee problem in 
accordance with UN Resolution 194 of 1949. Israeli propaganda reinforces the idea 
that Hamas’ aims reflect a deep-seated Arab desire to ‘drive the Jews into the sea’. 
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And yet, Israel has yet to respond to the Arab peace initiative and absolutely refuses 
to entertain the idea of withdrawing to its 1967 borders403.  
If this analysis of the situation proves to be true, the seizure of Gaza by 
Hamas and its separation from the West Bank will be a setback for the goals of 
establishing a Palestinian state (in the short to mid term). From the Israeli 
perspective, the division among Hamas and Fatah and the political and territorial 
division of the Palestinian Territories amongst the two factions will allow Israel to 
control them better. Fatah already enjoys ‘preferred choice’ status by the Israeli 
government and both the U.S. and the EU. Moreover, Israel is now targeting the Al-
Aqsa Martyr Brigades inside the West Bank, without any disapproval from President 
Abbas and his government. Hamas, on the other hand, is being treated as a “rogue” 
element by Israel, the U.S. and the EU. They are attempting to force Hamas to 
renounce its armed struggle by isolating and boycotting it (along with the Palestinian 
population living in Gaza). Should Hamas again resort to violence, Israel would have 
more room to maneuver and retaliate (considering that it will only have to launch its 
attacks on the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas). On the other hand, President Abbas 
and the PLO are already receiving full political and financial support by Israel and the 
international community.  
Hamas has been maneuvered into a corner by all sides. Gaza’s economic 
indicators are deteriorating and poverty is increasing exponentially (according to the 
IMF and the World Bank “more than 75 percent of households in Gaza were 
considered poor by end-2006”)404.  This in turn means Hamas is facing increasing 
dissatisfaction among the Gazan residents. Hamas faces a difficult choice if the 
international political and financial boycott continues. It will be unable to rule by itself 
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and may have to seek reconciliation with PLO/Fatah on the one hand and Israel and 
the international community on the other by accepting Fatah/PLO’s authority, Israel’s 
right to exist and renouncing its armed struggle. However, this will most likely 
alienate its more radical Palestinian constituencies. Besides, the Israeli government 
and Fatah/PLO show no signs of wanting to negotiate with Hamas for now. They still 
consider it to be too strong politically, enjoying wide popular support. Most likely 
Fatah /PLO and Israel will wait until Hamas is weakened enough politically, 
economically and militarily to accept Fatah/PLO rule before engaging in any talks.  
Israel, for its part, may choose to invade Gaza and overthrow the Hamas 
government. As Tzipi Livni stated, her primary goal if she wins the February 2009 
election is to overthrow Hamas. "The Hamas government in Gaza must be toppled, 
the means to do this must be military, economic and diplomatic.”405 Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Likud party leader and Livni's main rival, made similar statements, 
vowing that "In the long-term, we will have to topple the Hamas regime…In the short-
term ... there are a wide range of possibilities, from doing nothing to doing 
everything, meaning to conquer Gaza."406 Israel appears to be following the same 
pattern it followed in its ‘demonization’ of Arafat, placing full blame on him for his 
failure to ‘stop the terrorism’. Now Hamas is the scapegoat. But what the Israeli 
authorities appear to be conveniently forgetting is that Hamas is not the only 
organization resisting Israeli occupation. In fact, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility for most of the rocket fire sent off into Israel since the end of 
the truce in December 2008.  
Only time will tell which lessons have been learned. Hopefully one lesson will 
be Israel’s recognition that destroying the Palestinians’ capabilities to resist does not 
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mean their motivation has also been destroyed. To eliminate the struggle against the 
Israeli occupation ultimately requires addressing and lessening the Palestinians’ 
grievances as a population. The Palestinian population’s support for suicide attacks 
and armed resistance against Israel is likely to diminish when concrete progress is 
made in achieving at least some of the fundamental goals that both the factions and 
those supporting them share.  In the end, to stop the armed resistance, Israeli 
authorities must consider providing the Palestinian people with the same freedoms, 
opportunities and civil rights as Israeli citizens.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Written by Israeli human rights advocate, Lea Tsemel, on September 6, 1999, 
the day of the victorious Israel Supreme Court decision against torture. 
 
An Open Letter to "Abu Jerry"407 
So what do you say? 
What was it like, that moment at 10 o'clock in the morning when you turned off the 
deafening music, removed the sacks from all the bowed heads, unlocked the 
handcuffs, releasing the swollen wrists, and raised up dozens of distorted bodies from 
those awkward stools? How was it when you detached the chains hanging from the 
ceiling and allowed the stretched bodies to collapse and relax. Did you abruptly stop 
the "shaking" or did you finish one last farewell round? Did your boot complete its 
push on an exposed belly or did it retreat? 
It was as much a total surprise for me as for you. We were sitting in the Supreme 
Court, not believing, as Judge Matza read out the nine judges' unanimous decision: 
"We are making the order-to-show-cause final for all conditions and in all situations. 
Torture and any humiliating position are forbidden. 'Shabah' is forbidden. The frog 
position is forbidden. The sack on the head is forbidden. Forbidden. Forbidden. 
Forbidden." 
To my ears the decision played like pure beautiful music. The Court was reading the 
correct, perfect, obvious decision and I felt as if it had just recreated the Bill of Human 
Rights. Every argument we had researched, any claim we had brought for years and 
years, all found their natural place in this decision. I was looking at you and saw you 
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sitting there, pale and abandoned, as if you had lost your whole world in an instant. 
And when you came out into the hallway, it was not with the usual self-assured step 
and cocky gait. 
We both remember all the long sessions, case after case, when you explained that, 
"it's not exactly torture" and "for the security of the state" and, moreover, "secret 
material" and "in camera" and with good intentions". You have surely counted in your 
mind all those times when you succeeded in convincing -- just like the wolf in Little 
Red Riding Hood--that the deafening music is only so that the detainee does not hear 
and the stinking sack is only so that he does not see and the chains only so that he 
does not move and the beatings only so that he does not try to riot and the bruises are 
from falling down the stairs and, anyway, he has a long record and there's no 
alternative... 
All of a sudden, in a well-argued decision in front of your eyes, 32 years of security 
heroism are turned into 32 years of forbidden criminality. 
Like the spoiled and admired child you were, you reacted spontaneously, "Good! So 
we'll give the keys to the judges and we'll see them carrying out the interrogations." 
Was it out of a need to comfort you when I said that there are other dangerous places 
in the world and other interrogators who achieve breakthroughs with security 
offenders? You have not invented the war against terror; it is possible to handle 
interrogations to reach your objectives while safeguarding the law. I reminded you of 
all the examples we brought to the Court when offences, no less severe, were solved 
without the use of your brutal means. 
But you were not convinced. Together with losing your "special permission", you have 
also lost your grandiose self-esteem. Have you asked for the support of the 
politicians, the interpreters and the security experts? Or were they the ones who 
initiated the cries to the media, shrieking, "alas and woe!" 
Have you noticed how all your argumentation has been turned upside down? Allow 
me to remind you: until 1987, you totally denied the existence of torture. The 
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Palestinians, and moreover the self-hating Jews, were just defaming you. When the 
Landau Commission lit the darkness of your interrogation room with a penlight, you 
were forced to admit that there is moderate use of physical pressure and to promise 
that you would stop lying in the courts and in the interrogation committees. And then, 
over the years, as the transparency grew, you admitted, little by little, that there are 
"special means" and even the use of reasonable force, and after an accident or two 
you even admitted to the "shaking". And then you fired the interrogator who kicked too 
much. But you did not go overboard: you only sentenced to internal disciplinary 
censure the one who choked to death the detainee... who the hell knew that he was 
asthmatic? After too many on-the-job accidents, you set down regulations, you asked 
for and received government coverage and you entered the era of bureaucratized 
torture. And then, in spite of everything going so well, all those human rights 
organizations and those heathens who deny security is above all, pounced on you 
with huge floodlights and have exposed all the tied-up and the crawling and the 
hanged and the bent. In the glare of this total exposure you evaporate and dissolve 
like fungus that has no existence but in humid darkness. 
All of a sudden, you are the one who calls, "help!" All of a sudden the heads of the 
security services for generations-- the professional torture deniers-- are shouting from 
the rooftops like addicts in crisis. "Bring us our tools, give us back the rack and the 
tongs. We cannot live without them." Aren't you ashamed? 
Relax. I genuinely believe that you can relax. Hang a sign in the security services 
(Shabak) dining room that says, "torture and ill-treatment are unconditionally 
forbidden." And start working like any professional secret service interrogator. It is not 
such a shame to carry out interrogation like professional police. So what if you have to 
employ intelligence in the interrogation? Remember how you managed to crack the 
Jewish underground without having them pass through your torture chamber? 
Think of all the advantages: 
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-When Roni or Dana ask you, what did you do at work today, Daddy, you will be able 
to tell them that there was a battle of wits and you cracked the case, solved it, and can 
look into their eyes and forget the image of washing blood from your hands at the 
sink. 
-And when you caress your wife in the evening, your own words to A.K., tied and 
humiliated on the ground since the morning, will not echo in your ears: "Does your 
wife suck you? How are her breasts?" as he is sobbing, sobbing at your feet. 
-And think of the many thousands of guards, soldiers, policewomen and men, doctors 
and judges who you turned into secret accomplices to your sins. You forced them to 
tie up and take down, push down and wakeup, heal and prepare the hundreds of 
thousands of detainees in every last one of your institutions. 
They are free of you today. 
And especially think how you are getting rid of the glances. You remember all those 
brown eyes, begging for some mercy, crying with pain, that said that we will do 
whatever you want and confess to whatever you say. You cannot forget that you have 
always known that at a certain moment they will have a different gaze. Just in the 
blink of an eye, you read their promise for revenge. You remember how many times a 
quick shiver and a hesitation crept through you when those eyes told you that this 
humiliation and pain will never be forgotten and will blow up in your face one day. And 
you saw, deep within yourself, that the next bomb is one that you have created with 
your own hands. 
 
Lea Tsemel, Attorney 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel 
PCATI@Netvision.net.il 
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Appendix 2 
 
Testimonials of Intercepted Suicide Bombers408: 
 
Testimonial of Murad Tawalbeh  
(translated from Arabic into Hebrew into German) 
 
Aussage von Murad Tawalbeh  
(übersetzt aus dem Arabisch ins Hebraisch ins Deutsch) 
 
 
Mitteilung der: israel. Polizei                    
 
Ausweis Nr. Vorname   Familienname 
921869558 Murad    Tawalbeh 
 
Familienstand Geschlecht   Relegion 
Ledig maennlich   Moslem 
 
Geburtsdatum Geburtsort 
27/1/1983 Jenin 
 
Adresse Arbeitsplatz 
Fluechtlingslager von Jenin Gefaengniswaerter in dem Gefaengnis der palaest. 
National- behoerde in Jenin 
  
Name des Vaters  Adresse des Vaters 
Ahmad, Sohn von Mohammed     Fluechtlingslager, Jenin 
 
Datum                       Uhrzeit   Ort   Vernehmer 
23.7.01                      11:20   Kischon  Made Harb, Nr.45666 
 
Hiermit ist die Uebersetzung der Aussage des o.g. aus dem Arabisch ins 
Hebraeisch, nachdem der Verdaechtigte die Verdaechtigungen und die Warnungen 
verstanden und die Aussage in Original unterschrieben hat.  
 
Ich habe die mir vorgeworfenen Verdaechtigungen verstanden, nachdem du sie mir 
ins Arabisch uebersetzt hast. Die Verdaechtigungen sind richtig. Die Warnung habe 
ich verstanden, so dass  ich  nichts sagen muss. Jedes Etwas, was ich sage, 
koennte als Beweis gegen mich verwendet werden und das Schweigen koennte die 
Beweise gegen mich verstaerken. Ich habe auch verstanden, dass ich das Recht 
habe, die Aussage eigenhaendig auf Arabisch zu schreiben. Ich will dieses Recht in 
Anspruch nehmen und die Aussage auf Arabisch eigenhaendig schreiben.    
 
 
Frage: wo kommst du genau her und was machst du ? 
Antwort: ich bin Murad Ahmad Mohammed Tawalbeh von Jenin’s 
Fluechtlingslager ( im folgenden F.lager , E.S.), ledig und wohne mit 
                                                 
408 Translation from Hebrew into German kindly funded by the University of Vienna 
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meinen Eltern im Jenin’s F.lager. Ich habe die Geschwister: Zareefeh, 
Maisoon, Mohammed, Mahmoud, Raaed, Alaa, Khaleel und Abdallah. 
Ich arbeite z.Z. als Polizist in der palaest. Nationalbehoerde in Jenin. 
Ich nehme z.Z. an einem Kurs fuer Polizisten in Jenin teil und nach 
Beendigung des Kurses, haette ich als Gefaengniswaerter in einem 
Zivilgefaengnis der palaest. Nationalbehoerde ( im folgenden PNB, 
E.S. ) arbeiten sollen. Aber ich wurde gestern verhaftet, bevor ich den 
Kurs beenden kann. Nur Gott weiss, wann ich aus dem                  
Gefaengnis  raus komme. 
 
Frage:        wann bist du in die Organisation des Jihad Islame beigetretten, und 
wer hat dich angeworben ? 
Antwort: mein Bruder, Mahmoud, hat mich zu Jihad Islame vor einem Monat 
angeworben.  
Frage:  warum hat dein Bruder dich zu dieser Organisation angeworben? 
Antwort: mein Bruder hat mich ins Jihad Islame angeworben, damit ich einen 
Selstmord-Anschalg in Israel mache.  
 
Frage: warum hat sich dein Bruder, Mahmoud, an dich angewandt, damit du 
einen S.M.Anschlag in Israel machst? 
 
Antwort:       mein Bruder Mahmoud hat sich an mich angewandt, damit ich einen 
S.M.Anschlag in Isarel mache, da ich nach mich dem Mord meines 
Freundes, Amjad Azmi Hosnija, durch  die israel. Armee fuer einen 
Anschlag entschieden habe.  Waehrend einer Auseinandersetzung mit 
der isarel. Armee am 25/11/00 am Checkpoint von Jalameh wurde 
mein Freund Amjad Hosnija getoetet. Ich entschied mich einen 
S.M.Anschlag in Haifa zu machen, damit ich mich wegendes Mordes 
an meinen Freund an Juden raechen kann. Darueberhinaus hat sich in 
dem F.L.lager nach dem o.g. Mord ein Geruecht verbreitet, dass ich 
fuer einen S.M.Anschlag bereit bin. Und deswegen ist mein 
Bruder,Mahmoud, an mich vor einer Woche angetreten und hat mich 
gefragt, ob ich noch ernst bin einen S.M.Anschlag gegen Juden 
innehalb Israel zu machen. Ich antwortete ihm, dass ich ernst bin und 
ich bin jeder Zeit bereit. Mein Bruder Mahmoud, hat mich zu meinem 
Handy, Nr. 052-984929 angerufen und bat mich zu seinem Haus im 
F.L.Lager zu kommen. Dieses Handy, Nokia 5000, hatte ich von 
Hassan Alsanoure  fuer 400 Schekel gekauft. H. Alsanoure ist 31 Jahre 
alt, verheiratet, wird als Abu Mussa’b gennant und er ist der Partner 
meines Brueders Mahmoud in dem Kleidungsgeschaeft in dem 
Grossmarkt in Jenin. Als ich bei meinem Bruder angekommen bin, 
habe ich mich uberrascht, Thabet Merdawe zu sehen. Thabet 
Merdawe ist 28 Jahre alt, aus Arrabah, wohnt z.Z. in Jenin, aber ich 
weiss nicht genau wo. Thabet Merdawe ist frisch verheiratet, und ist 
mir bekannt, dass er geanauso mein Bruder dem militaer. Fluegel von 
Jihad Islame angehoeren. Ich moechte weiter hinzufuegen, dass mein 
Brueder Mahmoud und Th. Merdawe von den Israelis gesucht werden. 
Th. Merdawe ist deswegen nach Jenin umgezogen, da die Stadt unter 
der Verantwortung der palaest. Nationalbehoerde steht.  
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Frage:  seit wann weisst du, dass dein Bruder und Merdawe von den Isarelis 
gesucht werden? 
 
Antwort: mir ist vor zwei Monaten bekannt , dass mein Bruder gesucht ist und 
mir ist vor vier  Monaten  bekannt, dass Merdawe gesucht ist. 
 
Frage: was wollte dein Bruder nach deiner Ankunft in seiner Wohnung und 
worueber habt ihr  diskutiert?  
 
Antwort: nach meiner Ankunft in Mahmoud’s Haus haben Mahmoud und 
Merdawe angefangen,  ueber das Paradies und die Jungfrauen zu 
sprechen. Wer als Maertyrer und fuer Gott stirbt, verdient 
zweiundziebzig Jungfrauen. Sie haben angefangen, Versen aus dem 
Koraan zu lesen, die Maertyrer loben, und dass der Maertyrer Buerge 
fuer seine Eltern am Tag des Gerichts. Das Gespraech in dem 
Mahmoud’s Haus dauerte vier Stunden in Anwesenheit und Beteiligung 
Th. Merdawe. Wir haben uns verabschiedet und vereinbart, dass wir 
uns morgen in Mahmoud’s Haus wiedertreffen. Das zweite Gespraech 
fand in Mahmoud’s Haus an einem Dienstag statt, es dauerte 
anderthalb Stunde und hier diskutierten wir, Mahmoud, Merdawe und 
ich, ueber den Tod, Gott und die Jungfrauen. Am Mittwoch habe ich 
doch einen Anruf von minem Bruder Mahmoud erwartet, aber er hat 
mich nicht angerufen, da an diesem Mittwoch, soweit ich mich erinnern 
kann, Jihad aus Alhaschimieh (neben Jenin, E.S.) festgenommen 
wurde. Jihad sollte einen S.M.Anschlag in der israel. Stadt Affulah 
machen.  
 
Frage: kannst du dich genau erinnern, wann die relegioesen Sitzungen 
zwischen deinem Bruder Mahmoud, Thabet Merdawe und dir 
begonnen haben? 
 
Antwort: ich erinnere mich nicht an genaue Daten, aber ich kann mich erinnern, 
dass die Sitzungen und die Gespraeche dauerhaft waren, und sie 
waren vor der Festnahme von  Jihad. Nach der Festnahme von Jihad 
habe ich gewusst, dass er dem Jihad Islame angehoert. Deswegen 
wandte ich mich an meinen Bruder Mahmoud und fragte ihn, ob er und 
Merdawe, Jihad zum Verueben eines S.M.Anschlags in Affulah 
geschickt haben. Mein Bruder hat dies bejaht und sagte, dass er und 
Merdawe Jihad zum Verueben eines S.M.Anschlags in Affulah 
geschickt haben. Aber mein Bruder hat mir keine Einzelheiten ueber 
die Sprengstoffladung erzaehlt, die mit Jihad erfasst wurde.  
 
Frage: wann hast du letztens dein Bruder und Merdawe getroffen ? 
 
Antwort: leteztes mal war am vorigen Freitag. Das war das letzte Treffen, 
obwohl wir uns fast taeglich in den letzten zwei Wochen getroffen 
haben, um den S.M.Anschlag vorzubereiten. Ich moechte hinzufuegen, 
dass wir in jeder Sitzung uber Maertyrertod, Jungfrauen im Paradies 
gesprochen haben. In der letzten Sitzung am vorigen Freitag habe ich 
ihnen gesagt, dass ich jederzeit bereit bin, einen S.M.Anschlag zu 
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machen. Mein Bruder Mahmoud und Merdawe sagten mir, ich soll mich 
in die kommenden Tage fuer diesen Anschlag vorbereiten. 
 
Frage: habt ihr alle, dein Bruder, Merdawe und du, ueber den Anschlag 
entschieden, den du begehen solltest ? 
 
Antwort: bis zum letzten Freitag haben wir keinen Termin und keinen Otr 
vereinbart. Als ich vor zwei Tagen mit meinem Freund, Thaaer Abu 
Kamel, in Jenin’s  F.lager war, hat mich mein Bruder Mahmoud gegen 
18:00 Uhr angerufen und bat mich zum Haus des Alhaj Ali Zaffoure 
dringend zu kommen.  Thaaer Abu Kamet ist 19 Jahre alt und arbeitet 
als Polizist in dem Gefaengnis von Jenin. Alhaj Ali Zaffoure ist 36 Jahre 
alt, verheiratet und besitzt eine Schlosserei in dem Jenin’s F.Lager. Ich 
habe mich von meinem Freund Thaaer verabschiedet, ohne ihm 
logischerweise zu sagen, wohin ich gehe. Ich bin zum Haus des Alhaj 
Zaffoure gegangen. Dort war mein Bruder Mahmoud, aber er hat das 
Haus verlassen. In einem Zimmer, das im linken Fluegel des Zaffoure 
Hauses liegt, habe ich ein Testament geschrieben. Das Testament 
habe ich auf ein Papier geschrieben, das Alhaj Zaffoure mir gegeben 
hat. In dem Testament habe meiner Mutter und meinen Bruedern 
mitgeteilt, dass ich die Absicht habe, einen S.M.Anschlag zu machen, 
und ich habe sie gebeten, Geduld nach der Trennung zu haben. 
Nachdem ich das Testament fertig geschrieben habe, habe ich es vor 
einer Videokamera neben einem Koraan, Gewehr M-16, vorgelesen. 
Scheich Zaffoure hat mich mit der Kamera fotografiert. Alles habe ich 
gegen 19:00 Uhr beendet und dann ging ich nach Hause im F.lager 
zurueck.  
  
Frage: habt ihr, Mahmoud, Merdawe und du, wie der S.M.Anschlag 
ausgefuehrt wird ? 
 
Antwort: ja, wir haben entschieden, dass ich den Anschlag mittels eines mit 
Sprengstoff galldenen Guertels mache. Den Guertel habe ich erstmal 
in der dritten Sitzung im Haus meines Bruders Mahmoud gesehen. Der 
Guertel war damals bereit. Ich habe keine Ahnung, ob mein Bruder 
Mahmoud und Merdawe den Guertel vorbereitet haben.  
 Ich habe das Haus des Alhaj Zaffoure verlassen. Nachdem ich den 
Moschee im Jenin’s F.Lager nach dem Abendsgebet gegen 22:00 Uhr 
verlassen habe, hat mich Merdawe  angerufen und bat mich, die 
Hosen zu bringen und ihn neben der UNRWA- Schule im F.Lager zu 
treffen.  Gemeint ist der Sprengstoffguertel. Da der S.S.Guertel ca. 5-6 
kg. wiegt, und ich diesen nicht vor die Augen der Einwohner tragen 
kann, bin ich ohne den Geurtel zum Treffen gegangen. Als ich mich mit 
Merdawe getroffen habe, war Merdawe in einem gelben Taxi, dessen 
Fahrer aus dem F.Lager kommt.  Der Taxifahrer ist ca. 29 jahre alt , 
aber sein Name ist mir nicht bekannt. Er arbeitet in der Taxistation 
Alqassam oder Alsafaa. In dem ganzem Lager gibt es kein aehnliches 
Taxi.  
 
Frage:  kannst du mir den o.g. Taxifahrer beschreiben ? 
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Antwort: ja, er ist ca. 29 Jahre alt, ca.180 gross, staemmig, braunes Gesicht, 
schwarzes Haar nach hinten gekaemmt, ohne Schnauzbart oder Bart. 
Er hatte ein Handy gleich meins, Typ Nokia 5000. Ich habe aber seine 
Handynummer nicht. Von dort aus sind wir, Merdawe und ich mit dem 
o.g. Taxi zu meinem Bruder Mahmoud gefahren. Dort habe ich den 
Sprengstoffguertel von Mahmoud’s Faru bekommen, die ueber den 
Versteck wusste. Sie hat aber  logischerweise nicht gewusst, dass ich 
den S.S.Guertel in Israel platzen soll. Nachdem ich den S.S.Guertel 
genommen habe, sind wir mit dem Taxi zur Taxistation in Jenin 
gefahren, um dort einen jungen Mann aus Kufr A’nan abzuholen. Er 
hat doch auf uns gewartet. Von dort aus sind wir zum Haus von Alhaj 
Ali Alsaffoure in Jenin gefahren. Nach unserer Ankunft dort sind wir zu 
Dritt ausgestiegen: Merdawe, der den S.S.Guertel getragen hat, der 
junge Mann aus Kufr A’nan und ich. Danach hat uns der Taxifahrer 
verlassen. Zum Haus von Alhaj Ali sind wir gegen 23:00 Uhr 
angekommen. In dem Haus von Alhaj Ali sassen wir zu viert: Alhaj Ali, 
Merdawe, der junge Mann aus Kufr A’nan und ich. Wir diskutierten 
ueber den Ausfuehrungsplan des S.M.Anschlages, den ich machen 
wuerde. Der Plan sieht so aus : An demselben Abend soll ich in 
unserem Haus schlafen.Um 4:00 Uhr morgens soll ich zum Haus von 
Alhaj Ali gehen, und dort den S.S.Guertel tragen. Danach soll das o.g. 
Taxi mich abholen und weiter nach Kufr A’nan fahren, um den o.g. 
jungen Mann abzuholen. Der junge Mann hatte die Aufgabe, mich 
durch israelische Militaercheckpoints umleitende Wege nach Um- 
Elfahem mit gem S.S.Guertel zu bringen. Wenn wir in Um- Elfahem 
ankommen sollen, sollte er mich zum Taxi bringen, das nach Haifa 
oder nach Affulah faehrt. Und habe ich die Wahl, den S.M.Anschlag 
entweder in Haifa oder in Affulah zu machen. Nach dem Plan sollten 
zwei Wagen auf uns in Um-Elfahem warten. In dem ersten Wagen 
sollen ein Fahrer und Nebenfahrer sein. Dieser Wagen soll erst vor uns 
fahren, um den Weg zu pruefen und uns zu benachrichtigen, ob es auf 
dem Weg Checkpoints gibt.  Ich soll in dem zweiten Wagen fahren, 
und der S.S.Guertel dabeisein, bis ich an dem Ort ankomme, in dem 
ich den S.M.Anschlag begehen soll. Der Ort soll mit Soldaten voll sein. 
Der Ort sollte in den folgenden Staedten sein: Afffulah, Haifa, 
Benyamina, in Majedo- Gebiet und in einem Ort, an seinen Namen 
kann ich mich z.Z. nicht erinnern. Aber ich weiss, dass dieser Ort ca. 
70 km von Um-Elfahem entfernt. Nachdem wir den Plan 
abgeschlossen haben, habe ich das Alhaj-Haus verlassen, und dann 
bin ich nach Hause zum schlafen gegangen. Bevor ich nach Hause 
ging, bin ich bei meinem Freund Thaaer Abu Alkamel vorbeigegangen, 
und blieb bei ihm bis zwei Uhr nachts. Gegen 4:00 Uhr morgens 
weckte mich mein Bruder Mahmoud und bat mich zum Alhaj-Haus zu 
kommen. Und ich bin sofort hingegangen. In dem Alhaj’s Haus haben 
mein Bruder Mahmoud und Alhaj Ali mich mit dem S.S.Guertel 
bekleidet und sie haben mir erklaert, wie ich duch einen in der 
Hosentasche gesteckten Betriebknopf den S.S.Guertel platzen kann. 
Dieselbe Hose trage ich auch heute. ( der Verdaechtige weist auf eine 
hellblaue Jeanshose hin, mit vier Taschen, zwei vorne und zwei hinten 
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– der Vernehmer). Nachdem ich mit dem S.S.Guertel bekleidet wurde, 
habe ich mein Gebet gamacht. Danach hat Alhaj Ali fuer mich ein Taxi 
bestellt. Das Taxi hat mich zum Kufr A’nin gebracht. Gegen 6:15 holte 
mich der Junge aus Kufr A’nin ab. Vor dort sind wir durch einen 
Umleitweg bis zu einem Abfallplatz gefahren. Das Taxi ist nach Jenin 
zurueckgefahren. Wir warteten ca. Viertelstunde unter den Baeumen, 
damit wir feststellen koennen, dass es keine Militaercheckpoints gibt. 
Und nachdem wir dies feststellten, sind wir zu Fuss Richtung Um- 
Elfahem gegangen. Um Elfahem liegt ca. ein halbes Kilometer entfernt 
von dem Austeigeort. Der Junge aus Kufr A’nin sollte ca. 20 Meter vor 
mich gehen. Nach der Abmachung sollte er sich zu mir umdrehen, falls 
er Militaercheckpoints sieht, damit wir Versteckmassnahmen ergreifen 
koennen. Wir haben auch verabredet, dass er mir in Um Elfahem auf 
die beiden Wagen hinweist, die mich abholen sollen. Aber ich habe 
mich in Um Elfahem ueberrascht, dass keine Wagen auf mich 
warteten. Der Junge aus Kufr A’nin sagte mir, ich soll alleingehen und 
den S.M.Anschlag machen. Nachdem wir in der Taxistation 
angekommen sind, und ich feststellte, dass keine Wagen auf mich 
warten, sagte mir der Junge, ich habe zwei Wahlmoeglichkeiten: den 
S.M.Anschlag in Haifa oder in Affulah zu machen. Ich habe die Stadt 
Haifa gewaehlt.      
 
Frage:  warum hast du die Stadt Haifa als Anschlagsort gewaehlt ? 
 
Antwort: die Stadt Haifa habe ich gewaehlt, da es sich um eine Grossstadt 
handelt und man kann sich leicht verstecken.  
Nachdem ich mich etnschieden habe, den Anschlag in Haifa zu 
machen, hat mich der Junge aus A’nin zur Taxistation gebracht. Er hat 
mich auf ein bestimmtes Taxi hingewiesen, indem er seinen Hut 
abgenommen hat. Ich bin gegen 7:00 Uhr mit einem mit zehn Sitzen 
besetzten Sammeltaxi, an dessen Typ mich z.Z. nicht erinnern kann, 
gefahren.  
   
 Frage:  kannst du mir das Taxi, mit dem du von Um Elfahem nach Haifa 
gefahren bist, beschreiben? 
 
Antwort:  ja, ein Wagen fuer zehn Leute, ich kann mich an Typ nicht erinnern, 
Ford- oder VW- Transit, weisse Farbe, ein Grosswagen, neben dem 
Fahrer sind zwei Passagiersitze, in dem hinteren Teil sind Sitzreihen, 
die erste Reihe mit zwei Sitzen, die zweite Reihe ist auch mit zwei 
Sitzen und die letzte Reihe mit drei Sitzen. Ich moechte hinzufuegen, 
dass die Passagiere in den hinteren Teil durch eine Schiebetuer 
eingestiegen sind. Der Wagen hat blaue Gardinen an den Waenden 
und an den Fenstern. In dem Taxi gibt’s auch ein Funkgeraet und 
Quittungsapparat. Der Taxifahrer hatte ein Handy, Typ Starteck. 
 
Frage: warst du allein in dem Wagen oder waren auch andere Passagiere? 
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Antwort: der Wagen war voll und wir waren zehn Leute ausser dem Fahrer. Ich 
bemerkte, dass alle Passagiere Arbeiter aus Westbank  sind, aber ich 
kenne keinen von ihnen.  
 
Frage: wie sieht der Taxifahrer aus, mit dem du von Um Elfahem nach Haifa 
gefahren bist? 
 
Antwort: er ist ca. 45 Jahre alt, duenn, hat dunkel- graues Haar, mit normalem 
Schnauzer, d.h. nicht breit und nicht schmal, hellbraunes Gesicht 
soweit ich mich erinnern kann, braune oder gruene Augen. Ich 
moechte hinzufuegen, dass der Taxifahrer waehrend der Fahrt von Um 
Elfahem nach Haifa ein Telefongespraech bekommen hat, in dem er 
nach dem naechsten Checkpoints fragt. Ich habe von ihm gehoert, 
dass es ein Checkpoint neben Aljalame gibt. Ein hinten sitzender 
Passagier sagte dem Fahrer, fahr’ rechts, dort gibt’s nichts. Und 
wirklich haben wir keine Checkpoints auf dem Weg gefunden. Gegen 
7:45 sind wir in Haifa angekommen. In der Einfahrt zu Haifa bat ich den 
Taxifahrer, mich an den Flohmarkt neben dem „Alesteqlal“ Moschee 
abzusetzen. Und dort bin ich mit zwei Passagieren ausgestiegen. Vom 
Moscheeplatz bin ich zu Fuss Richtung des Markts gegangen und dort 
habe ich eine ca. 150 Menschen zaehlende Ansammlung in dem 
Markt, insbesondere um die Verkaeufer, gesehen. Die groesste 
Ansammlung war um den Fischverkaeufer, ca. 20 Menschen. Als ich 
diese grosse Ansammlung um den Fischverkaeufer gesehen habe, 
greifte ich zum Betriebknopf  des S.S.Guertels, aber ich habe sie 
zurueckgezogen. In der letzten Sekunde habe ich mich entschieden, 
den S.M.Anschlag in der Ansammlung um den Fischverkaeufer nicht 
zu machen.  
 
Frage:  warum hast du dich nicht gesprengt?   
 
Antwort: nachdem ich zum Betriebknopf des S.S.Guertel zugegriffen habe, habe 
ich Angst gefuehlt, und viele Gedanken und Bilder meiner Mutter und 
Geschwester haben mich ueberschwommen. Und deswegen habe ich 
mich entschieden, mich nicht an diesen Menschen zu sprengen. In 
demselben Augenblick habe ich mich dieser Menschen erbarmt, da sie 
mir nicht schlechtes angetan haben. Nachdem ich mich etnschieden 
habe, mich nicht in dieser Ansammlung zu sprengen, wollte ich den 
S.S.Guertel loswerden. Deswegen habe ich den Markt verlassen und 
mich ca. 300 m 
 vom Markt entfernt. Ich ging zom Ort, wo Arbeiter aus der Westbank 
setzen. Ich bin nochmal zum Flohmarkt gegangen, um mich in der 
Ansammlung zu sprengen. Nochmal habe ich zum Betriebknopf des 
S.S.Guertel zugegriffen und diesmal habe ich wieder Angst und Reue 
gefuehlt. Und deswegen habe ich mich etnschieden, den S.S.Guertel 
nicht zu sprengen, sondern ihn in einem Ort loszuwerden. Und das war 
gegen 8:30 Uhr morgens. 
Ich entfernte mich vom Markt und fing ich an, einen verlassenen Platz 
zu suchen, um den S.S.Guertel zu werfen und ihn 
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loszuwerden.Waehrend der Suche erinnerte ich mich an einen 
verlassenen Haus im Hadar (Stadtteil von Haifa, E.S.). 
 
Frage:  wie bist du zu dem verlassenen Haus im Hadar angekommen? 
 
Antwort: zu Fuss. Ich bin vom Flohmarkt duch die nach Hadar bringenden 
Treppen hingegangen. Das verlassene Haus kenne ich gut, da ich in 
der Stadt Haifa gearbeitet habe. Als ich in dem verlassenen Haus 
angekommen bin, habe ich dort einige Arbeiter aus der Westbank 
gesehen. Ich habe sie gefragt, ob ein gewisser Mohammed aus Jenin 
unter ihnen sei. Sie antworteten , dass keiner aus Jenin unter ihnen ist.  
 
Frage: warum hast du nach einem gewissen Mohammed aus Jenin gefragt 
und gesucht? Solltest du einen gewissen Mohammed in Haifa vor dem 
Anschlag treffen? 
 
Antwort: ich habe danach gefragt, damit die Arbeiter mich beim Ein- und 
Ausgehen nicht verdaechtigen. Ich habe diesen Namen erfunden. 
Nachdem ich mich mit den Arbeitern unterhalten habe, und ich habe 
den S.S.Guertel noch am Koerper, bin ich vom zweiten zum ersten 
Stock gegangen. Und dort habe ich das blaue Hemd, das ich im 
Moment trage, ausgezogen. Unter diesem Hemd hatte ich ein zweites 
gelbes T.schirt. Und darunter hatte ich ein rotes T.Schirt fuer Girls. Und 
unter alle diesen hatte ich den S.S.Guertel.  
 
Frage: warum hast du alle drei angezogen? 
 
Antwort: damit ich dick aussehe, damit ich die Finger des S.S.Guertel verstecke 
und damit ich keinen Verdacht errege.  
 
Frage: kannst du mir beschreiben, woraus der S.S.Guertel gabaut ist? 
 
Antwort: der S.S.Gurtel ist geabaut aus : Lederguertel in brauner Farbe, 10 cm 
breit, auf dem braunen Guertel sind ca. 15 Sprengroehre, jedes Rohr 
ist ca. 3,5 cm Durchmesser, jedes Rohr ist durch einen Faden mit dem 
Gurtel verbunden, aus jedem Rohr gehen zwei weisse Stromfaeden 
aus, die auch zu zwei Batterien verbunden sind, jede Batterie ist 
viereckig, 9 Volt. Aus den mit den Roehren verbundenen Batterien 
gehen Faeden raus, die miteinander verbunden sind und sie alle mit 
dem Betriebknopf wieder verbunden sind, der in der vorderen 
Hosentasche war, damit der S.S.Gurtel gesprengt werden kann. Der 
Btriebknopf besteht aus zwei Teilen: der untere Teil ist schwarz und 
der obere Teil ist rot. Der Betriebknopf hat ON und OFF Stellen. Ich 
moechte hinzufuegen, dass jeder mit den Sprengkoerpern verbundene 
Srtomfaden aus zwei weissfarbigen Sehnen besteht.  
 
Frage:  wo hast du genau den S.S.Guertel angezogen und wer hat dich 
bekleidet? 
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Antwort: den S.S.Gurtel habe ich in dem Alhaj’s Haus in Anwesenheit meines 
Bruders Mahmoud. Unter dem Gurtel habe ich ein weisses T-Schirt 
angezogen, und darauf haben sie mich mit dem S.S.Guertel bekleidet. 
Den S.S.Guertel haben sie mit einem weissen Faden nach hinten 
verbunden, damit er festbleibt. Danach haben sie den S.S.Guertel mit 
zwei Pflasterbaendern verbunden, damit er gestaerkt wird und damit 
die Sprengstoffroehre (= S.S.Roehre, E. S.) versteckt werden koennen. 
Auf den S.S.Guertel haben sie mich mit einem rotem Maedchen-T-
Schirt bekleidet und darauf ein gelbes T-Schirt und darauf ein blaues, 
das ich heute noch anziehe.  
 
Frage: wie hast du den  S.S.Guertel losgeworden und wo hast du den 
weggeworfen? 
 
Antwort: zuerst habe ich die drei T-Schirts ausgezogen: das blaue, das gelbe 
und das rote. Danach habe ich die Pflasterbaende runtergeholt. Den 
S.S.Guertel habe ich von hinten nach vorne umgedreht, um die 
Faeden zu loesen. Dies habe ich im ersten Stock des verlassenen 
Hauses gemacht. Nachdem ich den S.S.Guertel runtergeholt habe, 
habe ich wieder das blaue T-Schirt angezogen. Danach habe ich die 
Faeden des elektrischen Betriebknopfes voneinander entfernt und 
einen nach dem anderen gerissen, damit kein elektrischer Kontakt 
entsteht, der den S.S.Guertel aosloesen kann. Nach der Entfernung 
des Betriebknopfes habe ich ihn in meine Hosentasche gesteckt. Die 
beiden anderen T-Schirts und den S.S.Guertel habe ich im ersten 
Stock des verlassenen Hauses zusammen gelassen. Ich habe das 
Haus verlassen und ich bin Richtung der Taxi-Station von Osoffia 
durch die Treppen runtergelaufen. Auf  dem Weg herunter habe ich 
den Betriebknopf in einen Muelleimer geworfen.  
Ich bin zum Platz in der Unterstadt von Haifa angekommen, in dem 
sich regelmaessig Arbeiter aus der Westbank sammeln. Von dort aus 
wollte ich nach Osoffia fahren, um meinen Freund, Tarek Kayoof,  
besuchen kann. Ich habe bei seinem Vater, Abu Alameer, zwei Monate 
vor der heutigen Intifada als Helfer fuer Fliesenleger gearbeitet. Die 
Arbeit haben wir in dem Haus seiner Tochter gemacht. Da die 
Telefonnummer von Tarek in meinem Handy, dessen Nummer (057-
984929), gespeichert ist, habe ich einen Telefonapparat gesucht, um 
meinen Bruder Mahmoud anzurufen. Mein Handy habe ich bei meinem 
Bruder Mahmoud gelassen, bevor ich zum S.M.Anschlag ausgegangen 
bin. Und deswegen bin ich in das Restaurant von Um Schaker in dem 
Arbeiterpaltz gegangen, um eine Telefonkarte zu kaufen. Aber ich 
habe dort nicht gefunden. Ich bin zu einem anderen Restaurant in der 
Naehe gegangen, und hier habe ich eine T.Karte fuer 18 Schekel und 
eine Dose CocaCola gekauft.  
Ich habe meinen Bruder Mahmoud auf sein Handy, dessen Nummer 
(052-496661) ist, angerufen, aber sein Handy war aus. Ich habe auch 
auf mein Handy, das ich bei Mahmoud gelassen habe, angerufen, und 
es war auch aus. Ich versuchte nochmal vom selben Telefonapparat 
meinen Bruder Mahmoud auf andere Nummer, 059-701008, zu 
erreichen, aber ohne Erfolg, da ich von hier aus die Nummer der 
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palaestinensischen Firma „Jawwal“ nicht waehlen kann. Deswegen 
habe ich zum vierten Mal, und diesmal  meinen Freund, Thaaer Abu 
Alkamel, dessen Nummer (052-533340), angerufen. Ich bat ihn, 
meinem Bruder Mahmoud mitzuteilen, dass ich aus Haifa anrufe und er 
soll  sein Handy oeffnen, da ich ihn dringend brauechte.  
 
Thaeer Abu Alkamel fragte mich , was ich in Haifa mache, und ich 
versicherte ihm, in der ersten Gelegenheit, dass wir uns treffen, zu 
erzaehlen. Nach diesem Gespraech habe ich meinen Bruder Mahmoud 
wieder angerufen, aber sein Handy war noch aus. Deswegen bin ich 
Richtung der Taxistation gegangen, um zu meinem Freund Tarek zu 
fahren. Ich habe aber entschieden, zur Telefonzelle zurueckzukehren, 
um meinen Bruder Mahmoud anzurufen. Und diesmal auch ohne 
Erfolg. Ich habe wieder T. Abu Alkamel angerufen, und ihn gebeten, 
mich mit meinem Bruder Mahmoud in Verbindung zu setzen. Ich habe 
meinen Bruder Mahmoud auf sein Handy, Nr. (052- 496661) 
angerufen, und diesmal antwortete er. Ich fragte ihn nach der 
Handynummer von Tarek Kayoof,  und er hat mir Handynummer 
gegeben, aber die Nummer war nicht fuer Tarek. Ich bat ihn, weiter zu 
suchen. Zwischendurch habe ich einen Stift aus dem nahliegenden 
Restaurant geholt. Mein Bruder hat mir die Telefonnummer von Tarek’s 
Haus gegeben und ich habe sie auf meine Hand geschrieben. Als ich 
in Haifa festgenommen wurde, wurde diese Nummer registriert. 
 
Frage: hat sich dein Bruder nicht ueberrascht, dass du den Anschlag nicht 
gemacht hast, als du ihn angerufen hast? 
 
Antwort: ja, er hat sich ueberrascht, als ich mit ihm gesprochen habe. Er fragte 
mich danach, und ich lachte ihn aus, dass dies kapput ist, und was ihr 
mir gegben habt, keinen Strom liefert. Mein Bruder Mahmoud verlangte 
von mir, nach Jenin zurueckzukehren. Ich sagte ihm, dass ich die 
Hosen, d.h. den S.S.Guertel, weggeforfen habe und ich moechte 
meinen Freund Tarek in Osoffia besuchen gehen. Und danach werde 
ich nach Jenin zurueckkehren. Ich habe Tarek angerufen, aber das 
Telefon zuhause war abgetrennt. Ich entschied mich nach Osoffia zu 
fahren, ohne vorher anzurufen. Ich wandte mich zur Taxistation von 
Ossofia. Aber ein paar Meter entfernt, haben mich Polizisten in Uniform 
ueberrascht, mich festgenommen, und mich zur Polizeistation 
gebracht. 
  
 In der Vernehmung habe ich ein Gestaendnis eingelegt und sie ueber 
den S.S.Guertel informiert, den ich im verlassenen Haus hinterlassen 
habe. Ich bin mit den Polizisten zu dem verlassenen Haus gegangen 
und habe dort auf den S.S.Guertel hingewiesen. Danach haben mich 
die Polizisten zur Polizeistation in Haifa zurueckgebracht und von dort 
hierher. Ich habe ein Gestaendnis in der Vernehmung eingelegt in 
dem, was ich vor dir geschrieben habe.   
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Frage: du hast vorher gesagt, dass Thabet Merdawe Aktivist des Jihad Islame 
in Jenin ist. Weisst du, seit wann er Mitglied in Jihad Islame ist, und 
warum er gesucht wird ? 
 
Antwort: mir ist bekannt, dass der o.g. Thabet Merdawe seit fuenf  Monaten 
Mitglied des Jihad Islame in Jenin ist. Und er fuehrt das Jihad Islame in 
Jenin nach der Liquidierung von Iyad  Herdawe durch die Israelis, wie 
wir in den Nachrichten gehoert haben. Aber ich habe keine Ahnung, 
warum er von den Israelis gesucht ist, und welche Aktionen er 
ausfuehrte.  
 
Frage: wann hast du zum Erstmal Thabet Merdawe kennengelernt.  
 
Antwort: zum Erstmal habe ich ihn vor drei Monaten im Haus  meines Bruders 
Mahmoud in Jenin’s  Fluechtlingslager kennengelernt. Mein Bruder 
Mahmoud gehoert auch dem militaerischen Fluegel des Jihad Islame 
und er ist auch gesucht seit ca. drei Monaten von den Israelis.  
 
Frage: verfuegst du ueber Waffen ? Hast du schonmal geschossen ? 
 
Antwort: ich habe keine Waffen. Aber mein Bruder Mahmoud hat ein Gewehr, 
Typ M -16, den er vom o.g. Thabet Merdawe bekommen hat. Ich 
denke, dass dieses Gewehr dem Jihad Islame gehoert. Vor einem 
Monat und vor zwei Wochen vor meiner Festnahme habe ich dieses 
Gewehr in die Hand genommen. Mit meinem Freund, Thaeer Abu 
Alkamel, sind wir auf den Berg in der Naehe des F.Lagers gegangen 
und dort auf Zielflaschen geschossen. Im ersten Mal habe ich drei 
Kugeln und Thaeer hat vier Kugeln geschossen. Im zweiten Mal hat 
jeder von uns fuenf Kugeln geschossen. Das Gewehr haben wir jedes 
Mal meinem Bruder Mahmoud am selben Tag zurueckgegeben.  
 Ich moechte hinzufuegen, dass ich wahrend der israel. Bombadierung, 
deren Gruende mir nicht bekannt sind,  auf die Stadt  Jenin  vor 
anderthalb Monaten, drei- mal zum Schutz meines von den Israelis 
gesuchten Bruders Mahmoud mit ihm im F.Lager bewaffnet 
ausgegangen bin. Er hat mir zu seinem Schutz das o.g. Gewehr M-16 
gegben.  
 
Frage: hast du dich an Kundgebungen gegen die oeffentl. Ordnung waehrend 
der jetzigen Intifada beteiligt ?     
 
Antwort: ja, am Anfang der Intifada. Und in den Monaten Okt. + Nov. 2000 habe 
ich fuenf Mal an Auseinandersetzungen mit israel. Soldaten am 
Checkpoint Aljalameh teilgenommen. Waehren dieser 
Auseinandersetzungen habe ich Steine auf israel. Soldaten geworfen. 
In einer dieser Auseinandersetzungen hat mit mir mein Freund Amjad 
Azmi Hosnija teilgenommen und er ist  erschossen. 
Nach seinem Tod habe ich entschieden, einen S.M.Anschlag zu 
machen, wie ich am Anfang dieser Aussage geschildert habe.   
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Frage: habt ihr an diesen o.g. Auseinandersetzungen am Checkpoint  
Jalameh nur Steine oder verschiedene Sachen auf die Soldaten 
geworfen ? 
 
Antwort: wir haben Steine geworfen und einen Schleuder benutzt. Den 
Schleuder habe ich von meinem o.g. Freund Amjad genommen. Ich 
moechte hinzufuegen, dass ich wehrend einer dieser 
Auseinandersetzungen eine Brennflache neben einer Mauer gefunden 
habe. Diese Brennflasche habe ich auf die Soldaten geschleudert, aber 
sie ist weit von ihnen gefallen.  
 
Frage: kennst du die Teilnehmer an diesen  Auseinandersetzungen  am 
Checkpoint Aljalameh ? kannst du dich an sie erinnern ?  
 
Antwort: Zigleute haben daran teilgenommen. Von ihnen kenne : (1) den o.g. 
Amjad, (2) Usamah Eed  Na’naa’h  Turkaman und er ist waehrend 
Wechselschuesse mit israel. Soldaten am Checkpoint Aljalameh 
erschossen, (3) Muneer Ersaan, 17 Jahre alt, vom Jenin’s F.Lager, hat 
mit mir an fast allen Auseinandersetzungen am Checkpoint Aljalameh 
teilgenommen, und er hat auch Steine auf die Soldaten geworfen, (4) 
Amjad Albakh, 20 Jahre alt, vom Jenin’s F.Lager und er hat auch an 
allen  Auseinandersetzungen mit mir teilgenommen und Steine auf  die 
Soldaten geworfen. Soweit ich mich erinnere, hat er in  vier 
Auseinandersetzungen fuenf Brennflaschen auf  die Soldaten am 
Checkpoint Aljalameh geschleudert. Es waren auch Jugendliche aus 
Jenin, Alyamoon und Burkeen mit uns, aber ich erinnere mich z.Z. 
nicht an ihren Namen.  
 
Frage: wolltest du den S.M.Anschlag, den du in Haifa machen wolltest, im 
Namen einer bestimmten Organisation machen ? 
 
Antwort: ja, im Namen des Jihad Islame, dem ich angehoere.  
 
Frage: moechtest du etwas hinzufuegen, zu dem was du oben gesagt hast ? 
 
Antwort; ja, ich moechte hinzufuegen, dass ich meine Tat bereue. Dies ist die 
Aussage, die ich freiwillig mit meiner Hand geschrieben habe. Ich 
bestaetige ihrer Richtigkeit und dies ist meiner Unterschrift.   
 
 
Datum                       Uhrzeit  Ort   Vernehmer 
25/9/01                      15:25  Kischon    Lutuf Mere’e, Nr.90108-2 
 
 
Hiermit ist die Uebersetzung der Aussage des o.g. aus dem Arabisch ins 
Hebraeisch, nachdem er sie vor mir eigenhaendig geschrieben hat : ich habe 
verstanden, dass  du  mir  ein  paar  Klaerungs-fragen bzgl. der schon von mir 
abgegebenen Polizeiaussagen stellen moechtest. Ich habe die gesetzliche Warnung 
verstanden und ich bin bereit, jede Frage zu beantworten, die du mir stellen 
wuerdest.( Unterschrift des Verdaechtigten). 
212 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Appendices 
 
Frage:  sind alle von dir bei der Polizei abgegebenen Aussagen richtig? 
 
Antwort: ja, alle meine bei der Polizei abgegebenen und eigenhaendig 
geschriebenen  Aussagen sind richtig.  
 
Frage: in deiner Aussage hast du gesagt, dass du den S.M.Anschlag in Haifa 
mittels eines Messers Juden als Rache fuer den Mord Amjad 
ermoerdern moechtest. Wie hast du dich auf den Anschlag vorbereitet? 
Wolltest du Menschen erstechen ? Und dann dich selbst toeten? 
Erklaere mir bitte diesen Punkt.  
 
Antwort: ich war zuhause im Jenin’s F.Lager und habe angefangen an meinen 
ermoerderten Freund Amjad zu denken. In meinen Kopf ging die Idee, 
nach Haifa zu fahren und ein Messer an meinen Hueften nicht 
versteckt zu tragen, damit sie mich sehen. Entweder werden sie mich 
erschiessen oder mich festnehmen. Ich dachte, die Polizei wird mich 
moeglicherweise festnehmen. Ich hatte keine Absicht, einen bestimten 
Menschen zu erstechen. Aber am Tag der Ermorderung von Amjad 
habe ich entschieden, einen S.M.Anschlag in Haifa zu machen, wie ich 
in der ersten Aussage erzaehlt habe.  
 
Frage: in deiner Aussage hast du erzaehlt, dass du an Steinewerfen auf die 
Armee mit anderen beteiligt war. Erinnerst du dich daran ,wieviel mal 
du Steine auf die Armee geworfen hast, wieviel Steine jedesmal ? 
 
Antwort: ja, ich hatte nicht mehr als zehn Mal in zwei Monaten. Und jedes Mal 
habe ich zw. zehn bis zwanzig Steine geworfen.  
 
Frage: wann bist du in die palaest. Polizei eingetreten ? Und wo hast du 
gearbeitet ?  
 
Antwort: am 1/3/2001 bin ich in die palaest. Polizei angetreten und ich habe bis 
zum 21/7/2001 als Gefaengniswaerter im Jenin’s                
Zivilgefaengnis gearbeitet. 
 
Frage: Sameer Tubasse sagte in seiner Aussage, dass ihr geplant habt, 
deinem Vorschlag nach einen S.M.Anschlag gemeinsam zu machen. 
Ist das richtig ? 
 
Antwort: ja ,dies ist richtig. Wir haben geplant nach dem Vorschlag von Sameer, 
einen S.M.Anschlag gemeinsam zu machen.  
 
Frage: warum bist aber allein gegangen, um den S.M.Anschlag zu machen, 
und gegen die Abmachung mit Sameer ?  
   
Antwort: da ich Angst um Sameer hatte, wenn er einen S.M.Anschlag macht. 
Ich wollte nicht, dass er stirbt.  
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Frage: dein Freund Sameer sagte in seiner Aussage, dass er mit dir an 
Steinewerfen auf die Armeekraefte teilgenommen hat. Ist das richtig ? 
 
Antwort: ja, dies ist richtig. Am Beginn der Al-Aqsa Intifada hat mein Freund 
Sameer mit mir an Steinewerfen auf die Armeekraefte am Aljalameh 
Checkpoint viermal teilgenommen.   
 
Frage: warum hast du ueber Sameer Tubasse nict erzaehlt, obwohl du ueber 
seinen Plan, einen S.M.Anschlag zu machen, gewusst hast ? 
 
Antwort: da ich nicht erwartet habe, dass Sameer dies doch machen wuerde, 
obwohl wir darueber gesprochen haben. Ich habe auch nicht erwartet, 
dass Sameer ueberhaupt einen S.M.Anschlag machen kann. Und 
deswegen habe ich ueber ihn in meiner polizeilichen Aussage nicht 
erzaehlt. 
 
Frage: kannst du mir ueber die Sache mit den Jungfrauen im Paradies 
erzaehlen ? 
 
Antwort: wie ich in der ersten Aussage gesagt habe, mein Bruder Mahmoud und 
Thabet Merdawe haben mit mir darueber gesprochen. Sie sagten mir, 
wer einen S.M.Anschlag macht, kommt ins Paradies und dort bekommt 
fuer sich allein 72 Jungfrauen.  Man kann mit denen heiraten und gutes 
Leben machen. Sicherlich gibt es dort einen Fluss von Getraenken, 
einen Fluss von Honig, einen Fluss von Joghurt und alles, was du 
moechtest, gibt es dort.   
 
 Frage: warum hast akzeptiert, einen S.M.Anschlag gegen Juden zu machen? 
Hast du etwas gegen sie ? 
 
Antwort: ich habe es als Rache wegen des Mordes meines Freundes Amjad 
akzeptiert. Und weil mein Bruder Mahmoud und Thabet Merdawe mich 
ueberzeugt haben. Dies ist der einzige Grund. 
 
Frage: du hast in deiner Aussage erzaehlt, dass du den S.M.Anschalg, in 
Majedo- oder Benyamina-Gebiet machen wolltest. Wo wolltest du 
genau in Majedo machen? Kennst du einen bestimmten Ort ?  
 
Antwort: ich weiss nicht, wo Majedo liegt. Und ich kenne Benyamina- Gebiet 
nicht. Aber vor dem Anschlag haben sich: Alhaj Ali, Thabet Merdawe 
und ein dritter Mann, den ich nicht kenne, getroffen. Sie planten den 
S.M.Anschlag und schlugen einige Orte, darunter Majedo und 
Benyamina, vor. Persoenlich kenne ich diese Orte nicht.  
 
Frage: warum hast du den S.M.Anschlag nicht gemacht ? Hat der in deiner 
Verfuegung stehende Sprengstoff nicht funktioniert ? Oder waren zu 
viel Leute, die du dich erbarmst ? Warum hast du an deine Mutter 
gedacht ? 
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Antwort: den S.M.Anschlag habe ich nicht gemacht, da das Bild meiner Mutter 
in meine Gedanken ging. Es waren auch dort kleine Kinder, die ich 
nicht schlechtes antun moechte. Es waren auch Araber, die ich nicht 
toeten moechte. Ich habe auch eine Thailaenderin gesehen, die ein 
Kind traegt und dann habe ich an meine Mutter gedacht. Und 
deswegen habe ich den Anschlag nicht gemacht. 
 
Frage: du hast in deiner Aussage gesagt, dass du Haifa als Anschlagsort 
ausgewaehlt hast, da du dich in Haifa leicht  verstecken kannst. 
Warum wolltest du dich verstecken, wenn du aber durch S.M.Anschlag 
doch getoetet wirst ?  
 
Antwort: ich bin mit dem Gefuehl hingegangen, dass ich dies verfehle. Und mit 
dem Gefuehl, dass ich den S.M.Anschlag stornieren werde. Ich habe 
zwischen Haifa und Affulah ausgewaehlt, da ich den Ort besser kenne. 
Und ich kenne auch dort einige Versteckorte. Ich habe auch damit 
gerechnet, den S.M.Anschlag zu stornieren. Und deswegen habe ich 
Haifa ausgewaehlt.  
 
Frage: moechtest du etwas hinzufuegen? 
Antwort: nein, ich habe nichts.     
 
     -Unterschrift- 
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Testimonial of Areen Awa’d Hussein Ahmad 
(translated from Arabic into Hebrew into German) 
 
Aussage von Areen Awa’d  Hussein Ahmad  
(übersetzt aus dem Arabisch ins Hebraisch ins Deutsch) 
  
                          Im Namen des Erbarmigen und des Barmherzigen      
   
Ich, die unten unterschreibende Areen Awa’d  Hussein Ahmad, erklaere aus meinem 
freiwilligen Willen hiermit: 
Ruecktritt von Aufopferungsanschlag in Reschon Lezion ( israel. Stadt – E.Sabbgh)   
 
Ich hatte einen Kontakt mit Jadallah Mahmoud Atallah Salem vom Fluechtlingslager 
Dheischeh, 26 Jahre alt, und er ist als Maertyrer am 8.3.2002 gefallen. Und dies hat 
mich veranlasst,  zu denken, diese Aktion zu machen. Nach einiger Zeit und wegen 
der Invasion der israel. Streitkraefte in Betlehem und was sie dort von Brutalitaet und 
Mord machten, hat dies meine Beharrlichkeit bekraeftigt, diese Aktion doch 
duchzufuehren. Nachdem die palaestinensischen Aktivisten die Grabeskirche in 
Betlehem verlassen haben, habe ich das Thema dem Ali Yousef Almughrabe, 16 
Jahre alt, vom Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh, vorgelegt. Er verlangte Zeit, daran zu 
denken und er soll die Meinung  seines Brueders, Ahmad Almughrabe, vom 
Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh, hoeren. Danach hat er (Ali) mir Bescheid gegeben, 
dass ich jederzeit bereit sein soll.  In der Tat hatten wir uns in der Uni getroffen, so 
dass ich das Testament am Mittwoch, den 22.5.02, um 11 Uhr vorlesen soll. Aber zu 
meiner Ueberraschung sagte mir Ali  an dem verabredeten Mittwoch, dass die Aktion 
( Anschlag) heute sein wird, wenn es Gott will. Und Alles hat sich geaendert. Ich fuhr 
mit ihm und Mahmoud Salem, vom Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh, mit dem Wagen 
zum Haus von Darin Almughrabe, 20 Jahre alt, aus Betlehem, und dort machte ich 
die erforderlichen Gebote. Mahmoud Salem erklaerte mir und dem jungen Mann, der 
mit mir den Anschlag gemeinsam ausfuehren wollte, den Plan. Der junge mann 
heisst Issa Bder. Ich traf ihn nur dort, er ist 16 und halb Jahre alt, vom Al- Duhah  
(Stadtteil von Betlehem, E.S ). 
Wir, drei, wiederholten den Plan, fuhren wir zu Beit Sahour, lernten wir Ibrahim 
Alsajde, kennen, der uns auch den Plan weitererklaerte. Issa und ich blieben in dem 
Wagen, Ibrahim und seine Frau fuhren vor uns bis wir zu dem Ort ankamen. Ibrahim 
schrieb uns die beiden Anschlagsorte vor und ging.  Nach zehn Minuten rief ich ihn 
an und sagte ich ihm etnschieden, dass ich zurueckkehren moechte, aber er wollte 
mir nicht zuhoeren und versuchte mehr als eine Stunde zu entweichen. Nachdem er 
aufgab, entschieden wir, Issa und ich, nichts zu machen. Aber im letzten Augenblick 
entschied sich Issa, zu bleiben. Ich entschied mich, zurueckzukeheren, auch wenn 
dies nach Tagen wird, weil ich diese Sache nicht machen will.  
Ich kehrte mit Ibrahim und siener Frau zurueck, die mich verspottete, da ich dies 
nicht machte. Ibrahim sagte mir, ich werde sehr bereuen, und fing er an, ueber das 
Paradies und die damit zusammenhaengendenen Sachen zu erzaehlen, bis wir in 
Bet Jalah ankamen. Dort nahm ich ein Taxi zu Ali Mughrabe und Mahmoud Salem, 
beide vom Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh, und dann kehrten wir zum Haus von Darin 
Almughrabe in Betlehem, 20 Jahre alt, zurueck. Ich habe mich umgezogen, und sie 
brachten mich nach Hause zurueck....... 
      
    Areen Awad’ Hussein Ahmad 29.5.2002  
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Mitteilung der:   israel. Polizei                    
 
Ausweis Nr. Vorname  Familienname 
908331416 Areen    Ahmad 
 
Familienstand Geschlecht  Relegion 
Ledig weiblich   Moslemin 
 
Geburtsdatum Geburtsort 
1982 Jordanien 
 
Adresse Arbeitsplatz   Familienname des Vaters 
Bet- Sahour Schuelerin  Awad’/ Hussein 
 
  
Datum                       Uhrzeit  Ort   Vernehmer 
29.5.02                      17:25  Russischer Platz Zion Sasson, Nr.456566 
 
 
 
Ich sah die o.g. und erkaerte ihr, dass ich ein Polizist bin, Nr.456566. Mein Name ist 
Zion Sasson  und dass sie verdaechtigt, einen Selbstmordanschlag mit anderen zu 
planen, Mitgliedschaft in einer feindlichen Organisation. Ich warne dich, du musst 
meine Fragen nicht  beantworten, aber jedes Etwas, was du sagst, wird zu deinem 
Lasten im Gericht verwendet. 
Zion Sasson – Unterschrift 
 
Ich verstand den Inhalt der Warnung und aus meinem freiwilligen und guten 
Willen erzaehle ich dir, was mit mir geschehen ist. Vor einem Jahr lernte ich an der 
Uni von Betlehem einen jungen Mann kennen, der  Jadallah Mahmoud Atallah 
Salem heisst. Er ist vom Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh in Betlehem, 26 Jahre alt. Zu 
der Uni kam er oft mit anderen jungen Maennern. Jadallah und ich gingen sieben 
Monate zusammen. Dann veinbarten wir zu heiraten. Ich habe den Termin der 
Hochzeit bis zim Studiumabschluss vergeschoben, und er soll ein Haus bauen. Am 
8/3/2002 toetete die israel. Armee Jadallah. Jadallah war Aktivist in dem Tand’im, 
der Fateh- Organisation. Am 2/4/2002 dringte die israel. Armee in Betlehem ein. Ein 
Teil der Tand’im- Aktivisten fluechteten in die Grabeskirche u.a. Ali Mughrabe, den 
ich kannte, als ich mit Jadallah war. Nach zehn Tagen ging Ali aus der Grabeskirche.  
Am 16/5/2002 rief ich ihn an, und sagte ihm, dass ich mit ihm reden will. Wir traffen 
uns eines Nachmittags neben der Grabeskirche und sagte ich ihm, dass ich einen 
Anschlag durchfuehren moechte. Er antwortete, dass er seinen Bruder, Ahmad, 
fragen soll und dann wird er mir eine Antwort geben.  
 
Danach ging jeder von uns in seine Richtung.  
Ali fragte mich, ob ich ernstlich bin. Ich antwortete, ja. Er sagte, alles in Ordnung, 
bereite dich vor. Wir vereinbarten einen neuen Termin,  den letzten Dienstag, den 
21/5/02 an der Uni, und ich erinnere mich nicht an die Uhrzeit.Wie vereinbart kam Ali 
zum Treffpunkt an der Uni und sagte, ich muss in den naechsten zwei Tagen bereit 
sein, da der Selbstmordanschlag am Donnerstag, den 23/5/02 oder am Freitag 
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durchgefuehrt wird. ( In dieser Zeit der Vernehmung bat die Verdaechtigte um 
Kopfschmerzentabletten und ein Glas Wasser. Nach einigen Minuten bekam sie 
dies). Den Selbstmordanschlag entschied ich mich zu machen, ohne einen 
rechtfertigendenen oder respektvollen Grund zu haben. Ali sagte mir, ich soll am 
Mittwoch zum Haus seiner Schwester kommen, um das Testament zu machen. Das 
heisst, mich durch Video zu fotografieren. 
Am Mittwoch, um 8:00 Uhr traf ich mich mit Ali an der Uni und ich war doch 
ueberrascht, als ich einen anderen jungen Mann mit Ali sah, der Mahmoud Salem 
heisst. M. Salem ist vom Fluechtlingslager Dheischeh und er war in dem Tand’im 
aktiv. Ich suchte eine Ecke an der Uni, damit keiner uns sehen kann. Ali sagte mir, 
ich soll an Gott glauben und heute wird der Anschlag sein. Ich war ueberrascht und 
sagte zu Ali, ich dachte nicht, dass dies so schnell werden soll. Ich moechte 
hinzufuegen, dass ich waehrend meines Treffens mit Ali vor zwei Tagen ihn fragte, 
warum sein Bruder, Ahmad, mich ausgewaehlt hat, abwohl andere Kanditaten fuer 
Selbstmordanschlag zur Verfuegung standen. Ali antwortete, dass ich ins Paradies 
gehen soll und  ich werde  Jadallah treffen. Ich lachte und sagte ihm, ich bin kein 
Maedchen, so dass du mir auslachen und solches Quatsch erzaehlen kannst.  
Ali, Salem und ich fuhren  mit dem Wagen und Ali stellte mir Mahmoud Salem vor. In 
dem Wagen machte ich  dem Ali eine Handbewegung, die bedeutete, warum 
Mahmoud ihn begleite. Er zuckte mit den Schultern und sagte, er wird mir spaeter 
erzaehlen. Ich traue dem M. Salem nicht, und Jadallah traute ihm auch nicht. Wir 
kamen zum Haus von Ali’s Schwester, Darin. Dort traf ich einen jungen Mann, der 
Issa Bder heisst. M. Salem holte eine Skizze aus der Tasche, die wie ein Plan 
aussieht. M. Salem und I. Bder gingen raus, damit Issa eine Fahruebung machen 
kann. Darin und ich blieben zuhause und ich schrieb ein Testament fuer meine 
Eltern. Ich schrieb ihnen, dass ich diesen Weg suchte. Danach fotgrafierte mich Ali 
mit dem Video. Nach einiger Zeit kehrten M. Salem und Issa zu  Darin’s Haus 
zurueck.. Ali zeigte mir den Sprengstoff und zeigte Issa einen anderen S.stoff. Da ich 
keine Hosen hatte, ging ich mit M. Salem zum Markt und kaufte mir Hosen. Danach 
kehrten wir zu Darin’s Haus zurueck. Dort habe ich mich umgezogen. M. Salem 
zeigte uns den Plan anhand der Skizze wieder. Mein Plan sah so aus, dass ich den  
S. Stoff am Ruecken trage verbunden mit einem Betriebknopf zwischen den Busen. 
Anhand einer Stromschnuer sollte ich den Betriebknopf  aufheben, und dies soll den 
Sprengstoff ausloesen.  
Ich moechte zeichnen, dass ich mich vor dem Fotografieren gereinigt habe und habe 
gebeten. Danach gab mir Darin eine kurzere Bluse, damit ich in Isarel nicht 
verdaechtigt aussehe und dass ich genau wie eine Israelin aussehe. Nachdem Issa 
und ich das Funkionieren des Sprenstoffes lernten und uns fotgrafieren liessen, 
verliessen wir das Haus gegen 12:30 Uhr. Dann fuhren wir, Issa, Mahmoud und ich 
mit Mitsubishe – Wagen, weisser Farbe zur Tankstelle in Bet Sahour. Als ich im 
Darin’s Haus waren, fragte ich Ali ob ich seinen Bruder Ahmad Mughrabe treffen 
kann. Ali verneinte, da sein Bruder von den israel. Sicherheitskraeften gesucht wird. 
An der Tankstelle traffen wir uns mit Ibrahim Sarahne. Sarahne war mit einer 
russischen Frau und einem einjaehrigen Maedchen. Die Frau hat  blondes Haar. 
Mahmoud Salem hat uns den Ibrahim vorgestellt und sagte, dass die Frau Ibrahim’s 
Frau ist. Ibrahim zeigte uns in dem Wagen eine Skizze, die auf den Anschlagsort 
hinweist und die dem uns vorher von M. Salem gezeigten Plan aehnlich aussieht. M. 
Salem gab mir ein Funkgeraet und erkaerte mir seine Bedienung. M. Salem sagte, 
dieses Geraet soll der Verbindung zw. den beiden Wagen dienen. Ibrahim sagte 
uns, er wird uns mitteilen, ob es Checkpoints auf dem Weg geben wuerde.  M.Salem 
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fragte Ibrahim, ob die gebrochene Lampe des Wagens uns keine Probleme machen 
koennte. Ibrahim verneinte dies. Issa und ich blieben in dem Mitsubishe. Ibrahim und 
seine Frau fuhren vor uns, damit sie uns den Weg zeigt. Auf dem Weg sagte mir 
Issa, dass die Frau nicht Ibrahim’s Frau ist, sondern seine Frau sieht anders aus. 
Auf dem ganzen Weg fuhr Ibrahim vor uns vor und weiste uns durch das Funkgeraet 
hin, ob wir rechts oder links fahren sollen. Alles haben wir durch das Funkgeraet 
bekommen. Waehrend der Fahrt fragte ich Ibrahim, wann werden wir ankommen 
und wo soll der Anschlagsort sein. Ibrahim antwortete, wir drei wissen das. Bis heute 
weiss ich nicht, was er gemeint hat. Issa fuhr die ganze Zeit schlecht, da er nicht gut 
fahren kann. Zusaetzlich waren keine guten Bremsen im Wagen. Auf dem Weg lies 
ich die Fahrschilder. Auf dem einen stand Ihud (israel. Kleinstadt- E.S.) Von dort 
fuhren wir nach Reschon Lezion. Bevor wir den Wagen anhalteten, sagte mir 
Ibrahim durch das F.geraet, schau mal rechts, und hier wird der Anschlag sein. Und 
er sagte Issa, schau mal links, und hier wird der Anschlag sein. Issa haltete den 
Wagen an, stiegen wir aus jeder mit dem geladenem Gepaeck und bereit fuer die 
Aktivierung. Ich ging zu meinem Ort und Issa ging zu dem fuer den Anschlag 
vorgesenen Ort. Auf dem Plan erschien nur ein Fuessgaengeruebergang, aber dort 
waren doch zwei. Ich stand allein neben einer Mauer und nachdachte, warum soll 
ich einen Selbstmordanschlag machen und das ist ein Selbstmord. Das Selbstmord 
ist verboten im Koran. Ich sah Menschen wie ich, und sie machten mir nicht 
schlechtes. Warum soll ich einen Selbstmordanschlag machen. 
Nachdem Ibrahim den Ort verlassen hat,  sprach ich mit ihm mit dem Funkgeraet 
und sagte ihm, dass ich bereue und ich meochte nichts machen. Ibrahim antwortete, 
dies ist nicht moeglich, du kannst nicht zuruecktreten und die Sache ist nicht in 
meinen Haenden. Ich fing an, ihn zu bitten, mich abzuholen, aber er lehnte es ab. 
Nachdem er aufgab, sagte er mir, er wird versuchen, mich mit Mahmoud Salem in 
Verbindung ze setzen. Nach fuenf Minuten sprach ich mit Mahmoud Salem und 
sagte ihm, dass ich zurueckkehren moechte. Er versuchte mich, zu ueberzeugen, 
dass nicht jeder zu diesem Stand ( Posten) kommt. Er sagte, ich soll an Gott 
glauben. Ich sagte, lass Gott beiseits und liess mich gehen. Alles geschah neben 
dem Wagen, mit dem wir kamen. Issa kam zu mir und sagte, er will nach Betlehem 
zurueck und nicht den Anschlag machen. Ich sagte ihm , dass ich auch nicht 
ueberzeugt bin, den Anschlag zu machen. Mahmoud und Ibrahim versuchten mir zu 
ertweichen und nicht mehr mit mir, sondern mit Issa zu sprechen. Ich sprach 
trotzdem mit Mahmoud, dass Ibrahim uns abholen  oder uns Fahrgeld geben soll. 
Issa und ich liessen die Sprengstoffladung herunter und stiegen in den Wagen ein. 
Wir forderten Ibrahim auf, zu kommen oder uns Geld zu geben. Nachdem Ibrahim 
feststellte, dass wir entschlossen sind, sprach mit uns Mahmoud, dass Ibrahim uns 
Fahrgeld geben wird. Issa und ich stiegen aus dem Wagen und fangen an, zu Fuss 
zu gehen und liessen wir die Sprengstoffladungen in dem Wagen. Gegen 16:30 Uhr 
kam Ibrahim zurueck und gab uns 500 Schekel. Ibrahim’s Frau sollte uns ein Taxi 
bestellen. Ibrahim und seine Frau sprachen auf Hebraeisch und sie machte mir Platz 
und ich stieg in den Wagen ein. Issa sagte, ich bleibe hier, um den Anschlag zu 
machen. Ibrahim gab Issa 200 Schekel, damit er Zigaretten und Essen vor dem 
Anschlag kauft. Ibrahim, seine Frau und ich fuhren fort, und Issa blieb dort. Auf dem 
Rueckweg, sagte mir Ibrahim, guck mal, da sind hier viele Menschen, und du wirst 
sicherlich bereuen, dass du den Anschlag nicht gemacht hast. Du wirst keine andere 
Chance haben, sagte er mir. Seine Faru sagte mir, du bist feige und du denkst nur 
an Ehemann und Familie. Ibrahim sagte, wir benoetigten zwei Wochen, den 
Anschlagsort zu suchen. Seine Frau sagte, du siehst hier doch viele Juden und du 
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magst sie nicht und du weisst auch nicht, was der Koran ueber das Paradies sagt. 
Sie sagte weiter auf Englisch, du bist feige. Im Gegesatz zu seiner Frau  redete 
Ibrahim mit mir herzlich, aber ich brachte ihn zum Verstummen. Ibrahim liess mich 
dann zwischen Bet Jalah und Alkhader gegen 18:00 Uhr abends aussteigen.  
Ibrahim gab mir das Handy und bat mich, mit Mahmoud zu  sprechen und ihm 
mitzuteilen, dass Alhaj’  ihm 5000 Schekel ueberweisen soll.   Ich kenne den Alhaj’ 
nicht, aber ich denke, er ist Ahmad Almughrabe. Ali und Mahmoud bestellten fuer 
mich ein Taxi. Der Treffpunkt mit dem Taxi war neben dem Friedhof von Alkhader. 
Von dort aus fuhren wir, Ali, Mahmoud und ich, zum Haus von Darin. Dort habe ich 
mich umgezogen. Ali und Mahmoud brachten mich nach Hause zurueck. 
Donnerstags abend schickte ich Ali eine Nachricht mit dem Handy, dass ich ihn im 
Darin’s Haus sehen moechte, damit ich ihm erklaere, warum ich den Anschlag nicht 
ausfuehrte. Ich moechte zeichnen, dass ich am Tag des Anschlages in den 
Nachrichten ueber den Anschlag gehoert habe. Bezueglich  Jadallah moechte ich 
klarmachen, dass ich doch wusste, dass er in dem Tand’im aktiv ist und seine 
Freunde in dem Tand’im Ahmad Mughrabe,  Ali Mughrabe, Mahmoud Salem und 
Mahmoud Mughrabe waren.  
Dies ist alles, was ich zu sagen habe.  
 
Ich las ihr den Inhalt ihrer Aussage, sie bestaetigte sie und  unterschrieb sie 
eigenhaendig. 
 
Zion Sasson 456566. 
 
Ich zeige dir hier zwei weisse Papiere geschrieben auf Arabisch. Kannst du sie 
erkennen. 
 
- Unterschrift - 
 
Ja, sie sind meine, mit meiner Handschrift. 
 
Ich zeichnete die beiden Papiere mit den ersten Buchstaben meines Namen Z. 
S.und Datum 29.5.2002.   
 
 
220 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
Works Cited 
 
1 "Al-Ra'is: 'Amaliyat Nitanya Juramat did Sha'buna.'" (The President: 
"Netanya Operation is a Crime against Our People"). 2005. al-Quds 
(Jerusalem). 1A. July 12.  
2 "Interviews from Gaza: Palestinian Options under Siege," Middle East 
Policy, Dec. 2002, p. 118. 
3 “Without Distinction: Attacks on Civilians by Palestinian Armed 
Groups”; Amnesty International, July 2002 
4 Abadie, Alberto. 2004. Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of 
Terrorism. American Economic Review 96 (2): 50–56. 
5 Abrahms, M. 2004. Are terrorists really rational? The Palestinian 
example. Orbis 48(3) 533–549. 
6 AFP, Jan. 23, 2003. 
7 Agence France-Presse (AFP), Dec. 10, 2002. 
8 Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings, Donnan, eds: Islam, Globalization and 
Postmodernity: 1994, Routledge 
9 Ali, Tariq. The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and 
Modernity. New York, Verso, 2002. 342 p. 
10 Allen, Lori (2002) “There Are Many Reasons Why: Suicide Bombers 
and Martyrs in Palestine.” Middle East Report. No. 223. Vol. 32. pp. 34-37. 
11 al-Quds (Jerusalem). 2000-2005. Jerusalem.  
12 al-Quds al-'Arabi (Arab Jerusalem). 2000-2005. London.  
13 Al-Shuaibi, Issa (1980) The Development of Palestinian Entity-
Consciousness: Part II. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2. pp. 50-70. 
14 Andoni, Lamis (1997) "Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide 
Bombers." Journal of Palestinian Studies. XXVI (4): 33-45. 
15 AP, Dec. 27, 2002. 
16 AP, Feb. 6, 2003. 
17 AP, Feb. 7, 2003. 
18 AP, Jan. 22, 2003. 
19 Arafat, Yassir (1982) "A Discussion With Yassir Arafat" Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 3-15 
221 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
20 Arian, Asher. 2001. "Israeli Public Opinion in the Wake of the 2000-
2001 Intifada." Strategic Assessment 4(2). Accessed May 15, 2005 at: 
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v4n2p.Ari.html.  
21 Assaf, Moghadam. Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism March 2003. Available online at: 
http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9331054&db=aph 
22 Atran, Scott (2003) "Who Wants to Be a Martyr?" Op-Ed. The New 
York Times. May 5. 
23 Atran, Scott. Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science March 7, 2003. 
Available online at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9355002&db=aph 
24 Atran, Scott. Mishandling Suicide Terrorism. Washington Quarterly. 
Available online at: 
http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?sid=D86BC040-81BA-45DD-
BD1D-9394CAF63E16&ttype=6&tid=13782&mlid=301 
25 B’tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories. http://www.btselem.org/index.asp. 
26 Babbie, Earl. 2001. The Practice of Social Research. 9th ed. Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Thompson Learning. 
27 Bandura, A. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral 
control. Journal of Social Issues, 46, 27-47. 
28 Bar-Tal, D. (1998). The rocky road toward peace. Societal beliefs 
functional to intractable conflict in the Israel school textbooks. Journal of Peace 
Research, 35, 723-742. 
29 Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2004. The Necessity of Observing Real Life Situations: 
Palestinian-Israeli Violence as a Laboratory for Learning about Social 
Behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology 34 (6): 677–701. 
30 Bennis, Phyllis: Before & After – US Foreign Policy and the September 
11th Crisis: 2003, Olive Branch Press 
31 Berko, Anat. 2004. On the Way to Heaven – The World of Suicide 
Terrorists and Their Conveyors (in Hebrew). Yedi‘ot Aharonot: Hemed Books. 
32 Berko, Anat. The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicide 
Terrorism: An Analysis in Terms of Moral Judgment International Policy 
222 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism - ICT May 15, 2004. Available online at: 
http://www.ict.org.il 
33 Berman, E. & Laitin, D.D. (in press). Rational martyrs: Evidence from 
data on suicide attacks. In E.M. Meyersson-Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions 
and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
34 Berman, E., D. Laitin. 2006. Hard targets: Theory and evidence on 
suicide attacks. E. M. Milgrom, ed. Suicide Bombing from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
35 Bernhardt, P.C. (1997). Influences of serotonin and testosterone in 
aggression and dominance: Convergence with social psychology. Current 
Directions in Psychology, 6, 44-48. 
36 Beyler, Clara. Chronology of Suicide Bombings Carried out by Women 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism - ICT February 12, 2003. 
Available online at: http://www.ict.org.il 
37 Beyler, Clara. Messengers of Death: Female Suicide Bombers 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism - ICT February 12, 2003. 
Available online at: http://www.ict.org.il 
38 Bond, Michael. The Making of a Suicide Bomber. New Scientist 
182:34-37 May 15, 2004. 
39 Brooks, D. (2002). The Culture of Martyrdom: How suicide bombing 
became not just a  
40 Brym, Robert J., and Bader Araj. 2006. "Palestinian Suicide Bombing 
Revisited: A Critique of the Outbidding Thesis." Unpublished paper, 
Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.  
41 Butler, Linda (2002) "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair and the Need 
for Hope. An Interview with Eyad el Sarraj." Journal of Palestinian Studies. 
31(4):71-76. 
42 Chandler, M. (1978). Adolescence, Egocentrism and Epistemological 
Loneliness. In B. Presseisen, D. Goldstein & M. Appel (Eds.) Topics in 
Cognitive Development. Language and Operational Thought. New York: 
Plenum. 
43 Cohen, Richard. 2002. “Palestinian Suicide Signal Desperation, 
Irrationality.” Washington Post 
223 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
44 Combs, Cindy C.: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, 3rd edition: 
2003, Pearson Education, Inc. 
45 Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference. Herzliya, 
Israel, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2001. 160 p. Held 
February 20-23, 2000, Herzliya, Israel. 
46 Crayton, J. W. (1983). Terrorism and Psychology of the Self. L. Z. 
Freedman, & Y. Alexander (Eds), Perspectives on Terrorism ( pp. 33-41). 
Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources. 
47 Crenshaw, M. (1985). An organizational approach to the analysis of 
political terrorism . Orbis. 29(3):465-489. 
48 Crenshaw, M. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In M.G. 
Hermann (Ed.) Political psychology: contemporary problems and issues 
(pp.379-413). London: Josey-Bass.  
49 Crenshaw, Martha. 1990. The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour 
as a Product of Strategic Choice. In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, 
Ideologies, Theologies and States of Mind, ed. W. Reich, 192–207. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
50 Crenshaw, Martha. 1995. Terrorism in Context. Melrose Park: 
Pennsylvania State University. 
51 Crenshaw, Martha. 2000. The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for 
the 21st Century. Political Psychology 21:405–20. 
52 Creswell, John W.: Research Design: Qualitative & Quantative 
Approaches: 1994, Sage Publications, Inc.  
53 Davis, Joyce M. 2003. Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in 
the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan.  
54 Dor, D. 2001. Newspaper Under the Influence (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: 
Babel. 
55 Durkheim, Emile. 1953. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. London: 
Routledge. 
56 Elster, Jon. 2005. "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions." Pp. 
233-58. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Diego Gambetta, editor. Oxford 
University Press.  
224 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
57 Entman, M. Robert. 1991. Symposium Framing U. S. Coverage of 
International News: Contrasts in Narratives of KAL and Iran Air Incidents. The 
Journal of Communication 41:6–27. 
58 Ergil, Dogu. 2000. Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: The Workers’ Party of 
Kurdistan. Paper presented at “Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International 
Conference,” in Herzliya, Israel (International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism). 
59 Erikson, E.H. (1968). Identity: Youth and Crisis. NewYork: Norton. 
60 Eshel, David. Israel Reviews Profile of Suicide Bombers. Jane's 
Intelligence Review 13:20-21 November 2001.  
61 Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and 
Prospects for the 21st Century, edited with a foreword by Harvey W. Kushner. 
Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 2002. 399 p. 
62 Friedkin, N.E. (in press). The interpersonal influence systems and 
organized suicides of death cults. In E.M. Meyersson-Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide 
Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
63 Ganor, B. 2005. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision 
Makers. IDC, Herzliya, Israel. 
64 Ganor, Boaz, "Hamas—The Islamic Resistance Movement in the 
Territories," Survey of Arab Affairs, Feb. 2, 1992, p. 5. 
65 Ganor, Bohaz. 2000. Suicide Terrorism: An Overview. In Countering 
Suicide Terrorism, 134–45. Herzlia: ICT. 
66 Gill, Paul: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing159 IJCV 
: Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 
67 Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point. Little, Brown and Company: 
New York. 
68 Goldenberg, Suzanne; “Behind the suicide bombers”; The Age, June 
20, 2002 
69 Griset, Pamala L. and Mahan, Sue. Terrorism in Perspective. 
Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 2003. 391 p. 
70 Gunaratna, Rohan. Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat.  Jane's 
Intelligence Review 12:52-55 April 2000.  
225 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
71 Gupta, Dipak K. (1990) Economics of Political Violence: The Effects of 
Political Instability of Economic Growth. Westport, CT.: Praeger. 
72 Gupta, Dipak, and Kusum Mundra. 2005. Suicide Bombing as a 
Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
Terrorism and Political Violence 17:573–98. 
73 Gupta, Dipak. 2004. Exploring Roots of Terrorism. In Root Causes of 
Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. T. Bjorgo, 16–33 London: 
Routledge. 
74 Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press.  
75 Ha’aretz. http://www.haaretz.co.il. 
76 Ha'aretz (English), Jan. 30, 2003. 
77 Ha'aretz (English), Oct. 15, 2000. 
78 Ha'aretz, (English) Jan. 3, 2003. 
79 Ha'aretz, (English), Oct. 11, 2002. 
80 Haddad, Simon. 2004. A Comparative Study of Lebanese and 
Palestinian Perceptions of Suicide Bombings: The Role of Militant Islam and 
Socio-economic Status. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 45 (5): 
337–63. 
81 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006a. Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the 
Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and 
Illustrative Case Study. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2): 165–85. 
82 Hafez, Mohammed. 2006b. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making 
of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 
83 Harrison, Mark; “The Economic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”; University 
of Warwick, 11 June 2001 
84 Hassan, Nasra (2001) "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers." 
The New Yorker, November 
85 Hassan, Nasra. 2001. An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the Human 
Bombs. The New Yorker, November 19. 
86 Hecht, Richard D. Deadly History, Deadly Actions, and Deadly Bodies: 
A Response to Ivan Strenski's 'Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim 
"Human Bombers."' Terrorism and Political Violence 15:35-47 Autumn 2003.  
87 Hoffman, Bruce and McCormick, Gordon H. Terrorism, Signaling, and 
Suicide Attack. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27:243-281 July-August 2004.  
226 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
88 Hoffman, Bruce. The Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Atlantic Monthly June 
2003. Available online at: 
http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=9730945&db=aph 
89 Hoffman, Bruce: Inside Terrorism: 1998, Columbia University Press 
90 Horgan, John. 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London: Routledge. 
91 Horowitz, Donald L. (1990) "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative 
Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management." In Joseph V. Montville (ed.) Conflict 
and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books; 
451-476. 
92 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2468 
93 Huband, Mark (1998) Warriors of the Prophet. Boulder, CO.: Westview 
Press. 
94 Hudson, Michael C. (1972) "Developments and Setbacks in Palestinian 
Resistance Movement, 1967-71." Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3. 
(Spring, 1972), pp. 64-84. 
95 Human Rights Watch. 2002. Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing 
Attacks Against Israeli Civilians. New York: Human Rights Watch. 
96 Iannaccone, L.R. (in press). The market for martyrs. In E.M. Meyerson-
Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary 
Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
97 International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT). 
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/intnl_attacksearch_frame.htm. Herzlia, Israel 
98 International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the 
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya: Countering Suicide Terrorism: 2002, Anti-
Defamation League 
99 Israel Defense Forces. 
http://www1.idf.il/dover/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=22&docid=37572.EN. 
100 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+V
iolence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm. 
101 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2004. "Palestinian Violence and 
Terrorism since September 2000." Accessed Nov. 1, 2004 at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to 
227 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/PalestinianviolenceandterrorismsinceS
eptember 
102 Israeli, Raphael. A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political Violence 14:23-40 Winter 2002.  
103 Israeli, Raphael. Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology. 
Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 2003. 494 p. 
104 Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television 
Frames Political Issues. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
105 Jaber, Hala: Hezbollah – Born with a Vengeance: 1997, Columbia 
University Press 
106 Jansen, Michael E.: The United States and the Palestinian People: 
1970, Institute for Palestine Studies 
107 Jarbawi, Ali (1996) "Palestinian Politics At A Crossroad." Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4. (pp. 29-39. 
108 Jasso, G. & Meyersson Milgrom, E.M.  (in press). Identity, social 
distance and Palestinian support for the road map. In E.M. Meyersson-Milgrom 
(Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary 
Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
109 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, http://www.jmcc.org 
(accessed August 18, 2007). 
110 Johnson, P. W. and Feldman, T. B. (1992). Personality types and 
terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives . Forensic Reports . 5(4):293-303.  
111 Johnston, William Robert. 2003. "Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in 
Israel, Part IV: 1993-2000." Accessed Oct. 25, 2004 at: 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terrisrael-4.html.  
112 Jones, A. (1986). Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major 
Works. (Pp. 82-114). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 
113 Jubran, Michel and Drake, Laura, "The Islamic Fundamentalist 
Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," Middle East Policy, Spring 1993, 
p. 6. 
114 Juergensmeyer, Mark: Terror in the Mind of God – The Global Rise of 
Religious Violence: 2000, University of California Press 
115 Kalman, Matthew. 2002. “Isreal Forced to Revise 'Suicider" Profile.” 
USA Today :A 11. 
228 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
116 Kalyvas, Stathis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. 2005. In Making 
Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. D. Gambetta, 209–32. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
117 Kaplan, E., A. Mintz, S. Mishal, C. Samban. 2005. What happened to 
suicide bombings in Israel? Insights from a terror stock model. Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 28(3) 225–235. 
118 Karmon, Ely, "Hamas’ Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and 
Political Restraints," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Mar. 2000, p. 
1. 
119 Keohane, N. O., R. J. Zeckhauser. 2003. The ecology of terror 
defense. J. Risk Uncertainty 26(2–3) 201–229. 
120 Khalaf, Roula. 2001. Arafat’s Options Limited in Dealing with Hamas. 
The Financial Times, June 5. 
121 Kimhi, Shaul, and Shemuel Even. 2004. Who are the Palestinian 
Suicide Bombers? Terrorism and Political Violence 16:815–40. 
122 Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development. The psychology of 
moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers. 
123 Kondaki, Christopher. Suicide Terrorism, an Age-Old Weapon, Adds 
Technology. Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 29:8-9 2001.  
124 Korn, A. 2004. Reporting Palestinian Casualties in the Israeli Press: 
The Case of Ha’aretz and the Intifada. Journalism Studies 5:247–62. 
125 Krueger, A.B. and Laitin, D.D. (in press). Kto Kogo? : A cross-country 
study of the origins and targets of terrorism. In E.M. Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) 
Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
126 Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova (2002). "Does Poverty Cause 
Terrorism? The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers." The New 
Republic: 27-35. 
127 Kruglanski, A.W., Raviv, A. , Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Ellis, S., Bar, R., 
Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L. (in press).  Says Who?: Epistemic Authority Effects in 
Social Judgment. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social  
Psychology, Vol., 37. 
128 Kruglanski, Arie and Golec, Agnieszka, “Individual Motivations, The 
Group Process and Organizational Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” in E.M. 
229 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A 
Multidisciplinary Approach. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press  
129 Kurz, Anat and Tal, Nahman, Hamas: Radical Islam in a National 
Struggle (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1997), memorandum 
no. 48, p. 28. 
130 Lapidus, Ira M.: A History of Islamic Societies: 1988 Cambridge 
University Press 
131 Laqueur, Walter (2001) A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, N. J.: 
Transaction Books. 
132 Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First 
Century. New York, Continuum, 2003. 288 p. 
133 Lelyveld, Joseph; “All Suicide Bombers are not Alike”; New York Times 
Magazine, October 28, 2001  
134 Lester, David, Bijou Yang, and Mark Lindsay. 2004. Suicide Bombers: 
Are Psychological Profiles Possible? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27:283–
95. 
135 Lewis, Bernard. 2002. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle 
East Response. Oxford University Press.  
136 Lichbach, Mark. 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of 
Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent." Journal of Conflict Resolution 
31: 266-97.  
137 Luft, Gal. The Palestinian H-Bomb. Foreign Affairs 81:2-8 July-August 
2002. 
138 Mansdorf, Irwin J. The Psychological Framework of Suicide Terrorism 
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. April 15, 2003. Available online at: 
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp496.htm  
139 Margalit, Avishai. 2003. "The Suicide Bombers." New York Review of 
Books 50(1):36-39.  
140 Martyrdom and Murder. Economist January 10, 2004. Available online 
at: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=11908940&db=aph 
141 Merari, A. (1990). The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in 
the Middle East. In W. Reich (Ed.). Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, 
ideologies, theologies, states of mind. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, pp. 192-210. 
230 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
142 Merari, A. (2002). Personal electronic communication. January 09, 
2002. 
143 Merari, A. 1990. The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the 
Middle East. W. Reich, ed. Origins of Terrorism. Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 192–210. 
144 Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental 
View: Harper & Row. 
145 Mintz, A., S. Mishal, C. Samban. 2004. Suicide Bombings in Israel. 
Data set. United Nations Studies, Yale University, and the Program in Foreign 
Policy Decision Making, Texas A&M University. 
146 Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, 
Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 
160. 
147 Mishal, Shaul and Sela, Avraham: The Palestinian Hamas – Vision, 
Violence and Coexistence: 2000, Columbia University Press 
148 Moghadam, Assaf. Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 26:65-92 March-April 2003.  
149 Moore, Dahlia. 2003. "Perceptions of Sense of Control, Relative 
Deprivation, and Expectations of Young Jews and Palestinians in Israel." 
Journal of Social Psychology 143:521-40.  
150 Moore, Will. (1998) "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, 
and Timing." American Journal of Political Science, 42 (3), 851-73. 
151 Nasara, Hassan. 2001. An Arsenal of Believers. The New Yorker, 
November 6. 
152 Nassar, Jamal R. (1991) The Palestine Liberation Organization : from 
armed struggle to the Declaration of Independence. New York: Praeger. 
153 National Center for Policy Analysis - Daily Policy Digest . Suicide 
Terrorists. Available online at: 
http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/pd091201e.html 
154 Nofal, Mamdouth, et al. (1998) "Refelections on Al-Nakba" Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1. pp. 5-35. 
231 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
155 Oliver, Anne Marie, and Paul Steinberg. 2005. The Road to Martyrs' 
Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber. Oxford University 
Press.  
156 Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
157 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, www.pcpsr.org 
(accessed August 18, 2007). 
158 Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group. http://www.phrmg.org 
159 Palestinian Information Center. http://palestine-info.info/index.html 
160 Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism. Random House.  
161 Pape, Robert A. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American 
Political Science Review 97:343-362 August 2003. 
162 Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger. 2006. The Changing Nature of 
Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective. Social Forces 84 (4): 1987–
2008. 
163 Pedahzur, Ami, Arie Perliger, and Leonard Weinberg. 2003. Altruism 
and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists. Deviant 
Behavior 24:405–23. 
164 Pedahzur, Ami. 2004. Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide 
Terrorism: A Comment. Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (4): 841–44. 
165 Pedahzur, Ami. 2005. Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity. 
166 Peretz, Don: Intifada – the Palestinian Uprising: 1990, Westview Press 
167 Perina, Kaja. Suicide Terrorism. Psychology Today September-
October 2002. Available online at: 
http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=7146151&db=aph 
168 Pipes, Daniel. 2005. Despair and Hopelessness Do Not Motivate 
Suicide Bombers. In What Motivates Suicide Bombers?, ed. L. Friedman, 19–
23. Michigan: Greenhaven. 
169 Pipes, Daniel. The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism. National Interest 
Summer 1986. Available online at: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175  
170 Post, J.M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a 
product of psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.) Origins of terrorism: 
232 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp.25-40). New York: 
Cambridge University press.  
171 Post, Jerrold, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny. 2005. The Terrorists 
in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15 (1): 171–84. 
172 Post, Jerrold. (15 November, 2001). The Mind Of The Terrorist: 
Individual And Group Psychology Of Terrorist Behavior. Testimony prepared 
for Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Armed 
Services Committee. 
173 Prusher, Ilene. 2005. Despair and Hopelessness Motivate Suicide 
Bombers. In What Motivates Suicide Bombers?, ed. L. Friedman, 24–33. 
Michigan: Greenhaven. 
174 Pulido, Villamarín and Luis Alberto (1996) The FARC Cartel S.l. : 
Ediciones el Faraón. 
175 Radlauer, Dan (2002) "An Engineered Tragedy: Statistical Analysis of 
Casualties in Palestinian_Israeli Conflict Sepetember 2000- September 2002." 
ICT (June 24), http://www.ict.org.il/. 
176 Reich, Walter, ed.: Origins of Terrorism – Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind: 1998, Woodrow Wilson Center Press 
177 Reuter, Christoph: Mein Leben ist eine Waffe – Selbstmordattentaeter, 
Psychogramm eines Phaenomens: 2002, C. Bertelsmann Verlag 
178 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who 
Becomes a Terrorist and Why? (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal 
Research Division, 1999). 
179 Ricolfi, Luca. 2005. "Palestinians, 1981-2003." Pp. 77-129. Making 
Sense of Suicide Missions. Diego Gambetta, editor. Oxford University Press.  
180 Robinson, Glenn E., Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete 
Revolution (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 
169. 
181 Rosenthal, R. (in press). Suicide bombing: What is the answer? In 
E.M. Meyersson-Milgrom (Ed.) Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A 
Multidisciplinary  
182 Roy, Sara (2003) "Hamas and the Transformation(s) of Political Islam 
in Palestine." Current History. No. 660. Vol. 102. pp. 13-20. 
233 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
183 Sabbah, Raid: Der Tod ist ein Geschenk – die Geschichte eines 
Selbstmordattentaeters: 2002, Droemersche Verlagsanstalt 
184 Sageman, Marc. 2005. Understanding Terror Networks. Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
185 Said, Edward W. (1979) The Question of Palestine. New York: Times 
Books. 
186 Sarraj, Eyad (2002) "Why We Blow Ourselves Up." Time Magazine. 
35-42. 
187 Sarraj, Eyad. Why We Have Become Suicide Bombers: Understanding 
Palestinian Terror. Mission Islam. Available online at: 
http://www.missionislam.com/conissues/palestine.htm  
188 Schechter, Erik. 2004. Where Have All the Bombers Gone? Jerusalem 
Post, August 6. 
189 Schenker, David, "Palestinian Fictions—Yasser Arafat Stands Alone as 
the Undisputed Leader of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians," 
World and I, Nov. 2001, p. 26. 
190 Schiff, Ze'ev and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—
Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 239. 
191 Schlesinger, P. Philip. 1991. Media, State and Nation: Political 
Violence and Collective Identities. London: Sage. 
192 Schmid, Alex P. and Janny de Graaf. 1982. Violence as 
communication: insurgent terrorism and the western news media. Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
193 Schweitzer, Yoram. Suicide Bombings -The Ultimate Weapon? 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism - ICT.  August 7, 2001. 
Available online at: http://www.ict.org.il 
194 Schweitzer, Yoram: “Suicide Terrorism: Development & 
Characteristics”; ICT,  April 21, 2000 
195 Sela, Avraham and Moshe Ma'oz (eds. 1997) The PLO and Israel: 
From Armed Conflict to Political Solution 1964-1994. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
196 Selegut, Charles. Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence. 
Walnut Creek, CA, AltaMira Press, 2003. 269 p. 
234 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
197 Shahak, Israel and Mezvinsky, Norton: Jewish Fundamentalism in 
Israel: 1999, Pluto Press 
198 Shay, Shaul, and Yoram Schweitzer. 2002. The Al-Aqsa Intifada: 
Palestinian-Israeli Confrontation. 
http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=5363&str=shau
l%20shay. 
199 Shuman, Ellis. What Makes Suicide Bombers Tick?  Israelinsider.com. 
Available online at: 
http://www.israelinsider.com/channels/security/articles/sec_0049.htm  
200 Silke, Andrew. 2003. Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological 
Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences. West Sussex: Wiley. 
201 Simon, Steven and Stevenson, Jonathan. Confronting Hamas.  
National Interest 74:59-69 Winter 2003-04. Also available online at: 
http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=11960983&db=aph  
202 Smith, Charles (2001) Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New 
York: St. Martin's Press 
203 Soibelman, Mali. 2004. Palestinian Suicide Bombers. Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 1:175–90. 
204 Sprinzak, Ehud. 2000. Rational Fanatics. Foreign Policy 120:66–73. 
205 Sprinzak, Enud. Outsmarting Suicide Terrorists.  Christian Science 
Monitor October 24, 2000. Available online at: http://csmonitor.com/cgi-
bin/durableRedirect.pl?/durable/2000/10/24/fp9s1-csm.shtml  
206 Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious 
Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins. 
207 Stork, Joe. Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against 
Israeli Civilians. New York, Human Rights Watch, 2002. 160 p. 
208 Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,” in E.M. Meyersson Milgrom (Ed.) 
Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs, A Multidisciplinary Approach. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press  
209 Strenski, Ivan. Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim "Human 
Bombers."  Terrorism and Political Violence 15:1-34 Autumn 2003.  
210 Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat Jane's Intelligence Review October 
20, 2000. Available online at: 
235 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir001020_1
_n.shtml  
211 Suicide Terrorism: an Overview International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism -ICT February 15, 2000. Available online at: 
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=128 
212 Sweeny, George. 1993. “Self-Immolation in Ireland: Hunger Strikes 
and Political Confrontation.” 
213 Telhami, Shibely. 2002. Why Suicide Terrorism Takes Root. The New 
York Times, April 4. 
214 Tessler, Mark, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 721. 
215 The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 11, 2002. 
216 The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 6, 2002. 
217 The Jerusalem Times, Dec. 19, 2002. 
218 Tilly, Charles. 2005. Terror as Strategy and Relational Process. 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46 (1): 11–32. 
219 Top Hamas Official Brands Marwan Barghouti a Traitor," IDF 
spokesman, Sept. 20, 2002, at http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/030.stm. 
220 Van Biema, David. Why the Bombers Keep Coming. Time Atlantic 
December 17, 2001. Available online at: 
http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=5717911&db=aph 
221 Victor, Barbara. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian 
Women Suicide Bombers, foreword by Christopher Dickey. Emmaus, PA, 
Rodale, 2003. 300 p. 
222 Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. The Mind of a Terrorist: A Review and Critique of 
Psychological Approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 3–42. 
223 Weinburg, Leonard, and Ami Pedahzur. 2003. Political Parties and 
Terrorist Groups. London: Routledge. 
224 Wilkinson, Paul (2001) “Response to Terrorism from the Toolbox of 
Liberal Democracies: Their Applicability to Other Types of Regimes.” In 
Countering Terrorism Through International Cooperation. Proceedings of the 
International Conference on “Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced 
International Cooperation.” Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, pp: 206-213. 
225 William Reich, 192–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
236 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Works Cited 
226 Wittkopf, Eugene R., ed.: The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2nd 
edition: 1994, St. Martin’s Press  
227 Wolfson, Adam. Demystify It: How to Defeat Suicide Terrorism 
National Review Online September 16, 2003. Available online at: 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-wolfson091603.asp 
228 www.ict.org.il/arab_isr/mideast_attacksearch_frame.htm. 
229 Yaffeh, Aaron. 2003. Jihad in the Name of Allah – Female Terrorists in 
Service of the Intifada (in Hebrew). Hed Hamakhar 27:4–7. 
230 Yaniv, Avner: Dilemmas of Security – Politics, Strategy and the Israeli 
Experience in Lebanon: 1987, Oxford University Press 
237 
Lydia Wazir-Staubmann 2009 
Abstract 
Abstract 
 
Title: Explaining Palestinian Suicide Bombings from an Organizational 
Perspective: The (In)Effectiveness of Suicide Bombings as 
Organizational Strategy in the Palestinian Struggle with Israel from 
1993 to 2008. 
 
 
Submitted by: Lydia Wazir-Staubmann, Dr.Phil, 2009 
 
Directed by:  Dr. John Bunzl, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna 
 
Using human life as a weapon is often presented as a manifestation of 
Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism. In fact, however, studies by various scholars 
such as Ariel Merari, Robert Pape and Nasra Hassan as well as recent surveys have 
shown that the suicide attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are linked more to 
politics than to religion. What motivated the various Palestinian organizations to use 
suicide attacks? Although religion does not play as large a role as it is normally 
accorded, it was used effectively by the Palestinian Islamic groups Hamas and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad to recruit suicide attackers and to raise operational funds. 
But the leadership of these organizations had a secular goal: to force the Israeli 
government to change its policies and to withdraw from the Palestinian territories. 
Contrary to belief that the suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, in fact they are 
not:  the suicide attacks followed a strategic logic designed to coerce the Israeli 
government into making political and territorial concessions and to assert their power 
within the Palestinian political arena.  
To understand why suicide attacks are used, the focus should be on 
situational and political factors. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these 
include the Palestinian’s collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience 
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and a pervasive sense of social humiliations vis-a-vis the Israeli occupational power. 
The valid logic behind the use of suicide attacks is that they are an effective weapon 
for an inferior force fighting a greater or great power. Groups using such attacks are 
playing for strategic stakes and for victory, not mere destruction. The purpose of this 
research paper is to examine how effective the Palestinian groups were in achieving 
their goals by using the method of suicide bombings. What caused the suicide 
bombings to increase in number? What caused them to subside altogether?  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Titel: Zur Erklärung Palästinensischer Selbstmordattentate aus Sicht der sie 
ausführenden Organisationen: Die (In-)Effizienz von 
Selbstmordattentaten als Strategie von Organisationen im 
palästinensischen Kampf mit Israel von 1993 bis 2008. 
 
 
Eingereicht von: Lydia Wazir-Staubmann, Dr.Phil, 2009 
 
Betreuer:  Univ.-Doz. Dr. John Bunzl, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien 
 
Der Einsatz von Menschen als Waffen wird oft als Ausdruck von islamischem 
Fundamentalismus oder Fanatismus angesehen. Entgegen dieser Annahme 
belegen diverse wissenschaftliche Studien von Ariel Merari, Robert Pape und Nasra 
Hassan, sowie aktuelle Untersuchungen, dass Selbstmordattentate im Konflikt 
zwischen Israel und Palästina eher auf politische Hintergründe verweisen, als auf 
religiöse. Was waren die Motive verschiedener palästinensischer Organisationen, 
Selbstmordattentate auszuführen? Obwohl Religion keine so große Rolle spielt, wie 
bisher angenommen, wurde sie erfolgreich von den palästinensischen Gruppen 
„Hamas“ und „Palästinensischer Islamischer Jihad“ verwendet, um künftige 
Selbstmordattentäter zu werben und Mittel zu akquirieren. Aber die 
Führungsverantwortlichen dieser Organisationen verfolgen säkulare Ziele: Israel zu 
zwingen, seine Politik zu ändern und sich aus den palästinensischen Gebieten 
zurück zu ziehen sowie sich innerhalb der Palästinensischen politischen Arena zu 
behaupten. Entgegen der Vermutung, Selbstmordattentäter wären irrational oder 
fanatisch, sind sie das keineswegs: die Selbstmordanschläge verfolgen die 
Strategie, Israel zu politischen und territorialen Zugeständnissen zu veranlassen. 
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Um zu verstehen, warum gerade Selbstmordattentate dafür eingesetzt werden, 
sollte der Blick auf die situationsbezogenen und politischen Faktoren gelenkt 
werden. Im Falle des israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikts bedeutet dies das 
kollektive Empfinden historischer Ungerechtigkeit auf Seiten der Palästinenser, 
politische Instrumentalisierung und eine tiefe Empfindung der Demütigung durch die 
israelischen Besatzer. Die Logik hinter dem Einsatz von Selbstmordattentaten 
besteht darin, dass diese eine effiziente Waffe einer unterlegenen Macht im Kampf 
gegen einen stärkeren Gegner sind. Gruppierungen, die solche Attacken verwenden, 
verfolgen ein strategisches Ziel und sind an einem Sieg interessiert, nicht an purer 
Zerstörung. Ziel dieser Doktorarbeit ist es zu überprüfen, wie erfolgreich 
palästinensische Gruppen beim Erreichen ihrer Ziele mittels Selbstmordanschlägen 
sind. Warum ist die Zahl dieser Attentate angestiegen? Was veranlasste ihren 
Rückgang? 
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